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ABSTRACT
Research into cybersecurity risks and various methods of evaluating those threats has
become an increasingly important area of academic and practitioner investigations. Of particular
interest in this field is enhancing the designs and informing capabilities of cybersecurity risk
management solutions for users who desire to understand how organizations are impacted when
such risks are exploited. Many of the cybersecurity risk management solutions are extremely
technical and require their users to have a commensurate level of technical acumen. In the
situation evaluated during this research project, the founders of the company being researched
had created a highly technical risk management solution composed of sophisticated networking
and cryptography components. The company’s management team, on the other hand, had very
little cybersecurity industry background but needed to effectively communicate the specialized
capabilities of the solution to potential customers and business partners in an understandable
way. In this case, improving the company’s solution design to better convey its technical
foundation both inside and outside the company was required. Design Science Research (DSR)
offers a methodology that was created to help analyze, create, and evaluate design artifacts that
can identify useful ways to work through technical challenges such as those faced by the
company. The Elaborated Action Design Research (eADR) methodology can be used to further
improve design artifacts through an iterative process that is easily understood by practitioners
and academics and grounded in theory. When DSR and eADR methodologies are used together,
the result is the creation and demonstration of informing artifacts which will address technical
v

cybersecurity risk evaluation and communication issues. This research project contains a case
study, an accompanying technical note, and two research papers which will address research
questions informed by the DSR methodology process in response to related communication and
compliance issues noted in the cybersecurity risk management problem space.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
This research project is motivated by the need for better informing capabilities in current
cybersecurity risk management solutions. Cybersecurity practitioners have faced challenges in
finding effective ways to communicate the impacts of technology risks for years. The rapid
growth in the numbers and types of cyber risks have made these challenges even more
formidable. Designing cybersecurity solutions that can bridge the knowledge and information
gaps between industry practitioners and stakeholders who need to understand and act on these
risks is now a high priority for many organizations, including nation-states. Exacerbating this
issue is the increasing business and contractual requirement for such solutions to comply with
cybersecurity standards such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology
Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF).
The research approach and design for this dissertation project will incorporate several
different qualitative methods including case study, Design Science Research (DSR) and
Elaborated Action Design Research (eADR). Four research papers have been written during this
project that show the iterative nature of analyzing the design of a cybersecurity solution, building
design artifacts to increase the solution’s informing capabilities related to cybersecurity risks,
and evaluating the utility of those artifacts with cybersecurity practitioners to determine how the
artifacts affect the ability to better understand the impacts of cybersecurity risks.
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The primary goal of this research project is to describe or explain the internal and
external effects that cybersecurity risks have on organizations. This will be accomplished by
creating a conceptual model that can assist IT security practitioners to successfully communicate
cybersecurity control interactions in their organizations, based on the NIST CSF framework and
findings from this study. To accomplish these goals, the research activities will focus on
answering the following questions:


What is a conceptual model that can be constructed to identify key IT security risks that a
company must address? – Explanatory Question



What are cybersecurity risk management evaluation mechanisms that can be utilized to
inform a company of the effective implementation of its cybersecurity controls? –
Explanatory Question
This conceptual model and control evaluation mechanisms are then assessed to determine

their utility as used to design a maturity measurement framework for organizations. They can
demonstrate how they manage and communicate the company’s ability to mitigate IT security
risks as part of their overall risk management processes.
The motivation for this research project is discussed in the third and fourth papers in a
separate section that considers related academic literature that either articulated prior work on the
research problem or provided a detailed depiction of cybersecurity problem spaces and relevant
evidence supporting the investigation. These sections covered findings in the current research
and gaps in academic literature that inform the research problem. Following the research
motivation, the initial design artifact requirements are analyzed. The requirements are used to
build the artifact based on the DSR methodology. Each artifact was iteratively documented and
then discussed by internal participants and cybersecurity Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to
2

determine its ability to inform those contributors. The research goal of the DSR methodology is
to design an artifact that exhibits utility in practice, addresses the research question being
studied, and uses a methodology that demonstrates rigorous research principles. The final section
of the dissertation project addresses the evaluation of the DSR artifacts through the lens of a
fitness-utility model proposed for use by both academics and practitioners (Gill & Hevner,
2011).
The first paper, titled “Implementing a Cybersecurity Community of Trust: Reprivata
Seeks an “Early Adopter,”” utilized the case study methodology (Gill, 2011) to inform on
specific design gaps identified in the launch of a cybersecurity risk management solution. The
second paper, a technical note (Gill, 2011) on cybersecurity problem spaces titled “A Note on the
Cybersecurity Problem Spaces in 2018,” performed a review of current literature on the
cybersecurity challenges facing businesses, governments, and other entities. The third paper,
titled “Evaluating and Enhancing the Risk Informing Capabilities of a Cybersecurity Risk
Management Solution Using Action Design Research,” detailed the interactions with the
cybersecurity risk management solutions company to analyze and build design artifacts in an
iterative fashion that would close the gaps noted in the case study (Hevner, 2014).
After the motivation, build, and review of the DSR artifacts were studied within the
context of the cybersecurity risk management solution being assessed, an eADR methodology
(Mullarkey & Hevner, 2018) was used to progress and improve the artifacts. The fourth paper,
titled “Using a Fitness-Utility Model to Elaborate the Impacts of Artifacts Created to Enhance
the Risk Informing Capabilities of a Cybersecurity Risk Management Solution,” discusses how
the design artifacts created in the second paper were evaluated using a fitness-utility model (Gill
& Hevner, 2011). Cybersecurity practitioners, the management team of the cybersecurity risk
3

management company, and the company’s business partners were included in these discussions
and provided informed estimates of the artifacts’ utility in relation to the cybersecurity risk
management solution. The eADR approach documented in the fourth paper demonstrates that the
artifacts show real-world utility and introduce design values and principles that are both rigorous
and informing to practice.
References
Gill, T. G. (2011). Informing with the case method. Santa Rosa: Informing Science Press.
Google Scholar.
Gill, T. G., & Hevner, A. R. (2011). A Fitness-Utility Model for Design Science
Research. DESRIST.
Hevner, A. R. (2014). Design Science Research. In A. R. Hevner, & H. Topi (Ed.), Computing
Handbook: Information Systems and Information Technology, Third Edition (pp. 22-1
- 22-21). Boca Raton, Florida, United States of America: CRC Press.
Mullarkey, M., & Hevner, A. (2018). An Elaborated Action Design Research Process Model.
European Journal of Information Systems.
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CHAPTER TWO:
SEE APPENDIX B
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CHAPTER THREE:
SEE APPENDIX C
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CHAPTER FOUR:
EVALUATING AND ENHANCING THE RISK INFORMING CAPABILITIES OF A
CYBERSECURITY SOLUTION USING ACTION DESIGN RESEARCH
Abstract
This research project is focused on assisting a startup cybersecurity company in
increasing its clients’ understanding of cybersecurity risks as identified by the company’s
technology risk management solution. Several artifacts have been created for the solution,
including compliance matrices, a solution architecture, a conceptual model for the solution, and
recommendations on enhancing the legal agreement between users of the Reprivata Community
of Trust (CoT) cybersecurity risk management solution, and other supporting documentation
while acting as a researcher embedded within the firm. Discussions with the company’s
management and potential clients confirmed that the inclusion of the new artifacts in strategic
and technical presentations have increased their understanding of the cybersecurity risks
identified by the solution and how those risks are now more meaningful to their clients.
Introduction
The numbers and types of cybersecurity risks that governments, companies, and
individuals face are becoming overwhelming and nearly incomprehensible to many of those
parties. In current academic literature, researchers investigate ways to foster better understanding
of such risks when few cybersecurity risk management applications are available that could help
parties manage and comprehend the majority of those risks (Contreras, DeNardis, & Teplinsky,
2012). The emerging types of technology risk management measurements and supporting risk
7

management methodologies can inform these entities by helping them better understand
cybersecurity risks to their particular technology environments while increasing their abilities to
comply with cybersecurity program standards and maturity measures (Epstein & Brown, 2008).
In January 2018, the researcher was introduced to the senior executives of a startup
cybersecurity risk management company named Reprivata. During a discussion with the
company’s management team, the researcher found that while the Reprivata team had a great
deal of experience implementing the large interconnected networks that comprised the
commercial Internet, they had limited experience in cybersecurity and software development. In
fact, the cybersecurity application they had developed was designed originally to set up virtual
private networks.
After some review, the researcher determined the Reprivata CoT solution possessed three
advantages over other cybersecurity solutions. First, the Reprivata solution created a secure
Community of Trust (CoT), where entities communicated securely and exchanged sensitive data
inside the closed private network using embedded collaboration and data sharing applications.
Second, the Reprivata solution required the entities using the closed private network to sign
Master Agreements that committed them to implementing the National Institute of Standards and
Technology Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF) as their organizational cybersecurity model.
As part of its design, the NIST CSF drives the consistent application of business practices for
maturing cybersecurity programs and collaborating on mutual cybersecurity issues, which no
other cybersecurity standards require. Third, the solution had a Global Threat Intelligence (GTI)
component that, in real time and with a technology agnostic stance, monitors and mitigates
security threats to the entities’ private networks as well as potential cybersecurity risks inside the
CoT network.
8

During additional discussion with the Reprivata senior management team, the researcher
learned they did not understand how to map their solution to the NIST CSF key controls in order
to assess its compliance with those standards. Additionally, they did not understand how to
effectively demonstrate to potential clients that the solution’s encryption and threat management
capabilities could help those clients better understand, respond to, and mitigate their
cybersecurity risks.
At the request of Reprivata management, the researcher began to investigate ways to
create compliance testing artifacts for the solution and a NISF CSF mapping of the solution in
order to illustrate how each component met the NIST CSF requirements for cybersecurity
behavior management, risk management, and collaboration between all interconnected parties
doing business together over the Internet.
Motivation
As a cybersecurity practitioner and executive for over 25 years, I have found that one of
the most challenging things to do is effectively and accurately communicate cybersecurity
information to those parties who are not well-versed in the field. In particular, cybersecurity risks
and impacts are very difficult to communicate because those issues can be very technical or
theoretical and need to be “translated” into a vocabulary that can be better understood by people
with non-cyber backgrounds.
This communication problem came into sharp focus when I began assisting Reprivata, a
startup cybersecurity risk management solution company, with their go-to-market strategy. This
required me to re-think how to communicate what is a very technical and complex technology
solution into more conceptual terms that could show how the solution actually worked without
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confusing them by utilizing some of the potentially arcane and confusing language used by
cybersecurity practitioners.
To accomplish this, I began to appraise how to inform the Reprivata stakeholders and
potential customers by creating a design artifact in the form of a conceptual model, which
showed the solution in pictorial format. This artifact was created to show stakeholders how the
solution could work across an organization to improve its security controls posture.
Once the conceptual model was created and its initial assessment had been performed, I began
working on a compliance matrix, which broke the solution down into its primary security
controls, to identify how well the solution complied with the NIST CSF. The matrix also gave an
overview of how the solution could help mature the security control posture.
This research article is based on the Elaborated Action Design Research (eADR) process
model developed or descripted by Mullarkey and Hevner (2018). The diagnosis phase of this
research project included exploratory personnel interviews and problem analyses performed with
the Reprivata management team. Then, the findings on the design and product strategy of
Reprivata’s cybersecurity solution were detailed.
The findings resulted in several artifacts in the form of a business case discussing
Reprivata’s current business issues and pending decisions as well as technical overviews of
Reprivata’s cybersecurity collaboration solution software. Additionally, further analyses of the
cybersecurity problem spaces affecting Reprivata’s product strategy were performed to learn
how well the Reprivata CoT solution addressed some of the more prevalent issues around
understanding cybersecurity risks in the context of an organization’s technology risk posture.
Once created, the first set of artifacts that were created during the writing of the Reprivata
case study was evaluated by the Reprivata management team, updated based on their comments
10

and recommendations, and incorporated into the overall cybersecurity solution design,
architecture, and productization strategy presentations. Then, these artifacts were used as the
basis for the next ADR phase.
Reprivata and its clients cited the informing aspects of applying a more cybersecurityfocused vocabulary and taxonomy to the company’s product strategy as a key enhancement that
would enable a better understanding of the cyber risks identified and reported by the Reprivata
cybersecurity solution, which is consistent with findings in the academic literature reviewed for
this article (Elnagdy, Qiu, & Gai, 2016).
The motivation for these research activities is to develop additional suitable artifacts to
further improve the solution’s cybersecurity risk management capabilities. After additional
conversations and further documentation reviews with Reprivata’s management team, the next
artifacts to be created would include a conceptual model that illustrated the interrelationships of
the solution’s software components, its operational processes, and the technical cybersecurity
standards applied to the solution. Also, to demonstrate to clients how the solution, at the modular
level, complied with the NIST CSF standard that Reprivata had adopted when developing the
solution, a mapping of the Reprivata CoT solution architecture to provide a visual representation
of its components and how they work together was required. These artifacts will be evaluated by
Reprivata management, technical Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the cybersecurity field, and
Reprivata’s potential clients to determine further product design and strategy enhancement
opportunities for the Reprivata cybersecurity solution. The results of the interventions with the
cybersecurity SMEs and potential clients will be documented in the next paper of this research
project.
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The literature review was performed in two phases. The first phase was a survey of the
types of research methodologies used in the study of cybersecurity and related risk management
topics (see Table 1). These articles also included an overview of legal and ethical issues that
have arisen in prior research that, if not handled appropriately, could impact current and future
cybersecurity research projects. From this literature review, it was determined that Action Design
Research (ADR) has been used in previous cybersecurity research in the area of how to
effectively communicate information about cybersecurity risks to stakeholders. The Design
Science Research (DSR) approach helped guide the development of informing artifacts and other
documentation on cyber risks to provide more assistance to cybersecurity risk practitioners and
those entities that interact with them to better understand cyber risks as well as their potential
impacts on the organization.
Table 1 – Literature on Research Design Applicable to Cybersecurity Risks
Source
Burstein, A. J. (2008).
Conducting Cybersecurity
Research Legally and
Ethically. LEET, 8, 1-8

Findings

A variety of federal and state statutes either prohibit
activities that would provide cybersecurity researchers with data
about real systems and real attackers, or cast such doubt on
research activities that investigators modify their programs or
conduct them with a sense of uncertainty as to their legality.
(Page 1).

Though U.S. law does not permit everything that
cybersecurity researchers would like to do, relatively few research
activities are flatly prohibited. (Page 2).

Researchers should consider whether the papers or
datasets that they publish could reveal information that could help
adversaries attack the researcher's own network (or other friendly
networks). (Page 12).
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Table 1 (Continued)
Da Veiga, A. (2016, July). A
cybersecurity culture research
philosophy and approach to
develop a valid and reliable
measuring instrument. In SAI
Computing Conference (SAI),
2016 (pp. 1006-1015). IEEE.

Kolini, F., & Janczewski, L.
(2017). Clustering and Topic
Modelling: A New Approach for
Analysis of National Cyber
security Strategies. PACIS 2017

Muegge, S., & Craigen, D. (2015).
A design science approach to
constructing critical infrastructure
and communicating cybersecurity
risks. Technology Innovation
Management Review, 5(6), 6.


To mitigate cyber risks and minimize cybercrime,
cybersecurity is aimed at protecting information resources
connected in cyberspace, the information available via
cyberspace, and the individual who could fall prey to cyberattacks. (Page 1007).

An information security culture has been defined as the
attitudes, assumptions, beliefs, values, and knowledge that
employees/stakeholders use to interact with the organization’s
systems and procedures at any point in time. (Page 1008).

The assessment of the cybersecurity culture level in an
organization can be incorporated in existing information security
risk management and incident management frameworks to
understand the risk from a human perspective. (Page 1014).

Understanding the multifaceted nature of cybersecurity is
a key enabler for national governments and to adjust themselves
to rapidly changing nature and complexity of cybersecurity
ecosystems. (Page 1).

A common set of performance indicators or metrics that
can be used as a gold standard for systematically evaluating the
effectiveness of national cybersecurity strategies is yet to be
developed. (Page 2).
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic modeling was an
effective method for identifying a number of key topics and
corresponding words relevant to prior knowledge and extent
experiences in cybersecurity and public policy studies. (Page 8).

Globally accepted best practices that can be compared
with the result of topic modelling and topic labels for
cybersecurity are not available at this time. (Page 10).

Owners and operators of critical infrastructures, as well as
governments, do not disclose reliable information related to
cybersecurity risks. (Page 6).

Cybersecurity specialists can manipulate cognitive
limitations to overdramatize and oversimplify cybersecurity risks
to critical infrastructures. (Page 6).

The proposed design science process is a “learning
machine,” in which design principles provide a focal point for
collaboration between infrastructures, codify specialized
knowledge in a teachable form that can be more easily
communicated to others, elevate attention from point solutions to
higher-impact problems, enable knowledge sharing between
different infrastructures, and increase both the rate of learning and
the frequency of opportunities for learning. (Page 7).

Open source software projects are a high-potential setting
for collaboration where critical infrastructure providers can tap
into the benefits of high-quality software, and other developers
and users benefit from the critical infrastructure providers’ high
demands for security and testing. (Page 12).
13

Table 1 (Continued)
Mullarkey, M. T., & Hevner, A.
R. (2018). An elaborated action
design research process
model. European Journal of
Information Systems, 1-15.

Vishik, C., & Balduccini, M.
(2015). Making Sense of Future
Cybersecurity Technologies:
Using Ontologies for
Multidisciplinary Domain
Analysis. In ISSE 2015 (pp. 135145). Springer Vieweg,
Wiesbaden.


Action Design Research (ADR) is used effectively in
many research projects and, because of its ever-expanding
applications, the ADR concepts and process model continue to
grow and evolve to meet the demands of new and challenging
environments. (Page 1).

A key addition to the activities in the ADR intervention
cycle is the inclusion of the Artifact Creation activity. This
activity highlights the essential artifact build activities that are
central to the Design Science Research (DSR) process. (Page 15).

Practitioners from multiple application areas (such as
healthcare, education, government, and others) can be brought
together in common ADR projects by use of a shared process
model and produce innovative artifacts of value across
disciplines. (Page 16).

The effectiveness of cybersecurity risk mitigation
strategies depends on an accurate understanding of the
relationships among the components of systems that need to be
protected, their functional requirements, and of the trade-off
between security protection and core functionality. (Page 1).

Ontologies and the associated inference mechanisms
permit us to reason about connections between diverse domains
and contexts that are pertinent for the general threat picture, and
to highlight the effects and ramifications of the mitigation
strategies considered. (Page 1).

Ontologies are crucial tools for understanding the threat
space for new technology space, for increasing security experts’
situational awareness, and, ultimately, as decision-support tools
for rapid development of mitigation strategies. (Page 1).

In the literature review on the types of cybersecurity research methods, databases such as
ABI-Informs, Google Scholar and JSTOR.org were used for those searches. These databases
were selected as excellent starting points for the first phase of the literature review, based on the
recommendations of the USF librarians and the DBA dissertation committee professors. The
search queries concentrated on cybersecurity research methods to find the articles that were
ultimately reviewed and cited here.
The queries to these databases found a body of literature on these subjects by both
academics and practitioners dating from the 2000s. These are the selected results of the database
queries. Further review and summarization of the referenced articles and books are planned to
14

refine future queries as part of the ongoing research. Theses searches were completed between
June 28, 2018 and June 30, 2018.
The second phase of the literature review was focused on surveying selected articles that
provided insights on the ways cybersecurity risks were measured and how those measurements
were evaluated and understood by stakeholders (see Table 2). From these articles, consistent
findings were identified indicating the cybersecurity field has challenges informing internal
stakeholders, external stakeholders, and cybersecurity practitioners on the types of cyber risks
being faced. As the numbers and types of cyber threats and risks continue to increase, the ability
to measure their impacts accurately will lag, which will limit the ability to inform cybersecurity
practitioners. There are significant opportunities abound for cybersecurity researchers to help
create better risk informing measurement and evaluation solutions for this problem.
Table 2 – Literature on Understanding and Measuring Cybersecurity Risks

Source
Butler, A. (2012). When cyber
weapons end up on private
networks: third amendment
implications for cybersecurity
policy. Am. UL Rev., 62, 1203.

Findings

Regardless of the sources of many cyber-attacks, the
sophisticated malware programs utilized reveal the capacities to
capture credentials, communications, audio, video, and a wide
range of other sensitive data from a broad range of devices and
networks. (Page 1214).

The Third Amendment to the Constitution has
prohibitions that govern any military intrusions onto private
property, such as situations where military cyber operations can
affect private computers and networks, including innocent thirdparty systems. (Page 1227).

When framed as a right to exclude the military from
private property, it is clear that computers, networks, and other
systems fall within the scope of the Third Amendment. (Page
1230).
So far, no United States government policy efforts have
adequately addressed the civil liberties impact of cyber
operations. (Page 1234).
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Table 2 (Continued)

Contreras, J. L., DeNardis, L., &
Teplinsky, M. (2012). Mapping
today's cybersecurity
landscape. Am. UL Rev., 62, 1113.

Elnagdy, S. A., Qiu, M., & Gai, K.
(2016, June). Understanding
taxonomy of cyber risks for
cybersecurity insurance of financial
industry in cloud computing.
In Cyber Security and Cloud
Computing (CSCloud), 2016
IEEE3rd International Conference
on (pp. 295-300). IEEE.

Epstein, R. A., & Brown, T. P.
(2008). Cybersecurity in the
Payment Card Industry. The
University of Chicago Law
Review, 75(1), 203-223.


Cyber threats overtook terrorism as the number one
global threat to America, according to the 2013 global threat
assessment performed by the United States intelligence
community. (Page 1114).

Interoperability is critical in communications and
national infrastructure, including the national power grid and the
medical and financial establishments. The result of the tens of
thousands of technology standards in use is a world that is
massively interconnected. (Page 1117).

The security and stability of the Internet depend on the
preservation of three Internet characteristics:
- Permissionless innovation
- Open access
- Collaboration (Page 1121).

Several practical steps that firms can take to protect
themselves include:
- Implement best practices in cybersecurity risk management
- Engage senior leadership
- Encourage a culture of cybersecurity through education and
implementation of policies to control cyber risk
- Harden networks by implementing effective

- Formulate crisis response plans. (Page 1128).

Understanding cyber risks taxonomy is a challenging
task due to the high complexity of the entity-entity relations and
the broad crossed disciplines. (Page 295).

The cause effect relationships between cyber incidents
and cyber risks are hard to be accurately defined, because most
situations represent a multi-to-multi relation and very rarely do
one-to-one relations exist. (Page 297).

The vital issue is finding out the methods of creating
taxonomy of cybersecurity, which is the fundamental of
organizing cyber incidents and relevant technical issues in a
group-based manner. (Page 298).

The object of choosing the right rules for risk allocation
was to minimize the net costs of theft, as measured by the losses
from the theft, less the costs of prevention, including the costs of
running the system. (Page 207).

When a third party is the source of the stolen
information, consumers are unlikely to know the precise source
of a breach. (Page 213).

Breaches have occurred most often, almost 50 percent
of the time, in the government and education sectors, but the
most records have been stolen from retailers and processors of
financial data. (Page 213).
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Current or former employees and contractors are the
second greatest cybersecurity threat, exceeded only by hackers,
and that the number of security incidents has increased
geometrically in recent years. (Page 61).

Research in both government and commercial sectors
reveal that although the proportion of insider events is declining,
the financial impact and operating losses due to insider
intrusions are increasing. (Page 61).

A complete and effective insider threat mitigation
strategy must take into account human motivations and
behaviors along with organizational factors such as policies,
hiring, and training practices, and the technical vulnerabilities
and best practices for prevention or early detection of
unauthorized insider activity or access. (Page 63).

The risk management process begins with the
development of a policy, including a clear definition of an
acceptable risk tolerance. (Page 11).

A comprehensive risk management approach to
cybersecurity requires the early identification of threats and
vulnerabilities most likely to occur, the ability to qualify and
quantify the potential harm to the agency, and the development
and implementation of appropriate mitigation steps to achieve
an acceptable risk level. (Page 13).

The process model for continuously managing risk is
essentially equivalent, whether considering a program or project
with discrete start and end dates and well-defined deliverables
or for an ongoing service or infrastructure support activity.
(Page 64).

In order to detect attacks more accurately and to build
on a robust detection system, it is imperative to apply other
areas that include new technologies, big data, attacker
philosophies and the normal user activities. (Page 14).
Today’s network infrastructures are so complex that it is
categorically impossible to adequately distinguish plausible
valid alerts. (Page 16).
Current research in cyber protection shows that economic
impact can be very serious after a cyber-attack or data breach
but it also underlines that most organizations reluctance to
change, adaptation, and collaboration in addressing potentially
serious cybersecurity issues. (Page 21).
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A challenge in critical infrastructure assessments is the
difficulty in examining evidence that an organization may
present to demonstrate cybersecurity activities and appropriately
evaluating that evidence within the context of national security
objectives. (Page 84).

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has
developed an assessment methodology called the Cyber
Resilience Review (CRR) which helps organizations better
understand their role in critical infrastructure protection and
provides a lightweight review of how they are managing the
capabilities that are crucial for ensuring the cybersecurity and
continuity of high-value services during times of stress, when
effective management is needed most. (Page 85).

Goals in the assurance review are refined into specific
goals and sub-goals which are eventually turned into the
assessment questions that are asked of organizations under
review to determine the extent to which the goals are satisfied.
(Page 87).

To help cope with the security risks associated with the
complexity and interdependencies within various critical
infrastructure systems, standards bodies and federal agencies in
at least twelve countries or regions of the world have defined
criteria for security standards as well as implementation
methods. (Page 34).

These modern cybersecurity capability maturity models
provide the stages for an evolutionary path to developing
policies and processes for the security and reporting of
cybersecurity readiness of critical infrastructure. (Page 36).

The review of the current cybersecurity capability
maturity models highlighted that, although many models exist,
none are specifically crafted to address the scenario of an
operator of multiple interdependent systems and are instead
focused on federal infrastructures or specific industry subsectors, and are all at a high level. (Page 38).

An understanding of what aspects influence perceived
information trustworthiness is central to the goal of trustworthy
and effective risk communication. (Page 60).

The presentation and format, relevance and specificity
of information also become key factors in increasing a user’s
trust in a security risk message displayed. (Page 66).

Keeping communications about cybersecurity risk
simple and minimalistic, assisting users in seeing the potential
consequences of security-related decisions, and engaging in
some level of customization of the context and content of
cybersecurity risk information to specific target audiences are all
important factors to ensure effective and informing risk
communications to stakeholders and other affected parties.
(Page 66).
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While the proposed United States cybersecurity
framework may well be a reasonable approach to security from
the perspective of stakeholders (including citizens) whose
security may be breached, we should also note that our
government may itself be an active agent in some breaches and
attacks. (Page 1).

Many of our public laws and legal institutions are under
stress because they have not kept pace with technological
developments. (Page 2).

The pace of events in cyber space moves so quickly that
policy enhancements and requirements cannot keep up. (Page
2).

Despite regulatory pressure and financial institutions'
efforts to protect against security threats, sophisticated
cyberattacks against financial institutions occur every day, and
the resulting costs have become an increasingly significant part
of the business. (Page 348).

Even if cybercriminals cannot directly breach a
financial institution's network, they may still gain access to the
institution's network through the network of a third-party vendor
because some of these third parties' security practices are remiss
or even nonexistent. (Page 350).

Educating employees and consumers on how to
distinguish legitimate entities from fraudulent ones is key to
protecting against cybersecurity attacks. (Page 366).

From its inception, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework
has been developed with an aim toward creating a cost-effective
method of addressing critical infrastructure cybersecurity
vulnerabilities without enacting binding (and potentially
cumbersome and inflexible) regulatory security standards and
requirements. (Page 309).

Currently, no baselines or comprehensive cybersecurity
obligations are imposed across the United Sates critical
infrastructure, but regulations do exist for certain sectors,
leaving the status quo a complex patchwork of oftentimes
ambiguous state and federal regulations overlaying applicable
common law doctrines. (Page 310).

Despite gaps in the legal framework and the everchanging cyber threat, courts are increasingly willing to hold
both organizations and firms liable for not protecting sensitive
information. (Page 312).
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Analysis of cybersecurity issues has been weakened by
the lack of agreement on terminology and the use of exaggerated
language. (Page 7).

The cyber infrastructure, as well as providing a potential
vector for propagating and magnifying an original triggering
event, may also be the means of mitigating the effects of cyberattacks and data breaches. (Page 8).

One important characteristic of a global shock from
cybersecurity events is that responses limited to the level of the
nation state are likely to be inadequate; coordinated international
activity, with all the associated problems of nation states
reaching collaborative agreements and then acting in concert, is
what is required to deal with these types of cybersecurity issues.
(Page 11).

Emerging cybersecurity threats may require
increasingly comprehensive programs for scanning mass
quantities of information; yet such programs strain existing
constitutional and legal frameworks. (Page 398).

Automated processing of bulk data should be viewed
differently than individualized surveillance because the
distinction between content and metadata needs to be linked to
the purpose of monitoring; and the surveillance requirements,
particularly on a large scale, must be buttressed by measures of
privacy by design. (Page 401).

Cybersecurity threats in particular can be embedded into
all layers of a communication, regardless of the distinction
between content and metadata. (Page 412).

In addition to mechanisms of legal oversight,
cybersecurity monitoring programs require the creation of
operational accountability processes within intelligence and
national security agencies. (Page 424).

For years, the risks cyber threats remained obscure
because companies preferred not to disclose that they had been
breached and damaged. (Page 183).

Cybersecurity can longer be focused exclusively on
protecting the enterprise and its assets and reputation, but, in
light of several highly publicized data breaches, cybersecurity
measures need to be broadened if an enterprise is to be in a
position to defend its response cyber-attack. (Page 194).

The longer it takes an enterprise to detect an attack that
results in damage to a customer or a third party with whom the
enterprise has a formal commercial or corporate relationship,
and the longer it takes the enterprise such circumstances to
interdict and remediate the attack, the harder pressed the
enterprise and its counsel will be to demonstrate to a court that
an enterprise's actions did not fall short of reasonably
commercial standards of fair dealing. (Page 194).
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In the literature review on the communication of cybersecurity risks and impacts to
stakeholders, databases such as ABI-Informs, Google Scholar and JSTOR.org were used for
those searches. These databases were selected as excellent starting points for the second phase of
the literature review, based on the recommendations of the USF librarians and the DBA
dissertation committee professors. The search queries concentrated on communicating,
understanding, and measuring cybersecurity risks and impacts to find the articles that were
ultimately reviewed and cited here.
The queries to these databases found a body of literature on these subjects by both
academics and practitioners dating from the 2000s. These are the selected results of the database
queries. Further review and summarization of the referenced articles and books are planned to
refine future queries as part of the ongoing research. Theses searches were completed between
July 1, 2018 and July 3, 2018.
Both phases of the research provided significant insights into the challenges of
performing cybersecurity research and the manner in which details on cyber risk are
communicated to inform stakeholders effectively. A number of constraints and other challenges
can impact an organization’s ability to identify, analyze, and understand cyber risks (see Table
3).

Table 3 – Issues Identified that Impact the Better Understanding of Cybersecurity Risks
Identified Issue
Legal or Regulatory Restrictions

Impact on Informing of Cybersecurity Risks

In Federal and state law, regulations are in
place that prevent or severely limit the ability of entities
to legally share information about cyber risks.

Legal contracts often limit the disclosure of
information between entities. This non-disclosure
language restricts sharing of information on cyber risks
to specific situations (such as a data breach).
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Table 3 (Continued)
Ethical Constraints

Limited Collaboration between Parties

Lack of Common Cybersecurity Risk
Vocabulary and Taxonomy

Limited Mechanisms for Securely Share
Cybersecurity Risk Information


While cybersecurity practitioners have ethical
obligations on the sharing of cyber risk information
with other entities with “need to know” requirements,
no similar obligations are present between business and
their third-party interconnections, such as suppliers or
service providers.
 Many cybersecurity frameworks and standards do
not require the collaboration between businesses or
other entities on the identification, analysis, and
understanding of cyber risks.

The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF)
requires collaboration as part of its maturity model, but
the NIST CSF is not widely adopted in the United
States at this time.

Because the NIST CSF is primarily a United
States cybersecurity standard, it is unlikely to be widely
embraced outside of the United States.

Industries with their own cybersecurity
standards (such as the Payment Card and Energy
industries) have subtle, and sometimes significant,
differences in definitions and usages of cybersecurity
terms, which can make the understanding of cyber risks
more difficult when risk information is shared.

Very few cyber risk collaboration and sharing
solutions are in wide use that enable entities
(particularly those in different organizations) to security
share cybersecurity risk information that impacts all the
related entities.

As shown in Table 3, cybersecurity risk management issues clearly require further
research and evaluation in order to determine long term pragmatic ways to address them so that
cybersecurity research can be performed with fewer obstacles to such assessments. Continued
studies are necessary so researchers can effectively communicate opportunities for advancing
cybersecurity risk management processes and procedure. As cyber risk management
requirements on businesses and government agencies become more regulated and stringent, the
needs of stakeholders to share risk information and assist each other in understanding the
implications of those risks on the ways the stakeholders do business together become a necessity.
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The researcher compared the capabilities of the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management
solution to some of the risk-informing challenges as noted in Table 3. In three areas, the
Reprivata CoT solution provides users with ways to meet several issues noted. The Reprivata
CoT solution has secure voice, video, and texting capabilities to facilitate collaboration and
information sharing on cyber risks between organizations. These functions were developed using
encryption algorithms used by the United States.
The Reprivata solution was designed to meet the NIST CSF standards. These standards
require external participation and collaboration in order for organizations that use the standard to
comply with its requirements. This design intent is further elaborated in the artifact created to
assess the solution’s compliance with the NIST CSF guideline (see Artifact 2 in Appendix A).
The Reprivata solution has legal contracts (in the form of Master Agreements) that define
the rules of engagement and collaboration obligations for the entities that use the solution. This
enables the entities to have a well-defined process for helping all the stakeholders to learn more
about cyber risks through interactions and exchanges with other organizations with which they
do business. Over time, these collaborations will raise the cyber threat awareness for all entities
in addition to strengthening and maturing their cyber risk programs from the informing process.
Recommendations on ways to improve the Master Agreements to include additional and more
compliance-oriented language for the CoT users are provided in Artifact 3 in Appendix A.
This literature review has demonstrated that research on effective methods for informing
on cybersecurity risks is an emerging area with many opportunities for investigation. The
numbers and types of cybersecurity threats are rapidly expanding; therefore, the need for better
cyber risk-informing solutions for all types of stakeholders is of paramount importance.
Additional research is required to identify ways to minimize the differences that exist in the
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current approaches to cybersecurity risk management (Contreras, 2012). As mentioned above, a
trend was found showing that cybersecurity and risk management solutions are lagging in their
abilities to help stakeholders identify, analyze, and understand cyber risks (Trope, 2012).
A compelling area of research referenced in the current literature on cyber security risk
involves the use of data analytics to help measure key cyber risk performance measurements and
indicators (Tene, 2014). This approach could bring a common data-drive language to the field,
where cyber risks to organizations could be quantified as financial and operational impacts
(Sommer & Brown, 2011). Additional investigation, through the use of statistical techniques,
could better evaluate when, where, and how these cyber risks are found and more effectively
communicate this information to all affected stakeholders (Loukaka & Rahman, 2017). Such
communication and collaboration, governed by the appropriate legal language, will create more
risk-informed cybersecurity programs for many entities that are currently less prepared or mature
now and cannot effectively address the expanding challenges from cyber risks and threats (Shane
& Hunker, 2013).
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Research Method

Figure 1 – Action Design Research Methodology for Reprivata Community of Trust

The Action Design Research (ADR) methodology was chosen for this research project
for several reasons. First, ADR had been used successfully in other cybersecurity research efforts
(Muegge & Craigen, 2015). Similar academic articles reviewed drew on design science research
done by Dr. Alan Hevner, a leading international expert on ADR methods who is a professor at
the University of South Florida. Second, the work relationship between the researcher and the
target company (Reprivata) provided a unique opportunity for the analysis, design, creation, and
evaluation of specific ADR artifacts that could assist Reprivata’s management team to better
articulate the informing capabilities of Reprivata’s cybersecurity risk management solution,
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especially in relationship to cybersecurity risks identified by the application. Third, the proximity
of the Florida Center for Cybersecurity (Cyber Florida) on the University of South Florida
campus gave the researcher the ability to have cybersecurity Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)
independently evaluate and comment on the ADR artifacts to determine how those items might
inform a broader audience in the cybersecurity field. Fourth, the ADR approach enabled the
researcher to engage with Reprivata’s partners and potential customers and gauge how effective
the ADR artifacts were in helping them understand the cybersecurity risks identified by
Reprivata’s security control mechanisms. Finally, the ADR approach facilitated an in-depth
evaluation of Reprivata’s security controls in relationship the NIST CSF standards, which
identified how the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution met that standard or
enabled other security controls external to the solution (such as policies, procedures, and security
software) to become compliant with the NIST CSF.
The ADR approach utilized in this research project was drawn from a 2018 article by Dr.
Matthew Mullarkey and Dr. Alan Hevner (Mullarkey & Hevner, 2018). ADR concepts and
process modelling are growing in various research areas and have been found as very effective
ways of describing a variety of technology environments. The addition of artifact creation
activities as part of ADR intervention activities highlights the essential artifact build and
evaluation activities that are key to Design Science Research (DSR). Researchers and
practitioners from multiple application areas, such as healthcare, education, government, and
others, can be brought together in common ADR projects by use of a shared process model and
then produce inventive and original artifacts of value across research disciplines. (Mullarkey &
Hevner, 2018).
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The researcher first engaged with Reprivata in January 2018. After discussions with the
Reprivata management team, the researcher executed a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA)
which included language that allowed the researcher to perform an ADR project on the company
and its cybersecurity solution. The researcher then interviewed the Reprivata team to learn more
about the company and its go-to-market strategy. They then provided access to the company’s
technical documentation of its software, its current productization strategy, customer
presentations, and the security certification assessment report on the software solution from the
Underwriters’ Laboratory (UL), and the company’s Master Agreements used to set up the
responsibilities and rules of engagement for users of the Reprivata cybersecurity risk
management solution.
The Reprivata management requested a review the company’s cybersecurity risk
management solution against the NIST CSF standards to determine the solution’s level of
compliance with that security framework. Based on the documentation reviewed, the researcher
determined there were gaps in the way Reprivata had implemented the key security controls in
the solution. In particular, the researcher found that no current design documentation or model of
the solution could be mapped directly against the NIST CSF standard. Using action design
research principles, an artifact was designed, evaluated, and enhanced. This item was a
conceptual model of the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution (see Figure 4).
Once the artifact was created, it was shared with Reprivata’s management team. Overall,
they agreed that the artifact more clearly articulated the key security controls of the solution and
its compliance with the NIST CSF. The artifact was then incorporated to the Reprivata product
presentations that were given to potential customers. From the types of comments received
during the customer meetings, the customers stated that, while the recently developed artifact
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was very helpful in communicating how the Reprivata CoT solution mapped to the NIST CSF
key controls, it did not discuss which of the NIST CSF security controls were not implemented
in the solution, which of those controls were covered by external processes or parties, and how
that information could be communicated to help potential customers and business partners
understand cyber risks related to those controls. These comments were captured for inclusion in
the next iteration of artifacts about the Reprivata CoT solution. The conversations were captured
using unstructured interviews and the themes were coded using open and axial coding
techniques. As outlined in Figure 1, the design artifact requirements and evaluation criteria were
created using the Action Design Research methodology for each iteration of the design artifacts.
In the discussions that followed, the team asked if the artifacts could be assessed by
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the cybersecurity field so the team could get more feedback on
the solution to see if it could be enhanced to accelerate its productization and go-to-market
strategies. The researcher contacted the Cyber Florida team and asked for a meeting between the
Cyber Florida senior staff and the Reprivata management team. The intervention session was
scheduled for March 2018. During the meeting, the Reprivata and Cyber Florida teams discussed
the details of the cybersecurity risk management solution in addition to a product strategy
presentation. The Cyber Florida team members asked for clarification on how the Reprivata CoT
solution would be deployed. The Cyber Florida team provided recommendations on how to more
clearly articulate the capabilities of the solution and also suggested several potential use cases.
At the close of the meeting, the two organizations agreed to a second meeting to review the
enhanced solution and its informing capabilities to enable better understanding of cyber risks.
From Cyber Florida’s recommendations, the researcher began to create a more detailed
control mapping of the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution to the NIST CSF. This
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change was necessary to review and map all the new key security controls that were included in
version 1.1 of the framework that was published in April 2018. The Cyber Florida suggestions
also required a review of Reprivata’s Master Agreements to ensure that any appropriate key
security control language was added to the agreements and provide better compliance with the
updated NIST CSF.
The researcher then created an expanded NIST CSF version 1.1 assessment matrix. This
new matrix mapped the key security controls that were included in the design of the Reprivata
CoT solution, and also identified those that were not integral to the solution’s design but could
be enabled by controls already integrated into the solution. Additionally, the Master Agreements
were assessed in more detail to identify opportunities for improvement and to make
recommendations regarding the proposed changes to the legal language in the documents so they
align to the newest version of the NIST CSF.
After the newest artifacts were developed, they were shared with Reprivata’s
management team. In their comments, the Reprivata team agreed the artifacts would help them
more clearly inform their customers on the NIST CSF compliance of the solution as well as
improve the definition of user responsibilities and rules of engagement in the Master
Agreements.
Before sharing these new artifacts with potential customers, the Reprivata team then
requested another meeting with Cyber Florida senior staff to get more of their insights on how to
better position the solution so it had broader appeal in the cybersecurity risk management
market. That intervention with Cyber Florida was held in August 2018 and documented in the
detailed interventions article that is the third part of this research project.
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Description of First Artifact Created for the Reprivata CoT Solution
Reprivata Solution Conceptual Model
The first key artifacts discussed below were part of the initial design phase of this
research project. Each artifact addresses an aspect of the cyber risk informing capabilities of the
Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution.
The Reprivata Community of Trust (CoT) Conceptual Model (see Figure 2) was
developed to articulate the interactions of elements that influence successful cybersecurity CoT
implementations using the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution. These elements
help determine and, in some cases, manage the resources within these projects as the part of the
overarching corporate business strategy which determines the cyber risk posture, and how that
posture can be managed and measured. These are two distinct groups of elements: one that is
composed of the cybersecurity frameworks and legal documents that provide structure to the
CoT, and one that constitutes the Internal and External Stakeholders of the CoT.

Figure 2 – Reprivata Community of Trust Conceptual Model
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Reprivata selected the NIST CSF as part of their design strategy for two reasons. First, it
is a comprehensive set of cybersecurity control requirements based on 23 control categories
across 5 cybersecurity functional areas (see Table 4).
Table 4 – NIST CSF Security Functions and Control Categories [from NIST CSF v1.1, 2018]
Functions

Identify (ID)

Protect (PR)

Detect (DT)

Respond (RS)

Recover (RC)

Categories
Asset Management (AM)
Business Environment (BE)
Governance (GV)
Risk Assessment (RA)
Risk Management Strategy (RM)
Supply Chain Risk Management (SC)
Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control (AC)
Awareness and Training (AT)
Data Security (DS)
Information Protection Processes and Procedures (IP)
Maintenance (MA)
Protection Technologies (PT)
Anomalies and Events (AE)
Security Continuous Monitoring (CM)
Detection Processes
Response Planning (RP)
Communications (CO)
Analysis (AN)
Mitigation (MI)
Improvements (IM)
Recovery Planning (RP)
Improvements (IM)
Communications (CO)

As such, the CSF offers a comprehensive framework on which companies can build their
cybersecurity programs. Second, the CSF includes a maturity model (see Table 5) that gives
companies ways to determine how they are performing as they implement the CSF security
controls.
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Table 5 – NIST CSF Maturity Tiers [from NIST CSF v1.1, 2018]
Maturity Tier
1.
Partial

2.
Risk
Informed

Definition and Characteristics

Risk Management Process – Organizational cybersecurity risk
management practices are not formalized, and risk is managed in an ad hoc
and sometimes reactive manner. Prioritization of cybersecurity activities may
not be directly informed by organizational risk objectives, the threat
environment, or business/mission requirements.

Integrated Risk Management Program – Limited awareness of
cybersecurity risk at the organizational level is exists. The organization

implements cybersecurity risk management on an irregular, case-by-case
basis due to varied experience or information gained from outside sources.
The organization may not have processes that enable cybersecurity
information to be shared within the organization.

External Participation – The organization does not understand its
role in the larger ecosystem with respect to either its dependencies or
dependents. The organization does not collaborate with or receive
information (e.g., threat intelligence, best practices, technologies) from other
entities (e.g., buyers, suppliers, dependencies, dependents, ISAOs,
researchers, governments), nor does it share information. The organization is
generally unaware of the cyber supply chain risks of the products and
services it provides and that it uses.

Risk Management Process – Risk management practices are
approved by management but may not be established as organizational-wide
policy. Prioritization of cybersecurity activities and protection needs is
directly informed by organizational risk objectives, the threat environment,
or business/mission requirements.

Integrated Risk Management Program – An awareness of
cybersecurity risk at the organizational level is acknowledged, but an
organization-wide approach to managing cybersecurity risk has not been
established. Cybersecurity information is shared within the organization on
an informal basis. Consideration of cybersecurity in organizational objectives
and programs may occur at some but not all levels of the organization. Cyber
risk assessment of organizational and external assets occur, but is not
typically repeatable or reoccurring.

External Participation – Generally, the organization understands its
role in the larger ecosystem with respect to either its own dependencies or
dependents, but not both. The organization collaborates with and receives
some information from other entities and generates some of its own
information, but may not share information with others. Additionally, the
organization is aware of the cyber supply chain risks associated with the
products and services it provides and uses, but does not act consistently or
formally upon those risks.
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Table 5 (Continued)
3.

Repeatable 
Risk Management Process – The organization’s risk management
practices are formally approved and expressed as policy. Organizational
cybersecurity practices are regularly updated based on the application of risk
management processes to changes in business/mission requirements and a
changing threat and technology landscape.
Integrated Risk Management Program – An organization-wide approach to
manage cybersecurity risk is in place. Risk-informed policies, processes, and
procedures are defined, implemented as intended, and reviewed. Consistent
methods are in place to respond effectively to changes in risk. Personnel
possess the knowledge and skills to perform their appointed roles and
responsibilities. The organization consistently and accurately monitors
cybersecurity risk of organizational assets. Senior cybersecurity and noncybersecurity executives communicate regularly regarding cybersecurity risk.
Senior executives ensure consideration of cybersecurity through all lines of
operation in the organization.

External Participation – The organization understands its role,
dependencies, and dependents in the larger ecosystem and may contribute to
the community’s broader understanding of risks. It collaborates with and
receives information from other entities regularly that complements
internally generated information, and shares information with other entities.
The organization is aware of the cyber supply chain risks associated with the
products and services it provides and that it uses. Additionally, it usually acts
formally upon those risks, including mechanisms such as written agreements
to communicate baseline requirements, governance structures (e.g., risk
councils), and policy implementation and monitoring.
4. Adaptive

Risk Management Process – The organization adapts its
cybersecurity practices based on previous and current cybersecurity
activities, including lessons learned and predictive indicators. Through a
process of continuous improvement incorporating advanced cybersecurity
technologies and practices, the organization actively adapts to a changing
threat and technology landscape and responds in a timely and effective
manner to evolving, sophisticated threats.

Integrated Risk Management Program – An organization-wide
approach to managing cybersecurity risk exists that uses risk-informed
policies, processes, and procedures to address potential cybersecurity events.
The relationship between cybersecurity risk and organizational objectives is
clearly understood and considered when making decisions. Senior executives
monitor cybersecurity risk in the same context as financial risk and other
organizational risks. The organizational budget is based on an understanding
of the current and predicted risk environment and risk tolerance. Business
units implement executive vision and analyze system-level risks in the
context of the organizational risk tolerances.

33

Table 5 (Continued)
Adaptive
(continued)


Integrated Risk Management Program Cybersecurity risk
management is part of the organizational culture and evolves from an
awareness of previous activities and continuous awareness of activities on
their systems and networks. The organization can quickly and efficiently
account for changes to business/mission objectives in how risk is approached
and communicated

External Participation - The organization understands its role,
dependencies, and dependents in the larger ecosystem and contributes to the
community’s broader understanding of risks. It receives, generates, and
reviews prioritized information that informs continuous analysis of its risks
as the threat and technology landscapes evolve. The organization shares that
information internally and externally with other collaborators. The
organization uses real-time or near real-time information to understand and
consistently act upon cyber supply chain risks associated with the products
and services it provides and that it uses. Additionally, it communicates
proactively, using formal (e.g. agreements) and informal mechanisms to
develop and maintain strong supply chain relationships

As part of the creation of the Conceptual Model, the Reprivata solution design documents
were reviewed and compared against the NIST CSF version 1.0, which was released in 2014.
The initial Conceptual Model was designed to demonstrate how the Reprivata cybersecurity risk
management solution’s overall design and component integration showed its linkage to NISF
CSF. The Conceptual Model was evaluated by the Reprivata senior management team and
provided the researcher with a number of comments and recommendations, especially of the
security controls implemented in the solution regarding interconnected third parties. As part of
this effort, the researcher reviewed articles focused on the adoption of the NIST CSF framework
to support the updates to the Conceptual Model (Dedeke, 2017).
When the NIST CSF version 1.1 was released in April 2018, the Conceptual Model was
reviewed again to ensure that any new and enhanced security control elements were included.
Additional literature was surveyed on the integration of the updated and enhanced security
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controls (Chaput, 2017). This comparison of the initial and revised standards sought to ensure
that the Conceptual Model accurately conveyed how those security controls complemented the
initial design and presentation.
In the Conceptual Model, the CoT Risk Management Strategy element maps directly to
the Reprivata solution. This element defines the cybersecurity control requirements that the CoT
members follow. In the case of Reprivata, the company selected the NIST CSF framework in
2014 as they began development on their cybersecurity risk management solution. When the
NIST CSF was updated in 2018 to version 1.1, Reprivata used that event as rationale to
reevaluate the solution’s compliance with the new and enhanced standards.
For a more comprehensive description of the Reprivata Community of Trust (CoT)
Conceptual Model, please refer to Artifact 1 in Appendix A.
Evaluation of the First Artifact Created for the Reprivata CoT Solution
Due to reiterative design and evaluation process that is inherent to ADR, the artifact was
assessed multiple times by the Reprivata management team prior to the artifact’s adoption. This
process provided the team with a number of opportunities ask questions about cybersecurity
control risks, learn more about the vocabulary and taxonomy used by cybersecurity professionals
like the researcher, and begin to have a better understanding of how to better communicate the
Reprivata CoT solution’s cyber risk management capabilities. Because the Reprivata
management team was actively involved in the artifact design and evaluation sessions, they
accepted them more readily and were better able to communicate the benefits of the artifacts.
During the evaluation of the Conceptual Model for the Reprivata cybersecurity risk
management solution, one of the techniques utilized in this process was to compare documented
security controls with the NIST CSF version 1.0 standards. This comparison was done by
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creating a matrix of the design elements that make up the Conceptual Model of the solution with
the NIST CSF Security Functions and Control Categories from version 1.0 of the standards. This
matrix was one of the key informing activities in the minds of Repriviata’s management team
because, for the first time, they could better understand that their original security control design
intent was actually integrated in the solution. As part of the next ADR design phase, Reprivata’s
management asked for a complete NIST CSF controls assessment for version 1.1, which had
recently been released. This request led to the creation of the full NIST CSF version 1.1
compliance assessment (see Artifact 2 in Appendix A), which was completed in August 2018.
An example of the informing abilities of the Conceptual came in a meeting with the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS security team had been seeking a secure
communication solution to enable collaboration with other Federal agencies like the Department
of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The Reprivata team used the conceptual
model artifact to show how the security control functions in the cybersecurity risk management
solution were consistent to the DHS risk management strategy and mapped to its primary goals
and objectives. This meeting led to the creation of a use case for that collaborative
communication closed network so the DHS team could assess how the Reprivata solution could
meet those operational and security requirements for such inter-agency cooperation initiatives.
Description of Second Set of Artifacts Created for the Reprivata CoT Solution
The following description of the second key artifacts are part of the second design phase
of this research project. Each one was created in response to the Reprivata management team’s
request to better articulate the solution’s mapping to the NIST CSF version 1.1 standards so this
information could be used to inform potential customers on the solution’s level of compliance to
that standard.
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Reprivata Solution NIST CSF Assessment
The evaluation of the Reprivata solution’s technical controls was important for the
Reprivata team and potential customers. While the solution had been certified under the UL 2900
cybersecurity standards in 2016, it had not been assessed for compliance with the NIST CSF
criteria or any other cybersecurity control frameworks. Two separate NIST CSF compliance
assessments were performed during this research project: first, using NIST CSF version 1.0 and
then with NIST CSF version 1.1. The artifact presented in this article is the results of the NIST
CSF version 1.1 assessment of the Reprivata solution.
Table 6 – NIST CSF Assessment and Findings for the Reprivata Community of Trust (CoT)
Cybersecurity Risk Management Solution
NIST CSF
Functional Area

Identify
Protect
Detect
Respond
Recover
Total

Reprivata CoT
Solution
Compliant with
Key Controls
15 out of 29 key
controls
18 out of 39 key
controls
15 out of 18 key
controls
13 out of 15 key
controls
4 out of 6 key
controls
65 out of 107 key
controls

Technology
Controls

Enabling
Controls

Master
Agreement
Controls

5

14

10

12

21

6

11

3

4

3

2

10

0

2

4

31

42
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As part of the original design intent, the capabilities of the Reprivata Community of Trust
(CoT) cybersecurity risk management solution controls were based on and implemented to
comply with the initial version of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) version 1.0, which was published in 2014. This control
mapping analysis reviews the Reprivata solution’s compliance to the NIST CSF version 1.1,
which was released in April 2018.
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As stated in Section 6, the NIST CSF version 1.1 controls assessment matrix (see Table
6) was created at the request of Reprivata’s management team to determine how many of the key
security controls were integrated into the cybersecurity risk management solution. The matrix is
the summary of the assessment of the 107 key security controls across the 5 functional areas that
are included in the NIST CSF standard. The complete assessment provided guidance to the
Reprivata team on what types of control mechanism (such as policies, process, procedures, tools,
etc.) that would be required for the specific security control in the Reprivata CoT solution to be
deemed compliant with the key security control. The assessment also determined which of the
NIST CSF key security controls were either not applicable or not integral to the security
capabilities of the Reprivata CoT solution.
The technology security controls in the Reprivata solution were found to directly map to
31 of the NIST CSF key controls, with 22 of those controls covering compliance requirements
for the Protect functional area (which includes Identity Management, Remote Access, and
Encryption controls) and the Detect functional area (which includes Threat Monitoring and
Mitigation controls). This control coverage was important to note because the collaborative
capabilities of the Reprivata CoT solution heavily leverage the implementation of those Protect
and Detect security controls. The nine NIST CSF key controls that the solution did not map to
were related to the implementation of policies and procedures, such as Physical Security,
Awareness and Training, and Maintenance. While the Reprivata solution’s technology and
cybersecurity controls do not directly implement those policies and procedures, use of the
solution for collaborating on how to develop and implement such controls can enable their
deployment throughout the organization.
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Enabling controls, which are ones that can support or assist in the implementation of
other related controls (such as Access Controls, Physical Security, etc.) were also evaluated. In
this part of the assessment, the 42 such controls (like policies, practices, procedures, and
processes) that are external to the Reprivata technology controls were evaluated to determine
what potential use cases would facilitate implementation of the enabling controls. This appraisal
helped determine that Reprivata’s technology controls could support those controls that are more
process-oriented. The findings indicated that the collaboration, encryption, and threat
management capabilities of the solution could provide positive effects that could assist in
enabling these types of policies and procedures.
The review of the 34 key controls that map the Reprivata’s Master Agreements was
performed and specific recommendations were made for enhancing those agreements. With the
recent update of the NIST CSF standard to version 1.1, it is necessary to ensure the legal
language is consistent with the security and compliance requirements for the CoT users to ensure
accountability to and fulfilment of their contractual obligations
As part of future design and enhancement of artifacts, the software control mapping will
be included in a comprehensive Encrypted Collaboration Software Architecture. This will
include more details on the NIST CSF key controls and the specific security mechanisms that are
implemented in the Encrypted Collaboration Software.
Reprivata Solution Recommendations for Enhancing Master Agreements
Similar types of assessments were performed to determine which of the NIST CSF
controls might be included as legal language in the Reprivata Master Agreements. The specific
recommendations on the verbiage to be included in the Master Agreements were documented as
a way for Reprivata’s management team to determine where NIST CSF security-related verbiage
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could more effectively communicate CoT compliance and collaboration requirements when the
agreement was executed by users. This language is particularly critical because it establishes the
rules of engagement on how CoT users work together and share critical security and business
information when using the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution.
Table 7 – Recommendations for Enhancement of Reprivata Master Agreements for Implementing
Community of Trust (CoT) Cybersecurity Risk Management Solution
NIST CSF Key Control - Identity (ID)

ID.AM-6: Cybersecurity roles and
responsibilities for the entire workforce and
third-party stakeholders (e.g., suppliers,
customers, partners) are established.

ID.BE-1: The organization’s role in
the supply chain is identified and
communicated.

ID.GV-1: Organizational
cybersecurity policy is established and
communicated.

ID.GV-2: Cybersecurity roles and
responsibilities are coordinated and aligned
with internal roles and external partners.

ID.GV-3: Legal and regulatory
requirements regarding cybersecurity,
including privacy and civil liberties
obligations, are understood and managed.

ID.RA-6: Risk responses are
identified and prioritized.

ID.SC-2: Suppliers and third-party
partners of information systems, components,
and services are identified, prioritized, and
assessed using a cyber supply chain risk
assessment process.

Rationale for inclusion in Master Agreements

Documenting the cybersecurity roles and
responsibilities of internal stakeholders and third
parties such as suppliers and business partners enables
the CoT owner establish access control, incident
response reporting, user collaboration, and data sharing
processes to meet the needs of the CoT as a whole.

The cybersecurity roles for event identification
for the organization and its third parties like suppliers
and partners that are CoT users should be legally
defined in writing to ensure all obligations are
understood.

Compliance to cybersecurity policies by
stakeholders should be specific and with assessment
and reporting requirements for all CoT users.

Documentation of cybersecurity roles for all
internal and external stakeholders should be
documented and mutual collaboration and data sharing
responsibilities outlined in writing for all CoT users.

Legal and regulatory compliance cybersecurity
requirements should be clearly documented for all CoT
users.

Risk management collaboration requirements
for all CoT users should be clearly defined and
stakeholder obligations for risk review are
documented.

Risk management and review obligations for
third parties should be legally binding when
collaborating in the CoT.
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Table 7 (Continued)

ID.SC-3: Contracts with suppliers
and third-party partners are used to
implement appropriate measures designed to
meet the objectives of an organization’s
cybersecurity program and Cyber Supply
Chain Risk Management Plan.

ID.SC-4: Suppliers and third-party
partners are routinely assessed using audits,
test results, or other forms of evaluations to
confirm they are meeting their contractual
obligations.

ID.SC-5: Response and recovery
planning and testing are conducted with
suppliers and third-party providers.


Third party contracts should include provisions
for measuring and managing cybersecurity risks and
implementing cybersecurity controls for controlling
related risks.

Cybersecurity audit and assessment provisions
should be clearly documented and assessment
reporting requirements specified.

Cybersecurity recovery and response plans
should be required of all CoT users.

The complete NIST CSF Compliance Assessment and Findings for the Reprivata
Community of Trust (CoT) cybersecurity risk management solution can be found in Artifact 2 in
Appendix A.
NIST CSF Functional Area – Identify (ID) Controls Language to Include:
The report on recommendations for enhancement of the Reprivata Master Agreements
was requested by Reprivata’s management team as a result of the NIST CSF assessment report
as shown in Table 7. Recommendations were made for all of the five functional areas that are
included in the NIST CSF standard. Only the recommendations for the Identify functional area
are shown here.
With the update of the NIST CSF to version 1.1 in April 2018, Reprivata’s management
team wanted to ensure that the Master Agreements included appropriate verbiage for new key
security control areas such as Supply Chain Risk Management. Because one of the purposes of
Reprivata’s Master Agreements is to provide guidelines for interconnections with third party
business partners, determining and adding any required supply chain language to the agreements
is important.
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Of particular interest were the process improvement-related security controls. These
controls were aimed at helping those organizations that adopted the NIST CSF guidelines to
demonstrate their cybersecurity programs. As such, incorporating process improvement language
in the Master Agreements would commit all CoT users to maturing their cybersecurity programs.
The NIST CSF assessment noted that, of the 34 key control specific to the Master
Agreements, over 20 of them were related to security policy, process, or procedural
requirements. As such, the Reprivata team decided to engage with their external legal counsel to
determine which key controls should be covered in the Master Agreements and which one could
be addressed in the security language in the contracts prepared by CoT users to manage how they
work with their business partners and other third parties.
The complete documentation of Recommendations for Enhancement of Reprivata Master
Agreements for Implementing Community of Trust (CoT) risk management solution can be
found in Artifact 3 in Appendix A.
Evaluation of the Second Set of Artifacts Created for the Reprivata CoT Solution
During the creation of the second set of artifacts, the evaluation process differed slightly
from the one used for the first artifacts. While the first set of artifacts were primarily used for
informing external parties on the cybersecurity risk management capabilities of the Reprivata
CoT solution, these artifacts were created for informing the Reprivata organization on the CoT
solution’s mapping to the NIST CSF. The Reprivata management team, who are not
cybersecurity practitioners by training or experience, needed assistance on understanding more
about the implementation of cybersecurity controls in organizations.
The initial artifact created was a NIST CSF version 1.0 compliance assessment of the
Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution. This creation was done prior to the release of
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NIST CSF version 1.1 in April 2018. The focus of this review was to determine how many of the
security controls were integrated into the Reprivata solution. This exercise was performed as a
result of recommendation from the Cyber Florida staff at an intervention meeting in March 2018.
When this assessment was completed, it was discussed with Reprivata’s management team as
well as several potential clients. One of the comments on the initial assessment was that it did not
provide sufficient information on how the security controls could potentially enable other
controls because of the collaboration and data sharing capabilities of the solution.
In April 2018, just after the meeting with Cyber Florida, the NIST CSF version 1.1 was
released for implementation by government agencies. At that time, a second cycle of assessments
were performed. Since the primary change in the NIST CSF version 1.1 standards from the
initial one was the inclusion of cybersecurity controls related to Supply Chain Management, it
was straightforward to add the evaluations of these controls to the first assessment artifact. When
Reprivata’s management reviewed the new report, the team asked how they could better inform
potential clients on how the Reprivata solution could support the legal language with its
functional collaboration and encryption capabilities. This additional information was added to
the final legal recommendation artifact.
As with the evaluation of the first artifacts on the Reprivata solution’s technology
controls, both of the new ones on legal recommendations for the Master Agreements were
assessed several times by the Reprivata management team prior to the artifacts’ formal
acceptance. As before, the Reprivata team were able to both question and comment on the
process of assessing cybersecurity compliance across an organization. As they began to
understand the compliance process, they determined that the messaging was being shared with
potential customers on the Reprivata CoT solution’s cyber risk management capabilities. They
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also realized that the messaging needed to be enhanced to include these new insights. As a result,
additional artifacts, including product strategy presentations and new marketing collateral, were
scheduled for development.
Again, because the Reprivata management team was actively involved in the artifact
design and evaluation sessions, they were able to communicate the benefits of the artifacts very
clearly internally, with plans to create similar informing messages for potential customers and
other external parties. Additionally, the Reprivata team reported an increased understanding of
the challenges of complying with cybersecurity standards. In particular, the team stated that
Reprivata’s messaging regarding facilitating compliance with cybersecurity standards had
become better at describing how well the Reprivata CoT solution met those compliance
requirements.
Discussion
Cybersecurity researchers clearly need to continue exploring ways to create informing
artifacts that help explain the impacts of cyber risks to cybersecurity practitioners and other
stakeholders (Nurse, Creese, Goldsmith, & Lamberts, 2011). Research centers, such as Cyber
Florida, are working to create broad collaborative networks of researchers to facilitate this
research. Even so, the security of these collaboration networks is often limited by lack of
funding, the scarcity of trained personnel, or both. Continuously managing risk requires a
process that has specific dates for implementing capabilities, defined deliverables, and ongoing
service and support activities, so organizations must strive to overcome these resource issues
soon. (Jones & Gallo, 2007).
This issue is one reason that research based on ADR is important in cybersecurity
research in particular. By embedding cyber-trained researchers with organizations’ cybersecurity
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programs, the research is being conducted closer to the actual cyber risks. The outcomes and
artifacts from these research initiatives can help foster collaboration both inside and between
organizations as the reach of cyber risks is better understood and more affected parties. Such
mutually beneficial arrangements can provide a knowledge exchange on the understanding of
cyber risks and enable organizations to mature their cybersecurity programs by implementing
some of the practice-based artifacts that the organization helped develop to meet their
cybersecurity program needs. This approach was a success at Reprivata because of the
company’s desire to become more cyber aware about the security capabilities of its own solution,
as well as learning about the broader challenges, constraints, and opportunities of implementing
and maturing a new cybersecurity company in what has become an increasingly complex field.
As shown in Table 3 in the Literature Review section, two of the most significant
challenges that limit the abilities of organizations to understand cyber risks are legal and
regulatory restrictions and the lack of collaboration between parties dealing with shared cyber
risks (Shane & Hunker, 2013). While this research project did not face these particular problems,
the researcher has addressed these types of constraints as a cybersecurity executive and
practitioner working on cyber breach events. The inability to effectively and securely share
cybersecurity risk and threat information has been shown to decrease the opportunities to analyze
and understand cyber risks on a timely basis (Loukaka & Rahman, 2017). This limitation also
impacts the ability of any first responders to mitigate cyber risks discovered due to the lack of
actionable data about the technical vulnerabilities that have been exploited during an event
(Greitzer, Moore, Cappelli, Andrews, Carroll, & Hull, 2008).
The ethical commitments required of cybersecurity professionals is very significant,
especially as the need for practitioners to collaborate and share cyber risk information (Burstein,
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2008). Cybersecurity practitioners must meet the ethical requirements set forth by their
professional credentialing agencies in order for those credentials to remain in good standing.
Appropriate disclosure of information is one of those requirements. These ethical and legal
limitations impede the collaboration between cybersecurity practitioners in the same way the
NDAs and Federal and state laws restrict such disclosure. This issue comes into direct conflict
when companies have business relationships with their third-party interconnections, such as
suppliers or service providers. Often, no such ethical obligations exist.
While the cybersecurity field started initiatively for businesses to establish collective
security or defense relationships, many of the cybersecurity standards do not require such
collaboration by companies that implement those control frameworks. Except for the NIST CSF
framework, the majority of other cybersecurity frameworks and standards are silent on requiring
entities to share information on the identification, analysis, and understanding of cyber risks. By
encouraging a broader adoption of the NISF CSF, such collaboration would be required because
it affects how a company can mature its cybersecurity programs and comply with the standard
(Shackelford, Proia, Martell, & Craig, 2015). However, because the NIST CSF is primarily a
United States cybersecurity standard, it is unlikely to be embraced widely outside of the United
States, though it can be mapped to other widely accepted security frameworks, such as the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 27001 security standard and the Payment
Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) guidelines.
A number of industry governing bodies, such as Energy and Payment Cards, have created
their own cybersecurity standards. Such industry standards, though similar to the NIST CSF,
have differences in the number and types of cybersecurity controls that are required in definitions
and usages of cybersecurity terms. Many cases exist where companies may be required to
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implement more than one of these cybersecurity standards. In such cases, the determination of
which standard will take precedence can be obscured by a number of factors, such as industry
auditors, internal compliance managers, and Federal and state regulators. The difference in the
interpretation of potentially conflicting standards can make it more difficult for internal and
external stakeholders to understand the cybersecurity control requirements, to determine funding
and other resource allocations for compliance programs, and to effectively share information on
cyber risks because of the variances of the vocabulary and taxonomy in communications
(Elnagdy, Qiu, & Gai, 2016).
Research noted that a limited number of technology solutions are available for securely
sharing cybersecurity risk information (Fulford, 2017). As the cybersecurity landscape becomes
more complicated to both navigate and understand, such cyber risk collaboration and sharing
solutions will be required. This claim is especially true where business partners, particularly
those with interconnected third parties, need to share sensitive cybersecurity risk information that
impacts all the related parties (Trope, 2012).
The interventions with the cybersecurity SMEs were very revealing. Many questions and
comments that arose during those sessions directly resulted from the Reprivata team’s lack of
cybersecurity background and understanding of the terminology used by practitioners in the
field. With the researcher’s assistance and by including the artifacts in the company’s product
presentations and other collateral, the Reprivata cybersecurity message became clearer and more
focused. After two artifact design and build cycles, the Reprivata management team gained a
better understanding of the risk informing capabilities of their CoT solution, as well as the
language of cybersecurity. The next step is to better educate potential customers on the benefits
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of using the Reprivata CoT solution to help foster the same understanding in the customer
organizations.
Limitations of Current Research
Several limitations to this research were noted. First, the members of the Reprivata
management team lived all over the United States and overseas. This factor made scheduling of
meetings for interviews, artifact design sessions, and subsequent evaluations very difficult. The
researcher was able to meet with three of the Reprivata team in person on two different
occasions, which did allow for very useful interchanges. More face-to-face meetings would have
likely provided more insights into the informing capabilities of the Reprivata CoT solutions and
the artifacts produced as a result of this research project.
Another limitation of the research was the small number of potential Reprivata customers
and cybersecurity SMEs that were able to review and comment on the artifacts through either
presentations or intervention sessions. The researcher was involved in six such meetings, four
with customers and two with SME groups, and was able to gather valuable comments from the
participants. However, to better judge the informing capabilities of the artifacts to help improve
understanding of cyber risks, more evaluation and intervention sessions would be required.
A lack of cybersecurity-related literature on how to assist companies to better understand
cyber risks was noted throughout this project. As noted in the Literature Review section, such
research about informing stakeholders to enable their understanding of cybersecurity risks is very
promising because of the rapid spread of cyber risks and threats and the urgent need to
comprehend their effects more fully.
The researcher could not complete all the planned build phases because of the timing of
the external legal reviews of the Reprivata Master agreements. While the recommendations for
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enhancing the agreements to map to the NIST CSF version 1.1 standards have been reviewed by
Reprivata management team, they have not been submitted to the attorneys for updating the
Master Agreements until later in 2018.
Conclusions
Assisting a startup cybersecurity company to productize its cyber risk management
solution, particularly one like Reprivata where only one member of the Reprivata team has realworld cybersecurity background and experience, can be challenging and rewarding. The
differences in the use of cybersecurity terminology between the researcher and the Reprivata
management team was one of the significant obstacles in the cyber risk informing objectives of
this project. Through the analysis, design, and evaluation cycles that were part of creating the
artifacts for this project, the overarching goal was increasing the Reprivata team’s understanding
of the broader cybersecurity industry, its vocabulary, and the ways that practitioners in the field
communicated with each other about cyber risks. While this objective was met, it was clear that a
number of informing methods were required to effectively communicate the impacts of cyber
risks. This finding was more related to the specific industry that the cyber risk information was
being shared with than any other factor. Such differences, even small ones, impacted the success
of informing potential clients about the cybersecurity risk management capabilities of the
Reprivata solution during several presentations and also during the interventions.
Even as the researcher and the Reprivata team would gain a common understanding of
the current cyber issues facing the company, another set of risks would appear and the informing
process would begin again. The ultimate success of this research project came down to the
researcher and the Reprivata team reaching an agreement–sometimes on a daily basis–on which
artifacts and other comprehension enablers actually helped both parties understand cyber risks in
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the same way, especially the ones that might affect the Reprivata CoT solution and its
implementation by customers. When this agreement was reached and the Reprivata team
presented the artifacts to potential customers, the meetings were successful in helping the
customers understand the Reprivata cybersecurity controls and functionality, and to identify how
the solution would be useful in the customer’s technology environment to secure sensitive
communications and data. The identification of such use cases led to the first client Proof of
Concept (PoC) agreement with DHS, which was signed in August 2018.
A number of findings were drawn from this ADR project on evaluating and enhancing
the cyber risk informing capabilities of the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution. In
this case, potential challenges to current cybersecurity research initiatives, such as how to deploy
commercially available applications inside the Reprivata solution’s encrypted core and how to
operationalize the threat intelligence functionality both inside and outside Reprivata’s closed
network architecture, were overcome by the use of ADR techniques. Embedding this researcher
in an organization improved team collaboration on creating operations documentation for the
client PoC because sharing design information and improving client deliverables and other
artifacts were seen as informing exercises that enhanced the quality of the communications
between the Reprivata team and DHS. The collaboration that resulted allowed both parties to
both understand and solve cyber risk issues related to the PoC quickly.
This research showed that active involvement of company personnel, SMEs, and
potential customers in ADR artifact evaluations and interventions was most effective when
multiple parties, such as company stakeholder and external SMEs, participated in the sessions.
As a result of this approach, the artifacts took fewer reviews to be accepted. This approach
worked well with DHS as the PoC was defined. Multiple work sessions involving Reprivata and
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DHS personnel used DSR techniques to analyze and design project artifacts. By having already
created a common design approach and agreeing on the PoC functional and operational
requirements, the project had fewer delays in getting formal service agreement approved and
signed.
In creating better ways to inform understanding of cybersecurity risks, cybersecurity
practitioners and stakeholders are still struggling with the terminology required to enable better
understanding of cyber risks. Researchers should continue to account for this when creating
artifacts attempting to increase such comprehension in stakeholders. However, as demonstrated
during this research project, continuously engaging with stakeholders to educate them on the
vocabulary and taxonomy of cybersecurity communications is critical before any informing
messages can be successfully created and then understood by the stakeholders.
Conclusions from the literature review identified a lack of cybersecurity-related literature
on how to assist companies to better understand cyber risks. Research on enabling stakeholders’
understanding of cybersecurity risks appears to be a very promising area of investigation. The
Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution, as a secure, robust, and extensible method of
providing collaboration and data sharing to interconnected stakeholders, provides an interesting
opportunity to evaluate how risk informing the solution would be across industry and corporate
boundaries.
Also, the implementations of cybersecurity risk management solutions to help raise the
understanding of cyber risks with stakeholders face a number of challenges. In particular, the
implementation of such solutions are not keeping pace with the rapid spread of cyber risks and
threats and the urgent needs to determine their effects as accurately and quickly as possible. The
Reprivata solution can be implemented on a number of technology platforms using open source
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software. This ease of implementation could improve the successful deployment of other
technology risk management methodologies if they follow Reprivata’s example for using DSR
techniques to analyze and develop new cybersecurity risk management solutions.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
USING A FITNESS-UTILITY MODEL TO ELABORATE THE IMPACTS OF
ARTIFACTS CREATED TO ENHANCE THE RISK INFORMING CAPABILITIES OF
A CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT SOLUTION
Abstract
While assisting a startup cybersecurity company to productize its cyber risk management
solution, the company’s management team stated that, as a group, they had very little real world
working experience in the cybersecurity field. In an effort to become more cyber aware, the
company’s management requested assistance in creating artifacts, such as solution
documentation and other collateral. The artifacts would enable them to better communicate the
risk informing capabilities of their cybersecurity risk management solution internally to their
business partners and to potential customers. Once these artifacts were created, the FitnessUtility Model proposed by Dr. Grandon Gill and Dr. Alan Hevner (Gill & Hevner, 2011) was
used to evaluate how useful and impactful the artifacts were in increasing the solution’s risk
informing capabilities and to help the company’s management team and other third parties, such
as business partners and potential customers, to better understand cyber risks identified by the
solution.
Introduction
In the academic journals that publish cybersecurity research, scholars are investigating
how to advance a better understanding of cyber risks. However, few cybersecurity risk
management solutions are available to practitioners that could help them both manage and
comprehend the majority of those risks (Contreras, DeNardis, & Teplinsky, 2012). In this body
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of literature, few studies of cybersecurity risk management methodologies have been done to
determine how well they inform users about cyber risks to their particular technology
environments. Additionally, these methods have not been formally evaluated to establish how
well they enable compliance with cybersecurity program standards and maturity measures
(Epstein, & Brown, 2008). With the lack of scholarly articles that have measured the usefulness
and fitness of cybersecurity risk management solutions using research methods, more work is
required. That situation gave rise to this research project, which was an investigation into what
types of artifacts could be created for the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution that
could be useful and effective in informing its users about cyber risks.
The creation of the first artifacts began with two requests from the Reprivata
management team in January 2018. First, they asked for a way to pictorially illustrate the
technology security controls and capabilities in the solution that would make the types of
controls clearer and easier to describe to potential customers. Because the management team did
not have a strong background in cybersecurity controls, such as encryption, access control, and
vulnerability and threat mitigation, a way to clearly and concisely inform potential customers on
the solution’s technical security functionality was needed.
Second, they inquired on better ways to assess and then communicate that the company’s
cybersecurity risk management solution complied with the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF). In 2014, the company had based the
original design of their cybersecurity risk management solution on the newly released NIST
CSF. However, the company had never performed a detailed security control assessment on the
solution against the NIST CSF standards. With business partners and potential customers
requesting validation that the company had performed NIST CSF and other security standards
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reviews on the solution, this became a requirement to increase customer understanding of and
confidence in the solution’s security compliance posture.
The objective of this research project was to research the types of artifacts that could
assist the company in meeting its stated needs and requirements, and use the Action Design
Research (ADR) process to create and evaluate the effectiveness of the artifacts developed. In
this phase of research, the artifact interventions performed as part of the ADR process will be
described and how the fitness and utility of the artifacts can be assessed using the Fitness-Utility
Model, which was proposed by Dr. Grandon Gill and Dr. Alan Hevner in their Association for
Computing Machinery Transactions on Management Information Systems (ACM TMIS) journal
article published in 2011.
Motivation
Determining how the design artifacts developed during this research project enabled the
Reprivata management team to better communicate cyber risk internally, to potential customers,
and to business partners, has been the main of objective of the study since it started. Reprivata is
a four year old company that has struggled with effectively informing partners and potential
users of the industry-leading capabilities of its cybersecurity risk management solution. To meet
these challenges, the researcher created design artifacts to address specific information sharing
requirements related to how the solution communicates cyber risks to users.
This research article discusses the interventions and evaluations performed on the
artifacts developed for enhancing the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution. The
estimates of the artifacts’ fitness and utility were based on the Fitness-Utility Model proposed by
Dr. Gill and Dr. Hevner in 2011. This Model enabled the researcher to study the artifacts and to
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estimate their usefulness as parts of the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution’s
overall design intent.
Interviewing Approach for Artifact Evaluation
During the evaluation of the design artifacts created by utilizing the Design Science
Research (DSR) methodology, participant feedback on the utility of the artifacts gathered direct
observations, such as in-person meetings, Webinars, and conference calls with the participants,
in‐depth, open‐ended interviews performed with Reprivata’s management team, and written
solution and company documentations including design documents, client presentations, and
legal agreements. Every interaction was focused on engaging the participants to capture their
real-world interpretations of the process of designing the artifacts and in the usefulness of the
artifacts in practice. Realistic scenarios were used frequently to identify patterns of response and
common themes by the participants (Patton, 2002).
Of concern with research where the participants provide estimates in response to
questions and other inquiries, the validity of those responses is an important factor. For the
purpose of this investigation, validity is defined as “how accurately the account represents
participants’ realities of the social phenomena and is credible to them” (Cresswell & Miller,
2000). The research assumes the validity refers to the interpretations that can be made from the
data gathered and not to the data itself (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983).
Two of the particular techniques used to determine the validity of participant responses
was by looking at the language and vocabulary used in participant replies and by making use of
participants’ life experiences expressed during the evaluation sessions. This approach was drawn
from the recommended qualitative data analysis strategies recommended by Juliet Corbin and
Anselm Strauss in their book Basics of Qualitative Research (Corbin & Strauss, 2014). Corbin
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and Strauss stated that unstructured interviews and observations are recommended in this type of
research because the approach allows the participants to focus on those issues that are most
meaningful to them and go into such topics in great detail (Corbin & Strauss, 2014). This
approach is very advantageous when developing analyzing design requirements and evaluating
the results of the design build iteration for its utility and applicability to practice.
Personal observations were an important part of this study, as suggested by qualitative
research literature (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). From a researcher’s perspective, these in-person
discussions and collaborations were critically important for capturing the company’s information
for the case study, and for documenting the design requirements for the artifacts during the DSR
iterations. These observations offered opportunities to develop more context around both the
interview responses and the recommendations for enhancing the design artifacts.
Description of the Fitness-Utility Model Utilized
The Fitness-Utility Model was developed as a way to capture and evaluate how design
artifacts change and improve over time. This Model also assists in determining the fitness of a
particular design across a fitness landscape, which is defined by the authors as “a mapping
between attributes and fitness that exists in the real world, but which is not observable” (Gill &
Hevner, 2011).
This particular method has several advantages that make it suited for this research. As
proposed by Drs. Gill and Hevner, determining the usefulness for design artifacts is in alignment
with Design Research concepts. The use of fitness and utility models is understood by both
academics and practitioners, and has been found to communicate how well artifacts can
demonstrate fitness in attributes of their designs (Gill & Hevner, 2011).
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The Fitness-Utility Model applied to this research (see Figure 3) is used to help
demonstrate that a design artifact has an associated fitness, based on specific attributes that the
artifact’s creator uses to make estimates of the artifact’s usefulness within the system it is being
designed for. Once evaluated, artifacts can provide more concrete evidence that a particular
design has intrinsic value within that system and can otherwise evolve over time and improve the
artifact’s abilities to describe the fitness of the particular design system (Gill and Hevner, 2011).
Important in the case of this research project, the Fitness-Utility Model provides a vehicle for
communicating between the creators of the potential design system and other stakeholders, and
for providing a way to keep and share pertinent information about the design of the artifacts that
are indicators of its usefulness.
Design Science strives to impact the design space that is being reviewed or used in such a
way that design artifacts with a high level of fitness are continually introduced into the design
system. This effect is realized in two ways: through the creation of artifacts that can show
adaptability or the ability to evolve, and through the improvements in utility of the design
artifacts that are shown through evaluations of those artifacts (Gill & Hevner, 2011).
The evaluation of design artifacts should be based on a more extensive and detailed
utility function, instead of just the artifact’s usefulness, that estimates the artifact’s ability to
evolve to maintain or extend its fitness. Utility attributes support a design artifact and a design
system to evolve on an incremental basis, inspire designers and users to test and experiment with
artifacts and their related systems, and to communicate ideas and other information that will help
the design system and artifacts to proliferate and to become new and interesting over time (Gill
& Hevner, 2011).
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Figure 3 – Fitness-Utility Model for Design Research (Figure from Gill & Hevner, 2011)

Artifact Description – Reprivata Community of Trust Conceptual Model
The Conceptual Model for the Reprivata Community of Trust cybersecurity risk
management solution describes the elements that are part of the solution and shows, in a pictorial
way, how those elements can be affected and act together under the NISF CSF compliance
requirements. In the Conceptual Model (see Figure 4), it seeks to articulate and explain the
interactions of elements that influence successful Community of Trust (CoT) implementations.
These elements help determine and, in some cases, manage the resources within these projects as
part of the overarching corporate business strategy which determines the cyber risk posture, and
how that posture can be managed and measured. These are two distinct groups of elements. One
element is composed of the cybersecurity frameworks and contractual obligations, in the form of
Master Agreement legal documents that provide structure to the CoT. The other element
provides the rules of engagement and operational requirements for the Internal and External
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Stakeholders of the CoT. These Stakeholders take the form of company management and
governance as well as third parties that do business with or have influence on the company as
oversight and compliance functions.
The External Stakeholders in the Model are CoT oversight functions, known as the CoT
Privacy Authority. The CoT Privacy Authority is charged with reviewing how the CoT users
meet their obligations under the Master Agreements and their NIST CSF compliance
requirements.

Figure 4 – Proposed Conceptual Model – Reprivata Cybersecurity Community of Trust

Artifact Evolution
When the Conceptual Model was being designed and created, it was a new artifact that
did not exist previously as part of Reprivata’s risk informing collateral. The Model went through
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2 iterations before it was accepted by the Reprivata management team and published in its
current version.
The first version of the Model only mapped the Community of Trust Risk Management
Strategy and Community of Trust Governance elements, which map very closely to the NIST
CSF version 1.0 controls.
The second version of the Model was mapped to NIST CSF version 1.1, which had been
released in April 2018. The most important update to NIST CSF version 1.1 was the inclusion of
Supply Chain Management (shown in the Model as Interconnected Third Parties) and the
controls required by the updated framework. The revised model also included the Internal
Stakeholders, which are shown as corporate management functions.
Risk Informing Changes Made When the Artifact Was Implemented
When the Conceptual Model was shared with Reprivata’s business partners and potential
customers, these groups were able to better understand how security governance, compliance,
and other controls in the NIST CSF could be enabled or enhanced by using the Reprivata
cybersecurity risk management solution. Potential customers, including the Cyber Florida and
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), defined specific secure data sharing and
collaboration use cases that could improve their understanding of cyber risks. C2, DHS, FSISAC were able to define use cases based on the Conceptual Model that could improve
understanding of cyber risks. Some of the use cases identified included:


The deployment of a CoT for the Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) in the
State of Florida University System to use when they were required to collaborate and
share data regarding security events that affected one or more of the state universities.
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The design of a Proof of Concept (PoC) that would enable DHS investigators to share
information on investigations and interact securely with other government agencies like
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).



The Financial Services-Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC) requested a
PoC to securely share sensitive security information about Internet threats and
vulnerabilities with members of the ISAC.

Specific Cases Where the Artifact Made the Company Make Changes in the Way They
Communicated Cyber Risks
Initially, Reprivata’s management believed that the Master Agreements, which set forth
the terms and conditions for companies that deployed a CoT for itself and entities it desired to
collaborate and share information with, were their primary product. At that time, Reprivata had
decided to give away its CoT cybersecurity risk management solution if customers purchased the
Master Agreements. This approach confused potential customers and devalued the company’s
unique technology. Also, while the Master Agreements addressed the requirement for CoT users
to comply with the NIST CSF standards, they did not show how the overall structure of the CoT
solution complied with the security controls as part of its overall design.
However, after sharing the Conceptual Model with potential customers, the company
realized the integration of the CoT cybersecurity risk management solution and the Master
Agreements was the approach that better informed customers of Reprivata’s product and its
capabilities. The Conceptual Model made the company realize that the integrated solution was a
unique cybersecurity risk management offering that had NIST CSF compliance designed into
and implemented by the solution.
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Quotes from Intervention Participants About the Artifact
“The Conceptual Model enabled us to visualize how our solution, based on the NIST
CSF, could enable collaboration between groups in an organization that needed to
communicate and share data.” – Reprivata Management Team
“The Model helped us understand the concepts and relationships of the Reprivata
solution. We used it when creating our use case to determine if we had identified the
related work groups that needed to collaborate on security investigations.” – Customer
who engaged Reprivata for Proof of Concept
“The Model helped us quickly understand how the Reprivata solution could be leverage
the NIST CSF controls and help those controls be more widely implemented across an
organization.” – Reprivata Business Partner
Artifact Description – NIST CSF Assessment for the Reprivata CoT Cybersecurity Risk
Management Solution (version 4)
The NIST CSF Compliance Matrix was crested to assess the security controls and
capabilities of the Reprivata CoT cybersecurity risk management solution (see Table 8). The
Compliance Matrix provides information on how those controls are implemented and if they are
compliant with the NIST CSF requirements. The Matrix categorizes the security controls as
Technology controls, Enabling controls, or controls that should be considered for inclusion in
Reprivata’s Master Agreements to inform users of their security responsibilities as members of
the CoT.
Technology controls are security functions that are part of the CoT solution’s design,
architecture, and implementation. The Reprivata CoT cybersecurity risk management solution, in
its initial design, was conceived to meet or exceed the security control requirements outlined in
the NIST CSF. This Matrix provided the Reprivata management team and its potential customers
with a very straightforward way to identify how its technology complied with the NIST CSF
security requirements.
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Enabling Controls, where the CoT security functionality supports or enhances the
implementation of another control, were an important addition to the Matrix. This specific
control review was added to the Matrix in order to inform potential customers on how the
Technology-related controls in the CoT application and other controls which are based more on
policies and procedures could be more easily managed and monitored through the use of the
collaboration and data sharing functions of the solution.
Process improvement, program management, and similar controls that, when implemented,
would help users mature their risk management postures through exchanging threat and security
information. These controls were recommended for inclusion in the Reprivata Master Agreement
to add more structure and focus to the CoT rules of engagement on how users are required to
manage and improve their interactions with other users while they are collaborating and sharing
sensitive data in the CoT.
Table 8 - NIST CSF Assessment and Findings for the Reprivata Community of Trust (CoT)
Cybersecurity Risk Management Solution
NIST CSF
Functional Area

Identify
Protect
Detect
Respond
Recover
Total

Reprivata CoT
Solution
Compliant with
Key Controls
15 out of 29 key
controls
18 out of 39 key
controls
15 out of 18 key
controls
13 out of 15 key
controls
4 out of 6 key
controls
65 out of 107 key
controls

Technology
Controls

Enabling
Controls

Master
Agreement
Controls

5

14

10

12

21

6

11

3

4

3

2

10

0

2

4

31

42

34
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Artifact Evolution
When the Compliance Matrix was being designed and created, it was a new artifact that
did not exist previously as part of Reprivata’s security documentation for the solution. The
Matrix went through four iterations before it was accepted by the Reprivata management team
and published in its current version.
The first version of the Matrix mapped the solution compliance by high level Function
and Category of the NIST CSF version 1.0 controls. It was originally created after a meeting
with DHS in Washington, DC. The DHS security Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) asked if
Reprivata had ever assessed its solution against the NIST CSF guidelines, and Reprivata
answered that it had not. That afternoon, the researcher drafted the first assessment Matrix that
covered the five Functional areas and 22 Categories of NIST CSF version 1.0. When the
Reprivata solution was reviewed, it was determined that it could, at a high level, meet or exceed
20 of the 22 requirements. The two Categories that the solution could not directly meet were
Protection functional controls related to categories Awareness and Training and Maintenance.
The second version of the Matrix was expanded to do a more detailed mapping of the
Technology controls in NIST CSF version 1.0 to the solution. This version was a very revealing
document to both the Reprivata management team and to potential customers. This Matrix
demonstrated that, through the use of technology such as data encryption, security monitoring,
and access management, the solution could meet 30 of the over 100 security controls in the NIST
CSF version 1.0.
After the second revision of the Matrix, the Reprivata management team asked if a
demonstration could be performed to show that using the CoT could actually make it easier for
customers to implement security controls like policies and procedures. After some discussion,
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the researcher developed the idea of Enabling Controls, where technology controls would
support or speed up the deployment of security processes based on policies and procedures. The
third version of the Matrix was designed to evaluate how such Enabling controls might work in
practice. While documenting the third iteration, some controls were identified that attempted to
address the need for factors like security program maturity and process improvements. After
reviewing these items with the Reprivata management team, a new control evaluation was
identified for these factors and were captured separately. Because they are potentially useful to
many other CoT users, the researcher decided to use the factors as recommendations for
inclusion in the Reprivata Master Agreements, where they can influence how CoT users interact
with each other over time.
The fourth version of the Matrix was performed in July 2018 in response to the
publication of NIST CSF version 1.1 in April 2018. This version was a relatively minor update,
since the new NIST CSF guidelines added only one new category of controls for Supply Chain
Management. In Table 8, the overall compliance with the NIST CSF version 1.1 controls
reached 65 of 107 total controls, with 42 controls being enabled and supported because of the
interaction with technology controls.
Risk Informing Changes Made When the Artifact Was Implemented
Using the Compliance Matrix for both internal solution design and implementation
discussions, Reprivata management learned how to better communicate, at the individual
security control level, how the solution complied with the NIST CSF. As the Matrix information
was added to product presentations, customer interest in use cases and PoCs grew because
Reprivata could now demonstrate the solution’s NIST CSF compliance in an easy-to-understand
and risk informed way.
68

With the addition of the Enabling control assessment information in the Matrix,
Reprivata’s management could better explain how the solution supported the more effective
implementation of policy, process, and procedure controls. The CoT provided a secure
communication, collaboration, and data sharing environment for security and risk management
practitioners to utilize when they created and discussed these controls and any attendant risks.
After reviewing the Matrix, Reprivata customers better understood how the CoT solution could
improve their compliance postures by enabling them to more quickly create, deploy, and mature
risk informed security programs, which are deemed to be at the Tier 2 level of maturity in the
NIST CSF. The goal for security organizations that adopt the NIST CSF is aspiring to implement
a security program with repeatable security controls using technologies, processes, and policies,
described as the Tier 3 level of maturity.
Specific Cases Where the Artifact Made the Company Make Changes in the Way They
Communicated Cyber Risks
After reviewing the Matrix with a key business partner, the Reprivata management team
realized that the Technology control compliance achieved by the CoT solution met the
requirements of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which standardizes data
protection laws across all 28 European Union (EU) countries and imposes strict new rules on
controlling and processing Personally Identifiable Information (PII). This realization opened a
potentially new market for Reprivata’s CoT solution for Europe and other areas of the world.
The NIST CSF is primarily a United States security standard, so the CoT solution’s ability to
readily comply with international standards like GDPR is a tremendous market advantage.
Quotes from Intervention Participants About the Artifact
“The Compliance Matrix provided us with an understanding of the solution’s overall
compliance with NIST CSF as well as a way to explain to customer how the solution
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supports the implementation of policies and procedure through the use of its collaboration
capabilities.” – Reprivata Management
“Upon review of the Compliance Matrix, it was easy to see how the solution would also
provide a way for a CoT to comply with GDPR, because the control guidelines are very
similar and the controls are already implemented in the solution.” – Reprivata Business
Partner
Evaluation of the Artifacts’ Usefulness Based on the Fitness-Utility Model
Reprivata Community of Trust Conceptual Model (version 2)
The final intervention on the CoT Conceptual Model artifact was held at the Cyber
Florida offices at the University of South Florida on August 22, 2018. This meeting was the
follow up from the intervention performed with the Cyber Florida team on March 9, 2018, where
the Reprivata team discussed the first version of the Conceptual Model with the Cyber Florida
SMEs.
The purpose of this intervention was for the Cyber Florida team to provide their
professional evaluations and observations on how well the Model informed them on the potential
interactions of the CoT solution with its internal and external stakeholders as they worked to
become more compliant with the NIST CSF.
This table shows how the intervention participants rated the Model’s usefulness, based on
the fitness attributes that make up the Fitness-Utility model (see Table 9).
Table 9 – Estimates of Artifact Usefulness for the Proposed Conceptual Model for the Reprivata
Cybersecurity Community of Trust
Artifact Fitness
Attribute
Decomposable
The ability of a design to evolve
incrementally.

Estimate of
Artifact’s
Usefulness

Observations from
Intervention Participants
 New conceptual elements could be easily
added to the Model when required.
 Interactions of conceptual elements could be
readily identified.
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Table 9 (Continued)
Malleable
The degree to which artifacts can be
adapted by its users and respond to
changing use/market environments.

Open
The degree to which artifacts are
open to inspection, modification,
and reuse.

Embedded in Design
System
Artifacts created are part of a
sustainable design system
environment rather than one that is
produced in a context where design
is an unusual activity.

 The Model could be used by both government
agencies and commercial firms.
 Use cases where internal and external
stakeholders needed to collaborate could be
created.
 The Model was modified to address customerspecific conceptual elements and showed how
they interacted with other elements.
 Conceptual elements in the Model are part of
the CoT solution’s overall design.
 The Model could be adapted to new design
criteria in the CoT solution.

 The Model is a common design artifact so it is
easy to understand by stakeholders.

Novel
A design that originates from an
unexplored region of the design
fitness landscape.

Interesting
Artifacts that demonstrate
unexpected emergent behaviors that
are worthy of subsequent
investigation and the creation of
subsequent artifacts or artifacts that
can be constructed in an unexpected
way that intrigue other designers or
design researchers.

Elegant
Artifacts which have design
characteristics, such as compactness,
simplicity, transparency of use,
transparency of behavior, clarity of
representation, that can invite
surprise about, delight in, imitation
of, and enhancement of the artifact.

 The Model helps to identify unique
interactions between the organization and the
capabilities of the CoT solution.

 The Model is straightforward and
communicates compliance interactions
between internal and external stakeholders.

Legend:
Artifact Attribute
Meets Definition

Artifact Attribute Meets
Part of Definition

Artifact Attribute Does
Not Meet Definition
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From review of the estimates of the Model’s Fitness-Utility attributes, the Reprivata
Community of Trust Conceptual Model improved communication about the cybersecurity risk
management capabilities of the CoT solution and how groups that used or were planning to use
the CoT solution could interact based in its internal security functionality. Improvement to its
informing capabilities could have been made as subsequent versions of the artifacts were
designed and implemented.
NIST CSF Assessment for the Reprivata CoT Cybersecurity Risk Management Solution (version
4)
The final intervention on the NIST CSF Assessment Matrix for the Reprivata CoT
solution artifact was held at the University of South Florida on August 10, 2018. This meeting
was held between the Reprivata management team and one of the company’s key business
partners. That partner had developed an online Web site that enabled customers to perform an
assessment of various security frameworks, including the NIST CSF.
The purpose of this intervention was for a group of SMEs with a key Reprivata business
partner to provide their professional evaluations and observations on how well the Matrix
informed them on the overall compliance of the CoT solution with the NISF CSF standards. This
assessment identified the ways the CoT solution’s technology controls and their potential
enabling abilities supported the implementation of other non-technology controls, such as
policies and procedures. The CoT solution was determined, based on the discussions with its
internal and external stakeholders as they worked to become more compliant with the NIST CSF
standards, to provide a significant level of compliance with the security control requirements.
This table shows how the intervention participants rated the Matrix’s usefulness based on
the fitness attributes that make up the Fitness-Utility model (see Table 10).
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Table 10 – Estimates of Artifact Usefulness for the NIST CSF Assessment for the Reprivata
Cybersecurity Community of Trust
Artifact Fitness
Attribute
Decomposable
The ability of a design to evolve
incrementally.

Malleable
The degree to which artifacts can be
adapted by its users and respond to
changing use/market environments.

Open
The degree to which artifacts are
open to inspection, modification,
and reuse.

Embedded in Design
System

Estimate of
Artifact’s
Usefulness

Observations from
Intervention Participants
 The Matrix was straightforward and
communicated control interactions.
 The effects of Enabling Controls on overall
compliance was communicated clearly.
 Individual control requirements could be
compared with each other and with those of
other security standards to evaluate their
similarities and differences.
 The Matrix could be restructured to map
controls of specific types, implementation, or
governance.
 The Matrix could be readily adapted to other
security standards.
 The Matrix demonstrated that compliance to
NIST CSF security standard was integral to the
CoT solution design intent.

Artifacts created are part of a
sustainable design system
environment rather than one that is
produced in a context where design
is an unusual activity.

Novel
A design that originates from an
unexplored region of the design
fitness landscape.

Interesting
Artifacts that demonstrate
unexpected emergent behaviors that
are worthy of subsequent
investigation and the creation of
subsequent artifacts or artifacts that
can be constructed in an unexpected
way that intrigue other designers or
design researchers.

Elegant
Artifacts that have design
characteristics, such as compactness,
simplicity, transparency of use,
transparency of behavior, clarity of
representation, that can invite
surprise about, delight in, imitation
of, and enhancement of the artifact.

 The inclusion of Enabling Controls and Master
Agreement Control recommendations showed
that the CoT solution is integrated to enable
compliance at each part.
 Significant interest has been expressed in
determining how the CoT solution can be
utilized in other areas, such as Legal, Human
Resources, and Mergers and Acquisitions,
where the need to secure collaboration and
data sharing are required.
 Further investigation on how Enabling
Controls lead to cyber maturity was
recommended.
 The Matrix was very comprehensive but could
have been easier to work with.
 Automating the compliance assessment and
evaluation was recommended.
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Table 10 (Continued)

Legend:
Artifact Attribute
Meets Definition

Artifact Attribute Meets
Part of Definition

Artifact Attribute Does
Not Meet Definition

From a review of the Model’s Fitness-Utility attributes estimates, the NIST CSF
Assessment for the Reprivata CoT solution improved communication about how well the CoT
solution complied with the NIST CSF standards. Of particular interest was how the assessment
of Enabling Controls enhanced the CoT solution’s overall compliance potential for
organizations. By supporting the implementation of non-technology controls through the use of
collaboration and data sharing functionalities designed into the CoT solution, achieving,
maintaining, and maturing future compliance to the NIST CSF and other cybersecurity standards
could be easier.
Discussion and Interpretation of Results
The impacts from the interventions were significant to the Reprivata management team
and the intervention participants. For both design artifacts, the Reprivata team and the
intervention participants agreed that they were better informed about cyber risk compliance and
how various groups could collaborate together to achieve NIST CSF compliance. Additionally,
the groups stated that their understanding of the vocabulary used in cybersecurity increased with
the reviews of the design artifacts as they were about to gain more context about cybersecurity
concepts in relation to their organizations and how they managed their security programs.
In the discussion with potential clients and the intervention participants about the
versions of the Reprivata Community of Trust Conceptual Model, the most interesting impact of
the Model was the way that various compliance requirements between internal and external
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stakeholders could be easily identified and discussed. Demonstrating, initially at a high level, the
various types of potential activities that an organization’s internal and external stakeholder must
evaluate as they worked to comply with the NIST CSF implementation and maturity
requirements led to some rich conversations. These communications began to articulate the
usefulness of the CoT solution’s capabilities as an important enabling part of a maturing
cybersecurity program.
In the case of the NIST CSF Assessment Matrix for the Reprivata CoT Solution, the
interesting impact of the design artifact was the introduction and acceptance of Enabling
Controls as a way to increase the adoption of critical security controls and measure their
compliance with the NIST CSF. The intervention participants agreed that the Enabling Controls
helped them easily identify and show the interrelationships of various types of controls and how
technology controls can influence the effectiveness of controls based on policies and procedures.
While this research did not propose a quantitative method for measuring the influences of
Enabling Controls on an organization’s compliance program, such research would be an
interesting area of future investigation.
Using a Fitness-Utility Model, such as the one proposed by Drs. Gill and Hevner, helped
both the researcher and the intervention participants to break down the various impacts of the
design artifacts and to estimate which fitness attributes were important in showing the usefulness
of the artifacts. As stated above, additional study into finding more quantitative ways to evaluate
the fitness attributes to show improvements in the evolution of design artifacts would be a
stimulating project.
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CHAPTER SIX:
CONCLUSION, CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE
RESEARCH
Conclusions
Based on the literature review performed, a number of cybersecurity gaps were noted,
especially related to the effective communication and measurement of cybersecurity risks. The
differences in the use of cybersecurity terminology between the participants in this project were
significant obstacles in the cyber risk informing objectives of this research. Additionally, the
literature review identified a lack of cybersecurity-related literature on how to assist companies
to better understand cyber risks.
The Reprivata CoT cybersecurity risk management solution is an industry-leading
application with the capability to help disseminate a wide variety of cybersecurity information to
the internal and external stakeholders of an organization. By developing an understanding of the
security control types that were part of the solution’s design requirements, useful design artifacts
were created that improved the ways that Reprivata, its business partners, and potential
customers could discuss the solution’s security controls and their ability to comply with the
NIST CSF more easily and in more detail, with a better understanding between the parties.
Helping cybersecurity practitioners as well as other people who are impacted by cyber
risks to better understand those risks is a daunting task. It is becoming more difficult as the
number and types of cyber risks grow over time. Taking up this challenge, this research project
was able to appraise the usefulness of design artifacts that, according to cybersecurity
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practitioners, improved the understanding of these risks when evaluated using a Fitness-Utility
Model. While the findings are estimates, the increase in communication and information sharing
by internal and external stakeholders of the solution were strong indicators that improvements
did occur, though they could not be quantitatively measured at this time.
The interventions performed on the design artifacts identified the ways that cybersecurity
practitioners communicate with each other and how they do so with people with less
cybersecurity experience. This realization was very important to the Reprivata management team
because it radically changed the way they communicated how their solution informed its users
about cyber risks. The artifacts designed to assist in this informing process were not unique, but
they did include new concepts, such as demonstrating the interactions of Enabling Controls on
other controls and providing important context on how the Reprivata CoT solution was able to
take advantage of these Enabling Controls because of the design intent where the NIST CSF
cybersecurity framework was integrated into the technology.
The differences in the use of cybersecurity terminology used by the research participants
was a significant obstacle in meeting the cyber risk informing objectives of this project. Through
the DSR analysis, design, and evaluation cycles that were part of creating the artifacts for this
project, the overarching goal was increasing the participants’ understanding of the vocabulary of
cybersecurity risks and improving the ways cyber risks are communicated. While this objective
was met, it was clear that a number of informing methods were required to effectively
communicate the impacts of cyber risks. This finding was more related to the specific industry
that cyber risk information was being shared with than any other factor. Such differences, even
small ones, impacted the success of informing potential clients about the cybersecurity risk
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management capabilities of the Reprivata solution during several presentations and also during
the interventions.
Even as the study participants would gain a common understanding of the current cyber
issues facing the company, another set of risks would appear and the informing process would
begin again. The ultimate success of this research project came down to the participants reaching
an agreement – sometimes on a daily basis – on which artifacts and other comprehension aids
actually helped both parties understand cyber risks in the same way, especially the ones that
might affect the Reprivata CoT solution and its implementation by customers. When this
agreement was reached and the Reprivata team presented the artifacts to potential customers, the
meetings were successful in helping the customers understand the Reprivata cybersecurity
controls and functionality, and to identify how the solution would be useful in the customer’s
technology environment to secure sensitive communications and data. The identification of such
use cases led to the first client Proof of Concept (PoC) agreement with DHS, which was signed
in August 2018.
A number of conclusions were drawn from this ADR project on evaluating and
enhancing the cyber risk informing capabilities of the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management
solution. In this case, potential challenges to current cybersecurity research initiatives, such as
how to deploy commercially available applications inside the Reprivata solution’s encrypted
core and how to operationalize the threat intelligence functionality both inside and outside
Reprivata’s closed network architecture, were overcome by the use of ADR techniques.
Embedding this researcher in an organization improved team collaboration on creating
operations documentation for the client PoC because sharing of design information and
improving client deliverables and other artifacts were seen as informing exercises that enhanced
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the quality of the communications between the Reprivata team and DHS. The collaboration that
resulted allowed both parties to understand and solve cyber risk issues related to the PoC
quickly.
This research showed that active involvement of company personnel, SMEs, and
potential customers in ADR artifact evaluations and interventions was most effective when
multiple parties, such as company stakeholder and external SMEs, participated in the sessions.
As a result of this approach, the artifacts took fewer reviews to be accepted. This approach
worked well with DHS as the PoC was defined. Multiple work sessions involving Reprivata and
DHS personnel used DSR techniques to analyze and design project artifacts. By having already
created a common design approach and agreeing on the PoC functional and operational
requirements, the project had fewer delays in getting formal service agreement approved and
signed.
In creating better ways to inform understanding of cybersecurity risks, cybersecurity
practitioners and stakeholders are still struggling with the terminology required to enable better
understanding of cyber risks. Researchers should continue to account for this when creating
artifacts attempting to increase such comprehension in stakeholders. However, as demonstrated
during this research project, continuously engaging with stakeholders to educate them on the
vocabulary and taxonomy of cybersecurity communications is critical before any informing
messages can be successfully created and then understood by the stakeholders.
Also, the implementations of cybersecurity risk management solutions to help raise the
understanding cyber risks with stakeholders face a number of challenges. In particular, the
implementation of such solutions are not keeping pace with the rapid spread of cyber risks and
threats and the urgent needs to determine their effects as accurately and quickly as possible. The
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Reprivata solution can be implemented on a number of technology platforms using open source
software. This ease of implementation could improve the successful deployment of other
technology risk management methodologies is they follow Reprivata’s example for using DSR
techniques to analyze and develop new cybersecurity risk management solutions.
Contributions
Research Contributions


Contributions from the Case Study Paper

In this paper, “Implementing a Cybersecurity Community of Trust: Reprivata Seeks an
“Early Adopter”” (Fulford, 2018), a new and promising cybersecurity risk management solution
was identified and the management team was interviewed to determine some of the challenges it
faced while attempting to get its first client. The case study identified several challenges the
company faced, both with the design of its solution as well as with the messaging and
communications about the solution’s cybersecurity risk management capabilities. These gaps
served as the initial topics of discussion for analyzing the solution design for creating the
requirements for the artifacts. The case study will inform both academics and practitioners on
how differences in vocabulary and taxonomy can negatively impact both the design and ultimate
customer acceptance of a new cybersecurity risk management solution.


Contributions from the Technical Note Paper

This paper, “A Note on the Cybersecurity Problem Spaces in 2018” (Fulford, 2018), was
a supplement to the case study. It identified challenges that are facing governments, industries,
and individuals related to cybersecurity. Informing gaps and cybersecurity control
implementation issues were identified from the discussions of the numerous cybersecurity
problem spaces. This gap analysis was used to help determine what type of artifacts would be
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required and what types of information they would need to convey to internal and external
stakeholders of cybersecurity risk management solutions.


Contributions from the Design Science Research Paper

This paper, “Evaluating and Enhancing the Risk Informing Capabilities of a
Cybersecurity Risk Management Solution Using Action Design Research” (Fulford, 2018), was
authored while the researcher was embedded with the target company, Reprivata. This ability to
review all design documentation of the company’s cybersecurity risk management solution,
interact with company management, and participate in meeting with business partners and
potential clients offered advantages for this research. It made understanding the solution’s design
much easier and facilitated the analysis, creation, and evaluation of the design artifacts. A key
contribution of this paper was the identification of Enabling Controls and being able to perform
an initial assessment of control interrelationships as they were implemented in the solution.


Contributions from the Enhance Action Design Research Paper

This paper, “Using a Fitness-Utility Model to Elaborate the Impacts of Artifacts Created
to Enhance the Risk Informing Capabilities of a Cybersecurity Risk Management Solution”
(Fulford, 2018), demonstrated the use of a proposed fitness-utility model during the evaluations
of the design artifacts created and reviewed in Paper 3. By informing on expert estimates of
design utility, this model provides practitioners with a way to facilitate discussions on the
usefulness of future artifacts. This paper also showed the design research contribution types (see
Table 11) for each of the artifacts. By estimating design artifacts for usefulness and then
determining what types of contribution is being made to the overall design, practitioners now
have a better way to inform their stakeholders on the risk informing capabilities of cybersecurity
control and risk management solutions.
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Overall, in evaluating the results from the interventions, improvements were noted on
how the intervention participants moved toward a more consistent use of cybersecurity
vocabulary over the course of those meetings. Such an improvement of the communication of
cybersecurity risks and controls was the primary objective of this research. As the first design
artifact was created, the Conceptual Model helped set a starting point for discussing how
compliance to the NIST CSF could impact an organization at multiple levels, which was very
useful in showing how the Reprivata CoT solution could enable a compliance program’s
implementation and maturity.
However, the iterations of the Model did not include enough operational elements of an
organization to show where the intersection of control definition and control management meet
and where the compliance requirements of a cybersecurity program are actually measured. A
deeper operational analysis of control deployment and compliance measures should be
performed so the conceptual elements and their interactions with other elements can be included
in the future iterations of the Model.
Because more interventions were performed on the NIST CSF Assessment Matrix for the
Reprivata CoT Solution than on the Conceptual Model, the intervention participants stated that it
was easier to understand and communicate its findings. Also, the participants found it to have
more flexibility in examining controls, especially how the Technology Controls and the Enabling
Controls worked in concert to support overall compliance with the NIST CSF.
The participants also stated that the Matrix was cumbersome and more difficult to use in
its current form, especially when automated compliance assessment tools are available. While
the automated compliance tools reviewed to not include Enabling Controls, adding that type of
control analysis to such a tool would not be difficult. At this time, Reprivata is speaking with one
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of its business partners that offers a control analysis application about updating it with a section
that measures the potential impacts of Enabling Controls on the broader compliance
cybersecurity program.
The design intent and characteristics of the two artifacts were reviewed against the
Design Science Contribution Types table, which was included in the MIS Quarterly article by
Drs. Gregor and Hevner published in 2013 (see Table 11) (Gregor & Hevner, 2013). From that
evaluation, the Conceptual Model would be considered a Level 2 contribution to research. The
Model’s use of key conceptual organizational elements to describe and communicate how those
elements interact to influence compliance with the NIST CSF is key because of its potential
impact on better understanding how cybersecurity risks and compliance to cybersecurity
standards are useful in the ways an organization works with internal and external stakeholders.
The NIST CSF Assessment Matrix would be considered a Level 1 contribution to
research because it focuses on implemented or established processes. Designed to be a more
comprehensive cyber risk communicator than the Conceptual Model, the Matrix can be used to
quickly analyze control compliance and comment upon the ways some controls can support and
enable the implementation and maturity of other ones. Such matrices are often developed when
cybersecurity researchers are studying how organizations comply with security and risk
management guidelines. This Matrix, through its design intent and subsequent enhancements
through interventions, begins to assess the impact of Enabling Controls on organizational
compliance with cybersecurity standards, and suggests avenues of future research on the
measurement of Enabling Control impacts on other security and operational controls.
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Table 11 – Design Science Research Contributions by Artifact Type (from Gregor & Hevner, 2013)

Design Science Research Contributions by Artifact Type

More abstract, complete, and
mature knowledge

More specific, limited, and less
mature knowledge

Contribution Types
Level 3. Well-developed design
theory about embedded
phenomena

Example Artifacts
Design theories (mid-range and
grand theories)

Level 2. Nascent design
theory—knowledge as
operational
principles/architecture

Constructs, methods, models,
design principles, technological
rules.

Level 1. Situated
implementation of artifact

Instantiations (software products
or implemented processes)

Perhaps the most significant outcome from the uses of the design artifacts created during
this research project is that Reprivata has acquired several customers since the project began.
Reprivata’s management team has stated that including these design artifacts in Reprivata’s sales
and product presentations has helped improve internal understanding of cybersecurity risks and
increased customer interest in the CoT solution.
Contributions to Practice
Both of the design artifacts are useful in a broader context for cybersecurity and
compliance practitioners. For example, the Conceptual Model was created so the various
elements could be compared, individually, in groups, or all together, in order to investigate how
the elements influence NIST CSF compliance. The same type of Model would work when
comparing other compliance frameworks beyond cybersecurity, since the implementation
processes for compliance programs have many of the same requirements, regardless of the type
of standard or guideline to be deployed.
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The Compliance Matrix could be very helpful in situations where compliance
professionals are attempting to understand how specific types of cybersecurity controls work in
different compliance environments. While the Matrix is designed to help evaluate the NIST CSF
standard, it could be used to map other security control frameworks, such as the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) 27001 and GDPR.
By adding the analysis of Enabling Controls into the assessment evaluation process
presented in this research, practitioners will be able to get a much broader view of their
organization’s compliance environment and potentially find areas of non-compliance of controls
before any control weakness can be exploited.
Limitations of Current Research
Limitations of this research were related to the challenges with setting up interventions
and getting feedback from participants. In particular, non-disclosure agreements with potential
customers limited the researcher’s ability to hold group meetings to discuss the design artifacts,
which could have led to more enhancements to the design artifacts.
One issue in the research was the proximity of the participants. They lived all over the
United States and overseas. This factor made scheduling of meetings for interviews, artifact
design sessions, and subsequent evaluations very difficult. Interventions were held with three of
the Reprivata team in person on two different occasions, which did allow for very useful
interchanges. More face-to-face meetings would have likely provided additional and better
insights into the informing capabilities of the Reprivata CoT solutions and the artifacts produced.
The small number of potential Reprivata customers and cybersecurity SMEs that were
able to review and comment on the artifacts through either presentations or intervention sessions
meant there were fewer estimates of the utility of the design artifacts. A total of six intervention
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meetings, four with customers and two with SME groups, were held and the feedback from those
sessions provided valuable comments and recommendations for improving the artifacts.
However, to better judge the informing capabilities of the artifacts to help improve understanding
of cyber risks, more such evaluation and intervention sessions would be required.
Another limitation is that the artifacts ability to improve in communicating cybersecurity
risks was only estimated during the evaluation discussions. The participants stated that their
understanding of cybersecurity risks increased during the interventions and they were better able
to communicate the implications of those risks afterwards. Even with that advance in informing
capabilities, the research did not include any comprehension or content testing in order to get
more accurate measurements of those improvement.
Also, the Master Agreement control recommendations, while reviewed, were not
implemented in the legal documents so they could be reviewed by the intervention participants.
The participants discussed how the Master Agreements could be used to establish rules of
engagement for collaborating on cyber risk, but they could not comment on how the
recommendations actually increased the usefulness of the Master Agreements.
A lack of cybersecurity-related literature on how to assist companies to better understand
cyber risks was noted throughout this project. As noted above, such research about informing
stakeholders to enable their understanding of cybersecurity risks is very promising because of the
rapid spread of cyber risks and threats, and the urgent need to comprehend their effects more
fully.
All the planned build phases related to the Master Agreements could not be completed
because of the timing of the external legal reviews of those contracts. While the
recommendations for enhancing the agreements to map to the NIST CSF version 1.1 standards
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have been reviewed by Reprivata management team, they have not been submitted to the
attorneys for updating the Master Agreements until later in 2018.
The maturity assessment mechanism for the cybersecurity risk management solution
could not be completed during this research project. The compliance matrix that was created
provides a way to measure the effective implementation of cybersecurity controls, but it does not
provide the repeatability measures that the maturity assessment could provide.
Areas Requiring More Research
Research into data analytic techniques that help determine how particular cybersecurity
controls can be exploited shows a great deal of promise. In particular, the Reprivata Global
Threat Intelligence (GTI) module captures a significant amount of network security data.
Research methods that were examined as part of the Literature Review, such as utilizing the
Latent Dirichlet Allocation algorithm to perform topic modeling of cybersecurity-related data
sources, would be very useful artifacts for inclusion in cybersecurity risk management solutions
(Kolini & Janczewski, 2017).
Investigating the interaction of Enabling Controls within a cybersecurity control
framework implementation holds a great deal of potential. At present, no academic literature
exists on this subject and current cybersecurity standards and control frameworks do not discuss
how particular controls can enhance or speed the implementation of other similar or related
controls. A research project on Enabling Controls is being performed by a team that includes Dr.
Carol Saunders. Dr. Saunders is working to determine if there are any relevant management or
social science theories, such as agency theory, that contribute to the implementation of
cybersecurity controls. This study is assessing how cybersecurity controls interact with each
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other and how some cybersecurity controls influence the deployment of complementary or
related controls.
Further work on creating a quantitative method for measuring the influences of Enabling
Controls on an organization’s compliance program could be a valuable contribution on the
understanding and communicating of how cybersecurity risks can be mitigated and to what
extent they can be eliminated or remediated. Understanding how and when those Enabling
Controls impact other controls will be a necessity for practitioners as the risk and threat
environment expands. Creating a measure or maturity metric that can demonstrate such things as
funding, personnel, equipment, and other requirements and what their impacts would be in
financial terms would be one goal of this research project.
Additional research into finding more quantitative ways to evaluate the fitness attributes
of the design artifacts to show improvements in their evolution would help to better measure how
useful the artifacts are. By helping practitioners to evaluate the level of understanding (measured
as comprehension) that stakeholders have on the usefulness of design artifacts and how those
artifacts can inform the stakeholders in practice, better solutions can be designed and the
subsequent artifacts can be more effectively measured in use.
Research into cybersecurity risk management and compliance holds many opportunities
to advance knowledge in the field. The estimation of the usefulness of artifacts in
communicating cyber risk issues and analysis is a good start, but studies into quantifying the
effectiveness of cybersecurity risk management solutions to inform their users can provide new
insights on how cybersecurity solutions should approach the next generation of tools for cyber
risk collaboration and information sharing.
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Another topic for study would be expanding the mapping of other security control
standards to include Enabling Controls and then determining what generalizable ways exist to
implement these Enabling Controls that can improve compliance across multiple security
standards. In today’s compliance-driven business environment, organizations are often required
to implement more than one cybersecurity standard. A generalizable way of deploying such
Enabling Controls could streamline the implementation of cybersecurity standards, meet the
majority of the security requirements, and lessen the compliance assessment and management
process by decreasing the number of security controls that must be regularly reviewed or
classified as exceptions for closer management oversight and governance.
Performing interventions with groups of participants with less cybersecurity background
and experience would be a valuable project to undertake. Evaluating how these groups improve
in their understanding and communication of cybersecurity risk concepts and then comparing
these results with those of practitioners or people with more cyber experience to find which
topics are most easy to assimilate and which ones required focused design artifacts to improve
cyber risk understanding and communication.
As discussed above, future directions in cybersecurity risk management should address
how security controls interact with each other so that such relationships can be measured. In
particular, the usefulness of future artifacts for the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management
solution will require the inclusion of such measures in order to show its maturity against the
NIST CSF and other cybersecurity standards, and how well it can maintain and monitor its
compliance with those frameworks.
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APPENDIX A
Artifact 1 – Proposed Conceptual Model for the Reprivata Community of Trust (CoT)
Cybersecurity Risk Management Solution

Figure A1 - Proposed Conceptual Model and Description – Reprivata Cybersecurity Community of
Trust
In the Proposed Conceptual Model above (also shown as Figure 2 in Section 5 above), the research will
seek to articulate the interactions of elements that influence successful Cybersecurity Community of Trust
(CoT) implementations. These elements help determine and, in some cases, manage the resources within
these projects as the part of the overarching corporate business strategy which determines the cyber risk
posture, and how that posture can be managed and measured. These are two distinct groups of elements:
one that is composed of the cybersecurity frameworks and legal documents that provide structure to the
CoT, and one that constitutes the Internal and External Stakeholders of the CoT.
In the Proposed Conceptual Model, the CoT Risk Management Strategy element (see Figure 2 in Section
5 above) defines the cybersecurity control requirements that the CoT members follow. In the case of
Reprivata, the company selected the Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) that was developed by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2014. The CSF was selected for two reasons. The CSF is
a comprehensive set of cybersecurity control requirements based on 23 control categories across five
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cybersecurity functional areas (see Table 4 in Section 5 above). As such, the CSF offers a comprehensive
framework on which companies can build their cybersecurity programs. Also, the CSF includes a
maturity model (see Table 5 in Section 5 above) that gives companies ways to determine how they are
performing as they implement the CSF security controls.
The CoT Governance element (see Figure 2 in Section 5 above) is based on the Master Agreements that
are executed between the overall Community of Trust’s Internal Stakeholders and its External
Stakeholders. The Master Agreements provide the legal guidance over its governance functions that the
CoT members will utilize in interactions between themselves, and are the basis for the on-going
collaboration activities in the CoT. The IT risk assessment processes are defined, outlining the risk
management requirements for each member, such as purchasing cyber insurance and the how the
cybersecurity program maturity of the members will be evaluated against the CSF security controls
framework. The contractual obligations of each member with regard to its IT compliance and how the
technical and business interconnections are to be managed are also specified by this element. Finally, the
risk metrics are defined, outlining what risk measurements and the frequency of reporting those measure
are stipulated.
These two elements (CoT Risk Management Strategy and CoT Governance) augment each other as
required to implement the selected Cyber Risk Management methodology (see Figure 2 in Section 5
above). The provisions of COT Governance empower the company’s ability to measure risk and show the
company’s overall risk posture is being managed effectively. If risk management requirements are
changed, the company will reassess its risk posture and determine how such changes impact its
operational stance within the CoT and under the conditions of the Master Agreement. In this way, the
Proposed Conceptual Model would demonstrate that any change in by one or both of these elements will
typically require a business to re-assess its cyber risk posture with respect to the overall change in its
technology footprint it uses to support the CoT and its strategic and operational decisions and initiatives.
The effects on the corporation’s internal technology environment are ways that these elements influence
the direction and scope of the cyber-related management program. These influencers provide both an
internal and external context on how the CoT Risk Management Strategy is implemented, how its success
is measured, and how it is evaluated against CoT Governance requirements, such as internal or external
audits, external risk assessments, or regulatory reviews. These evaluations influence the CoT Risk
Management Strategy implementation by providing the legal and cybersecurity orientation for enhancing
cyber risk management, as well as the key performance metrics and reporting required by management.
The CoT Internal Stakeholders (see Figure 2 in Section 5 above) are the leaders of the company that is
engaged in starting and maintaining the CoT. Boards of Directors Stakeholders assign the strategic and
tactical responsibilities for implementing and maintaining effective cybersecurity and cyber risk
management programs to the Management Stakeholders. These Stakeholders also provide oversight,
advice, and review on Management’s performance on maturing these cyber-related programs, based on
their fiduciary responsibilities to the company. The Management Stakeholders include the executives of
the organization that are charged with resourcing, staffing, and monitoring the cyber-related programs in
order to better secure and manage the risks prevalent in its interconnections with business partners. The
executives are supported by the Cyber Security and Cyber Risk teams in this effort. The Cyber Security
team is responsible for implementing and maintaining the requisite security controls required under the
CSF framework, as well as performing regular “health checks” on those controls through the use of
security management tools and techniques. The Cyber Risk team works closely with the Cyber Security
group. They are charged with identifying, researching, and providing ways to measure the potential
likelihood of threats that could impact the company and the CoT as a whole, the degree to which the
applicable security controls are implemented, and the potential impact to the company and the CoT as a
whole if a specific security control was not implemented effectively. The Cyber Risk also provides risk
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reporting, as required under the CoT Governance element, on the relationships between the required
security controls and the potential impacts where those controls are exposed by cyber-related threats and
vulnerabilities.
The CoT External Stakeholders (see Figure 2 in Section 5 above) are those companies and other entities
that are the third-party business interconnections connected to the overarching Cybersecurity CoT and the
CoT Privacy Authority, which provides assessment and oversight of the privacy compliance of the COT.
The CoT External Stakeholders are required under the Master Service agreements to implement, manage,
and maintain robust cybersecurity and cyber risk programs in support of their organizations as well as the
Cot, and strive to mature those programs over time. These Stakeholders have internal teams that ensure
that risk analysis and measurement capabilities are in place and providing effective feedback on how the
organization is managing to the CSF security framework and the executed CoT Master Agreement. They
are making sure that continuous collaboration with the other members of the CoT takes place to share any
real and potential security issues that do or could affect the CoT as a whole. These Stakeholders also
assess the compliance of the company to all appropriate security controls required under the CSF and the
maturity of the cyber-related programs. They then report on the security and risk management processes
and practices for both the implementation of the applicable security controls as well as the maturation of
those internal management control structures.
Other entities, such as the CoT Internal Stakeholders and the CoT External Stakeholders (see Figure 2 in
Section 5 above), have a very different effect on the success of the implementation of the CoT Risk
Management Strategy as required under the CoT Master Agreement. They can influence many of the
business and cultural factors that will aid in both the success of the implementation of the cyber-related
management programs and their long-term acceptance and maturation. The CoT Risk Management
Strategy provides the enterprise-level structure of the security controls environment as well as the
mechanism for the security and risk collaboration within the CoT. Each of these Stakeholder groups
carries on the risk and compliance assessments of the CoT risk posture and how it impacts their
organizations. As the CoT Internal Stakeholders and CoT External Stakeholders cooperate to support the
business interconnections between them, they provide other important feedback on how the cyber-risk
management programs are operating within the corporation and report on its effectiveness. This
interchange between the Stakeholder groups is critical to the success of both companies’ cyber risk
management programs within the CoT. When this collaboration is done well, these Stakeholder groups
have created a cyber risk management reporting vehicle risk analysis and reporting that will provide
significant benefits for all members of the CoT.
Key Terms for the Forces Used in the Proposed Conceptual Model Include:






Cybersecurity Community of Trust: A group or entity (usually led by one entity that
establishes the community and is considered its owner) that contract together to collaborate and
create secure business interconnections. This Community’s cybersecurity posture is based on a
robust set of cybersecurity controls that assist the companies in developing and maturing their
enterprise cybersecurity and cyber risk programs.
Community of Trust Risk Management Strategy: Those cybersecurity and cyber risk practices
and processes, based on a robust and standard set of cybersecurity controls, that entities must
implement (as required by legal agreements) in order to participate in the Cybersecurity
Community of Trust. This Strategy must be applied by all entities to assess, categorize, prioritize,
and assist in the remediation of cyber risks within the entity as part of strong and mature
cybersecurity and cyber risk programs.
Community of Trust Governance: The contractual management control and risk management
processes requirements that the members of the Cybersecurity Community of Trust utilize to as
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part of building, managing, assessing, and reporting on the security and risk postures of the
Community.
Community of Trust Internal Stakeholders: Those functional groups inside the entity
establishing the Cybersecurity Community of Trust that support, assess, or are the recipients of
outputs from the cybersecurity and cyber risk programs within the entity and the broader
Community.
Community of Trust External Stakeholders: Those functional groups inside the entity joining
the Cybersecurity Community of Trust that support, assess, or are the recipients of outputs from
the cybersecurity and cyber risk programs within the entity and the broader.
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Artifact 2 – Assessment of the Reprivata Community of Trust (CoT) Cybersecurity Risk
Management Solution Compliance with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) version 1.1
As part of the original design intent, the capabilities of the Reprivata Community of Trust (CoT)
cybersecurity risk management solution controls were based on and implemented to comply with the
initial version of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework
(CSF), which was published in 2014.
This control mapping analysis reviews the Reprivata solution’s compliance to the NIST CSF version 1.1,
which was released in April 2018. This analysis expands on the initial NIST CSF version 1.0 control
mapping performed on the Reprivata solution in March 2018.
The NIST CSF Functional Areas are documented in Table 4 of Section 5 of this document. The primary
change in the NIST CSF Functional Areas from version 1.0 to version 1.1 is the inclusion of controls for
Supply Chain Management that address security controls related to suppliers, vendors, and other
interconnected business partners.
The color code used in the control’s assessment is as follows:




Bold Black – Controls that are compliant with the NIST CSF version 1.1 standards.
Bold Blue – Controls that, once implemented, can enable the implementation of other related
controls (such as Access Controls, Physical Security, etc.).
Bold Red – Controls that are recommended for inclusion in the Reprivata Master Agreements
that would enable their implementation by the CoT users.

The Reprivata cybersecurity risk management control details and descriptions were provided by the
Reprivata application design and supporting documentation as of April 2018 and from interviews with
Reprivata’s Chief Executive Officer and Chief Technology Officer from January 2018 to August 2018.
Overview of Reprivata CoT NIST CSF Compliance Assessment
NIST CSF
Functional Area

Identify
Protect
Detect
Respond
Recover
Total

Reprivata CoT
Solution
Compliant with
Key Controls
15 out of 29 key
controls
18 out of 39 key
controls
15 out of 18 key
controls
13 out of 15 key
controls
4 out of 6 key
controls
65 out of 107 key
controls

Technology
Controls

Enabling
Controls

Master
Agreement
Controls

5

14

10

12

21

6

11

3

4

3

2

10

0

2

4

31

42

34
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NIST CSF Key Controls

1.

Identify – Develop an
organizational understanding to
manage cybersecurity risk to
systems, people, assets, data, and
capabilities. The activities in the
Identify Function are
foundational for effective use of
the Framework. Understanding
the business context, the
resources that support critical
functions, and the related
cybersecurity risks enables an
organization to focus and
prioritize its efforts, consistent
with its risk management strategy
and business needs. (28 key
controls)
a. Asset Management
(ID.AM): The data,
personnel, devices,
systems, and facilities
that enable the
organization to achieve
business purposes are
identified and managed
consistent with their
relative importance to
organizational objectives
and the organization’s
risk strategy.
i. ID.AM-1:
Physical
devices and
systems within
the organization
are inventoried

ii. ID.AM-2:
Software
platforms and
applications
within the
organization are
inventoried

Key NIST
CSF
Controls for
Program
Implementat
ion

Asset
management
application or
capabilities are
in place for
network,
desktop, server,
and mobile
devices.

Software
management
application or
capabilities are
in place for
enterprise and
workgroup
applications for
network,
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Reprivata
CoT
Compliance
with NIST
CSF Key
Controls

Reprivata
CoT
Support for
NIST CSF
Key
Controls

Areas where
other
solutions
could
support
Reprivata
CoT

Reprivata CoT
identifies end
users and
attached devices
through the use
of certificates
during
provisioning of
devices and for
access control
for end users
and devices.
Reprivata’s
software
components are
documented in
the
Underwriter’s
Laboratory
certification
report.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Configuration
management
databases can
provide this type
of device
information.

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Compliant with
NIST CSF
Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Software
licensing and
management
databases can
provide this type
of device
information.

iii. ID.AM-3:
Organization
al
communicati
on and data
flows are
mapped

desktop, server,
and mobile
devices.
Data flows and
communication
paths have been
mapped for
critical business
functions.
Data flows are
included in all
business process
documentation.

iv. ID.AM-4:
External
information
systems are
catalogued

v.

ID.AM-5:
Resources
(e.g.,
hardware,
devices, data,
time,
personnel,
and software)
are
prioritized
based on
their
classification
, criticality,
and business
value

Data flows are
included in all
business
continuity plans.
Asset and
software
management
applications or
capabilities are
in place for
external
information
systems not
directly managed
by internal
company
personnel

Hardware and
software
resources are
prioritized by
function and
included in
business
continuity plans.
A data
classification
program is in
place and
regularly
reviewed.

Reprivata’s CoT
data flows are
captured in the
software
documentation
prepared for the
UL certification
process.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

External
software
requirements
for the
Reprivata CoT
solution are
captured in the
software
documentation
prepared for the
UL certification
process.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Resource
classification
policies and
procedures are
implemented as
part of the
organization’s
cybersecurity
risk
management
program.

The Reprivata
solution enables
these policies
and procedures
and provides
information that
can be used to
determine data
classification,
criticality, and
business value.

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Security
responsibilities
for internal
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Configuration
management
databases can
provide this type
of device
information.
Software
licensing and
management
databases can
provide this type
of device
information.
Cybersecurity
policies and
procedures can
be created and
evaluated by
companies that
offer
cybersecurity
awareness and
training software
as well as by
external
consulting firms.
Training for
creating
cybersecurity
policies and
procedures is
available with a
variety of online
and in-person
sessions.

Technology and
operational risk
assessments are
performed
regularly.

vi. ID.AM-6:
Cybersecurit
y roles and

Enterprise
network
management
systems have the
capability to
create network
communication
maps.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master

Cybersecurity
roles and
responsibilities

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be

responsibiliti
es for the
entire
workforce
and thirdparty
stakeholders
(e.g.,
suppliers,
customers,
partners) are
established

b.

Business Environment
(ID.BE): The
organization’s mission,
objectives, stakeholders,
and activities are
understood and
prioritized; this
information is used to
inform cybersecurity
roles, responsibilities, and
risk management
decisions.
i. ID.BE-1: The
organization’s
role in the
supply chain is
identified and
communicated

ii. ID.BE-2: The
organization’s
place in critical
infrastructure
and its industry
sector is
identified and
communicated

personnel,
external
partners, and
other stakeholder
are documented,
implemented,
and regularly
reviewed.

Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

Senior
management has
created
appropriate
tactical and
strategic
responsibilities
for the supply
chain
management
program and
communicated
that information
to the
appropriate
stakeholders.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

Senior
management has
created
appropriate
tactical and
strategic
responsibilities
for the supply
chain
management

The assignment
and
communication
of supply chain
management
responsibilities
require senior
management
input and
approval.
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are defined in
corporate
policy. The
Reprivata
solution enables
these
cybersecurity
roles and
responsibilities
to be used
effectively to
protect
sensitive data
and
collaborations
with business
partners.

easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

The Reprivata
solution enables
the enterprise’s
cybersecurity
responsibilities
related to
supply chain
management by
providing
encrypted data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities for
the CoT users.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
communication
of supply chain
management
responsibilities
to stakeholders
by providing
encrypted data

Supply chain
management
strategies and
tactical
procedures can
be created and
evaluated by
companies that
offer supply
chain

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

iii. ID.BE-3:
Priorities for
organizational
mission,
objectives, and
activities are
established and
communicated

iv.

ID.BE-4:
Dependencies
and critical
functions for
delivery of
critical services
are established

program and
communicated
that information
to the
appropriate
stakeholders.
Senior
management has
created
appropriate
tactical and
strategic
responsibilities
for the supply
chain
management
program and
communicated
that information
to the
appropriate
stakeholders.
Critical services
have been
identified and
the dependencies
on those services
are documented.
Critical service
dependencies are
documented by
function and
included in
business
continuity plans.

v.

c.

ID.BE-5:
Resilience
requirements to
support
delivery of
critical services
are established
for all operating
states (e.g.
under
duress/attack,
during
recovery,
normal
operations)
Governance (ID.GV):
The policies, procedures,
and processes to manage
and monitor the
organization’s regulatory,
legal, risk, environmental,
and operational
requirements are
understood and inform

Critical service
dependencies are
documented by
function and
included in
business
continuity plans.
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sharing and
collaboration
capabilities.

management
software as well
as by external
consulting firms.

The
prioritization
and
communication
of supply chain
management
goals and
objectives
require senior
management
input and
approval.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
communication
of supply chain
management
goals and
objectives to
stakeholders by
providing
encrypted data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities.

Supply chain
management
strategies and
tactical
procedures can
be created and
evaluated by
companies that
offer supply
chain
management
software as well
as by external
consulting firms.

The critical
service delivery
requirements
must be created
and approved
by key
management
stakeholders.
These
requirements
must be
included in
business
resiliency and
recovery plans.
The critical
service delivery
requirements
must be created
and approved
by key
management
stakeholders.
These
requirements
must be
included in
business
resiliency and
recovery plans.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholder
when
discussing
mission-critical
service delivery
requirements.

Service delivery
strategies and
business
resiliency
procedures can
be created and
evaluated by
companies that
offer business
resilience
management
software as well
as by external
consulting firms.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholder
when
discussing
mission-critical
service delivery
requirements.

Service delivery
strategies and
business
resiliency
procedures can
be created and
evaluated by
companies that
offer business
resilience
management
software as well
as by external
consulting firms.

the management of
cybersecurity risk.
i. ID.GV-1:
Organizational
cybersecurity
policy is
established and
communicated

Senior
management has
established a
cybersecurity
program and
assigned
leadership for
the function.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

Cybersecurity
program
information is
regularly
communicated to
the appropriate
stakeholders.

ii. ID.GV-2:
Cybersecurity
roles and
responsibilities
are coordinated
and aligned
with internal
roles and
external
partners

iii. ID.GV-3: Legal
and regulatory
requirements
regarding
cybersecurity,
including
privacy and
civil liberties
obligations, are
understood and
managed

Senior
management has
established a
cybersecurity
program and
assigned
leadership for
the function.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

Cybersecurity
program
requirements
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
Cybersecurity
program
compliance and
legal
requirements
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
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When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholder
when
discussing the
governance of
the
cybersecurity
organization
and its
operation.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
internal and
external
stakeholders
when
discussing the
governance of
the
cybersecurity
requirements
for all CoT
users.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

The Reprivata
Master
Agreement is a
legal document
that can be
customized as
required by the
CoT owner so
the appropriate
security,
operational, and
policy
requirements
are in place for
all CoT users.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and

collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.
iv.

d.

ID.GV-4:
Governance
and risk
management
processes
address
cybersecurity
risks

Risk Assessment
(ID.RA): The
organization understands
the cybersecurity risk to
organizational operations
(including mission,
functions, image, or
reputation),
organizational assets, and
individuals.
i. ID.RA-1: Asset
vulnerabilities
are identified
and
documented

ii. ID.RA-2: Cyber
threat
intelligence is
received from
information
sharing forums
and sources

Cybersecurity
governance risk
management and
review processes
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
cybersecurity
risk
management
program that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
governance and
measurement of
the
cybersecurity
risk
management
program.

Cybersecurity
risk management
programs and
measurements
can be created
and evaluated by
companies that
offer
Governance,
Risk, and
Compliance
(GRC)
management
software as well
as by external
consulting firms.

A vulnerability
management,
assessment, and
remediation
process is
documented,
implemented,
and
implemented.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
cybersecurity
vulnerability
management
program that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with the
vulnerability
management
program.

Cybersecurity
risk management
programs and
measurements
can be created
and evaluated by
companies that
offer
vulnerability
management
software as well
as by external
consulting firms.

A threat
intelligence
assessment and
review process is
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Reprivata CoT
can integrate
active network
threat
monitoring,
identification,
and mitigation
both inside and
outside the CoT
through its
Global Threat
Intelligence
capabilities.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

External threat
intelligence and
vulnerability
databases can
provide this type
of threat and
vulnerability
information.
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Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Security
Information and
Event
Monitoring

(SIEM) software
and analytics
tools can
provide this type
of device
information.
iii. ID.RA-3:
Threats, both
internal and
external, are
identified and
documented

A threat
intelligence
assessment and
review process is
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
cybersecurity
threat
assessment and
intelligence
program that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with the threat
assessment and
intelligence
program.

Cybersecurity
threat
assessment and
intelligence
programs can be
created and
evaluated by
companies that
offer threat
assessment and
intelligence
software as well
as by external
consulting firms.

iv.

ID.RA-4:
Potential
business
impacts and
likelihoods are
identified

A threat and
vulnerability
research and
evaluation
process is
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
cybersecurity
threat
assessment and
intelligence
program that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with the threat
assessment and
intelligence
program.

Cybersecurity
threat
assessment and
intelligence
programs can be
created and
evaluated by
companies that
offer threat
assessment and
intelligence
software as well
as by external
consulting firms.

v.

ID.RA-5:
Threats,
vulnerabilities,
likelihoods, and
impacts are
used to
determine risk

A threat and
vulnerability
research and
evaluation
process is
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
cybersecurity
threat
assessment and
intelligence
program that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with the threat
assessment and
intelligence
program.

Cybersecurity
threat
assessment and
intelligence
programs can be
created and
evaluated by
companies that
offer threat
assessment and
intelligence
software as well
as by external
consulting firms.

vi.

ID.RA-6: Risk
responses are
identified and
prioritized

A risk
management and
communication
program is
documented,

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables

The Reprivata
Master
Agreement is a
legal document
that can be

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
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e.

Risk Management
Strategy (ID.RM): The
organization’s priorities,
constraints, risk
tolerances, and
assumptions are
established and used to
support operational risk
decisions.
i. ID.RM-1: Risk
management
processes are
established,
managed, and
agreed to by
organizational
stakeholders

ii. ID.RM-2:
Organizational
risk tolerance is
determined and
clearly
expressed

implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

compliance with
NIST CSF.

Senior
management has
established a risk
management and
communication
program and
assigned
leadership for
the function.
A risk
management and
communication
program is
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
An operational
risk management
and
communication
program is
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
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customized as
required by the
CoT owner so
the appropriate
risk
management
response and
communication
requirements
are in place for
all CoT users.

and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
cybersecurity
risk
management
strategy and
assign
appropriate
leadership that
is consistent
with the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
risk
management
cybersecurity
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with the
cybersecurity
risk
management
strategy.

Cybersecurity
risk management
strategies can be
created and
evaluated by
external
consulting firms.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement an
operational risk
management
strategy and
assign
appropriate
leadership that
is consistent
with the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
operational risk
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with the
operational risk

Cybersecurity
risk management
strategies can be
created and
evaluated by
external
consulting firms.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

management
strategy.
iii. ID.RM-3: The
organization’s
determination
of risk tolerance
is informed by
its role in
critical
infrastructure
and sector
specific risk
analysis

f.

Supply Chain Risk
Management (ID.SC):
The organization’s
priorities, constraints, risk
tolerances, and
assumptions are
established and used to
support risk decisions
associated with managing
supply chain risk. The
organization has
established and
implemented the
processes to identify,
assess and manage supply
chain risks.
i. ID.SC-1: Cyber
supply chain
risk
management
processes are
identified,
established,
assessed,
managed, and
agreed to by
organizational
stakeholders

ii. ID.SC-2:
Suppliers and
third party
partners of
information
systems,
components,

Senior
management has
established a risk
tolerance and
posture based on
the analysis of
its technology
footprint,
industry
position, and
other critical
business
indicators.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
cybersecurity
risk posture that
is consistent
with the
organization’s
overall risk
appetite.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
risk
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
corporate risk
posture.

Cybersecurity
risk management
postures can be
created and
evaluated by
external
consulting firms.

Senior
management has
established a
supply chain
management
program and
assigned
leadership for
the function.

The
establishment,
agreement, and
communication
of supply chain
cybersecurity
risk
management
responsibilities
require senior
management
and key
stakeholders
input and
approval.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
communication
of supply chain
management
cybersecurity
risk
management
responsibilities
to stakeholders
by providing
encrypted data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities.

Supply chain
management
strategies and
tactical
procedures can
be created and
evaluated by
companies that
offer supply
chain
management
software as well
as by external
consulting firms.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
communication
of supply chain
management
cybersecurity

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as

A risk
management and
communication
program is
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
Cybersecurity
risk management
and review
processes for
critical suppliers
have been
documented,
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and services are
identified,
prioritized, and
assessed using a
cyber supply
chain risk
assessment
process

implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

iii. ID.SC-3:
Contracts with
suppliers and
third-party
partners are
used to
implement
appropriate
measures
designed to
meet the
objectives of an
organization’s
cybersecurity
program and
Cyber Supply
Chain Risk
Management
Plan

Cybersecurity
legal
requirements for
suppliers have
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

iv.

ID.SC-4:
Suppliers and
third-party
partners are
routinely
assessed using
audits, test
results, or other
forms of
evaluations to
confirm they
are meeting
their
contractual
obligations

Cybersecurity
legal and
regulatory
compliance
requirements for
suppliers have
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

ID.SC-5:
Response and
recovery
planning and
testing are

Incident
response,
recovery, and
management
requirements for

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables

v.

106

risk assessment
responsibilities
to third parties
by providing
encrypted data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities.

required by the
CoT owner.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
communication
of contractual
obligations
related to
supply chain
management
cybersecurity
responsibilities
by providing
encrypted data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
communication
of contractual
obligations
related to
supply chain
management
cybersecurity
audit and
assessments
responsibilities
and reporting
by providing
encrypted data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
communication
of contractual

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

conducted with
suppliers and
third-party
providers

2.

Protect – Develop and implement
appropriate safeguards to ensure
delivery of critical services. The
Protect Function supports the
ability to limit or contain the
impact of a potential
cybersecurity event. (39 key
controls)
a. Identity Management,
Authentication and
Access Control (PR.AC):
Access to physical and
logical assets and
associated facilities is
limited to authorized
users, processes, and
devices, and is managed
consistent with the
assessed risk of
unauthorized access to
authorized activities and
transactions.
i. PR.AC-1:
Identities and
credentials are
issued,
managed,
verified,
revoked, and
audited for
authorized
devices, users
and processes

ii. PR.AC-2:
Physical access
to assets is
managed and
protected

suppliers have
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

compliance with
NIST CSF.

An identity and
access
management,
review, and
assessment
program has
been have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Physical access
requirements for
facilities where
information and
technology
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obligations
related to
supply chain
management
business
resiliency
testing and
reporting
responsibilities
by providing
encrypted data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities.

and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

Reprivata CoT
identifies end
users and
attached devices
through the use
of certificates
during
provisioning of
devices and for
access control
for end users
and devices.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Identity and
access
management
systems can
provide this type
of user and
device access
information.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

Security log
management
software and
analytics tools
can provide this
type of user and
device access
information.
Physical security
access
management
programs can be
created and

iii. PR.AC-3:
Remote access
is managed

iv.

v.

vi.

PR.AC-4:
Access
permissions and
authorizations
are managed,
incorporating
the principles of
least privilege
and separation
of duties

PR.AC-5:
Network
integrity is
protected (e.g.,
network
segregation,
network
segmentation)

PR.AC-6:
Identities are
proofed and
bound to
credentials and

assets are stored
and managed
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

physical security
access
management
program that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with physical
security access
management
program.

evaluated by
companies that
offer physical
assess control
software as well
as by external
consulting firms
that specialize in
physical
security.

User and service
remote access to
technology
assets have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
User identities,
roles,
permissions, and
access
requirements
that ensure that
the only
minimum
necessary access
to technology
assets is granted
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
Network
architecture
requirements to
implement
secure network
design and
connectivity
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
User identities,
permissions, and
access
requirements
that ensure that

Reprivata CoT
requires end
users and
attached devices
to connect
through the use
of encrypted
virtual private
network tunnels.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Remote access
software can
provide this type
of functionality.

Reprivata CoT
enables access
control
permissions for
end users and
attached devices
through the use
of certificates.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Reprivata CoT
includes
network
segregation and
segmentation
capabilities as
part of the
implemented
cybersecurity
trusted and
closed network
control
structure.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Reprivata CoT
identifies end
users and
attached devices

Compliant with
NIST CSF
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Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Control
implemented in

Next-generation
firewalls can
provide this type
of functionality.

Identity and
access
management
systems can
provide this type
user and device
access
information.

Network device
configuration
controls and
device
management
software
provides this
type of
functionality.

Identity and
access
management
systems can
provide this type

asserted in
interactions

vii.

b.

R.AC-7: Users,
devices, and
other assets are
authenticated
(e.g., singlefactor, multifactor)
commensurate
with the risk of
the transaction
(e.g.,
individuals’
security and
privacy risks
and other
organizational
risks)

Awareness and Training
(PR.AT): The
organization’s personnel
and partners are provided
cybersecurity awareness
education and are trained
to perform their
cybersecurity-related
duties and responsibilities
consistent with related
policies, procedures, and
agreements.
i. PR.AT-1: All
users are
informed and
trained

only authorized
users have
access to
technology
assets have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
The use of user
authentication
mechanisms for
user access to
technology
assets is based
on the risks
inherent to the
specific user role
and technology
asset type has
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

through the use
of certificates.

the Reprivata
solution

user and device
access
information.

Reprivata CoT
enables access
control
permissions for
end users and
attached devices
through the use
of certificates.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Identity and
access
management
systems can
provide this type
user and device
access
information.

A cybersecurity
awareness
program has
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
cybersecurity
awareness
program that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Multi-factor
authentication
systems provide
this type of user
and device
functionality.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
internal and
external
stakeholders
when
discussing the
cybersecurity
risks.

Cybersecurity
awareness
training can be
obtained from
companies that
offer
cybersecurity
awareness and
training software
as well as by
external
consulting firms.
Cybersecurity
awareness
training is
available with a
variety of online
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and in-person
sessions.
ii. PR.AT-2:
Privileged users
understand their
roles and
responsibilities

iii. PR.AT-3:
Third-party
stakeholders
(e.g., suppliers,
customers,
partners)
understand their
roles and
responsibilities

iv.

PR.AT-4:
Senior
executives
understand their
roles and
responsibilities

Privileged and
administrative
user identities,
roles,
permissions,
responsibilities,
and access
requirements for
information and
technology
assets is granted
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
Supplier and
other third party
identities, roles,
permissions,
responsibilities,
and access
requirements for
information and
technology
assets is granted
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Cybersecurity
management is
required to
create the roles
and
responsibilities
for privileged
users such as
system
administrators
and network
analysts.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by
privileged uses
when
discussing their
roles and
responsibilities
related to
cybersecurity.

Privileged user
responsibilities
can be created
and evaluated by
device and
software
companies as
well as by
external
consulting firms.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
communication
of third party
contractual
obligations
related to data
and system
protection
responsibilities
by providing
encrypted data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

Senior executive
identities, roles,
permissions,
responsibilities,
and access
requirements for
information and
technology
assets is granted
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Senior
management is
required to
create,
document, and
implement an
executive-level
cybersecurity
responsibilities
management
and reporting
system that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by
senior
executives and
upper
management
when
discussing their
cybersecurity
responsibilities.

Executive-level
cybersecurity
responsibilities
training can be
obtained from
companies that
offer
cybersecurity
training software
as well as from
external
consulting firms.
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All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

Cybersecurity
awareness
training is
available with a
variety of online

and in-person
sessions.
v.

c.

PR.AT-5:
Physical and
cybersecurity
personnel
understand their
roles and
responsibilities

Data Security (PR.DS):
Information and records
(data) are managed
consistent with the
organization’s risk
strategy to protect the
confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of
information.
i. PR.DS-1: Dataat-rest is
protected

ii. PR.DS-2: Datain-transit is
protected

Physical security
personnel
identities, roles,
permissions,
responsibilities,
and access
requirements for
information and
technology
assets is granted
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
physical security
management
program that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with physical
security
management
program.

Physical security
management
programs can be
created and
evaluated by
external
consulting firms
that specialize in
physical
security.

Data encryption
requirements for
all electronic
information
assets residing
on technology
platforms and
other devices
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
Data encryption
requirements for
all electronic
information
assets being
transmitted over
insecure
networks or
where such
encryption is
specified by
legal agreements
have been
documented,
implemented,

Reprivata CoT
implements
multi-level
encryption for
data at rest.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

No applicable
external
solutions are
available since
the Reprivata
CoT implements
governmentlevel encryption
in the software
solution.

Reprivata CoT
requires end
users and
attached devices
to connect
through the use
of encrypted
virtual private
network tunnels.

Compliant with
NIST CSF.
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Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

No applicable
external
solutions are
available since
the Reprivata
CoT implements
governmentlevel encryption
in the software
solution.

iii. PR.DS-3:
Assets are
formally
managed
throughout
removal,
transfers, and
disposition

iv.

PR.DS-4:
Adequate
capacity to
ensure
availability is
maintained

v.

PR.DS-5:
Protections
against data
leaks are
implemented

and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
An information
and technology
asset refresh,
removal, and
replacement
management
program has
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
A technology
capacity
assessment and
management
program has
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

A data leakage
assessment and
protection
management
program has
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
computer and
technology asset
management
program.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
management of
critical
technology
assets that are
members of the
CoT by
ensuring
security
management
and tracking of
those assets.

Configuration
management
databases can
provide device
inventory
reporting.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
computer and
technology asset
capacity
management
program.

The Reprivata
solution enables
visibility of the
technology
assets that are
members of the
CoT by
ensuring
security
tracking of
those assets
while they are
logged into the
CoT.

Network and
system capacity
planning
software can
enhance
technology
availability and
integrity by
ensure the
devices are sized
appropriately for
the functions
they perform.

Reprivata CoT
implements
multi-level
encryption for
data at rest.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Data Loss
Prevention
(DLP) software
can provide this
type of
functionality.

Reprivata CoT
requires end
users and
attached devices
to connect
through the use
of encrypted
virtual private
network tunnels.
Reprivata CoT
can integrate
active network
threat
monitoring,
identification,
and mitigation
both inside and
outside the CoT
through its
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Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Asset tracking
and reporting
software can
enhance
technology asset
management and
replacement.

d.

vi.

PR.DS-6:
Integrity
checking
mechanisms are
used to verify
software,
firmware, and
information
integrity

A file and
system integrity
assessment and
protection
program has
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

vii.

PR.DS-7: The
development
and testing
environment(s)
are separate
from the
production
environment

viii.

PR.DS-8:
Integrity
checking
mechanisms are
used to verify
hardware
integrity

Separate
production,
quality
assurance, and
testing
environments
have been
implemented and
their usage
requirements
have been
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
A file and
system integrity
assessment and
protection
program has
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Information Protection
Processes and Procedures
(PR.IP): Security policies
(that address purpose,
scope, roles,
responsibilities,
management
commitment, and
coordination among
organizational entities),
processes, and procedures
are maintained and used
to manage protection of
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Global Threat
Intelligence
capabilities.
Technology
Management is
required to
create and
implement file
and information
integrity
monitoring
capabilities for
securing critical
data and
systems.

The Reprivata
solution enables
visibility of the
technology
assets that are
members of the
CoT by
ensuring
security
tracking of
those assets
while they are
logged into the
CoT.

File Integrity
Monitoring
(FIM) software
can provide this
type of
functionality.

Technology
management is
required to
implement
separate
development
and production
and
environments
for applications.

The Reprivata
solution enables
the ability to
segregate
development
and production
environments.

Separate
development and
production
environments
can be provided
by external
hosting or cloud
service
providers.

Technology
Management is
required to
create and
implement
hardware
integrity
monitoring
capabilities for
securing critical
data and
systems.

The Reprivata
solution enables
visibility of the
technology
assets that are
members of the
CoT by
ensuring
security
tracking of
those assets
while they are
logged into the
CoT.

Hardware
integrity
monitoring
(HIM) software
can provide this
type of
functionality.

information systems and
assets.
i. PR.IP-1: A
baseline
configuration of
information
technology/indu
strial control
systems is
created and
maintained
incorporating
security
principles (e.g.
concept of least
functionality)
ii. PR.IP-2: A
System
Development
Life Cycle to
manage
systems is
implemented

iii. PR.IP-3:
Configuration
change control
processes are in
place

iv.

PR.IP-4:
Backups of
information are
conducted,
maintained, and
tested

v.

PR.IP-5: Policy
and regulations

A minimum
baseline
configuration
program for all
technology
assets has been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Base
configuration of
Reprivata CoT
solution are
included in the
software
documentation
prepared for the
UL certification
process.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

A systems
development,
assessment, and
management life
cycle for all
technology
assets has been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
A change control
management
program for all
technology
assets has been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Technology
Management is
required to
create and
implement a
Systems
Development
Life Cycle for
the software
design, creation,
and
implementation
functions.

The Reprivata
solution enables
the segregation
and
segmentation of
application
systems under
development to
support a
Systems
Development
Life Cycle
(SDLC).

Companies can
get assistance in
creating and
implementing a
SDLC from
software
programming
and development
training
companies as
well as from
external
consulting firms.

Technology
Management is
required to
create and
implement a
change
management
and control
function for
tracking
changes to
applications,
devices, and
other technology
assets.

Change
management
software can
provide this type
of functionality.

A backup and
data archival
management
program for all
technology
assets has been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
Physical security
policies and

Technology
management is
required to
create and
implement a
data backup and
archival
program to
ensure the
security of
critical business
data.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
changes made
to applications
and other
technologies
managed by the
company.
The Reprivata
solution enables
critical data
protection
within the CoT
so it can be
archived and
secured by the
backup
program.

The Reprivata
solution enables

Physical security
management

114

Senior
management is

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Configuration
management
databases can
provide device
configuration
reporting on
compliance with
internal and
external
configuration
standards.

Backup and data
archival
software can
provide this type
of functionality.

regarding the
physical
operating
environment for
organizational
assets are met

procedures for
ensuring security
of facilities have
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

required to
create and
implement a
physical security
management
program that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with the
physical
security
management
program.

programs can be
created and
evaluated by
external
consulting firms
that specialize in
physical
security.

vi.

PR.IP-6: Data
is destroyed
according to
policy

A data
destruction
policy and
supporting
program have
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
data destruction
program that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with data
destruction.

Data destruction
programs can be
created and
evaluated by
data
management and
archival firms as
well as by
external
consulting firms
that specialize in
data
management.

vii.

PR.IP-7:
Protection
processes are
improved

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

The Reprivata
Master
Agreement is a
legal document
that can be
customized as
required by the
CoT owner so
the appropriate
security,
operational, and
policy
requirements
are in place for
all CoT users.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

viii.

PR.IP-8:
Effectiveness of
protection
technologies is
shared

Information and
technology asset
protection
policies and
procedures are
regularly
reviewed to
determine what
enhancements
are required to
meet
cybersecurity
risk management
requirements and
any
enhancements
are documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
The use and
management of
information and
technology
protection
controls have
been
documented,
implemented,

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.
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and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

ix.

x.

xi.

responsibilities
for improving
cybersecurity
protection
processes over
time.

PR.IP-9:
Response plans
(Incident
Response and
Business
Continuity) and
recovery plans
(Incident
Recovery and
Disaster
Recovery) are
in place and
managed

Cybersecurity
event response
and recovery
programs for
information and
technology
assets have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

PR.IP-10:
Response and
recovery plans
are tested

Cybersecurity
event response
and recovery
programs for
information and
technology
assets have been
tested and the
results of those
tests have been
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

Personnel
screening
policies and
procedures have
been
documented,
implemented,

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
personnel
screening

PR.IP-11:
Cybersecurity
is included in
human
resources
practices (e.g.,
deprovisioning,
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All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for
implementing
and managing
business
resiliency and
incident
response plans.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for testing and
reporting test
results for
business
resiliency and
incident
response plans.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management

Personnel
screening
programs can be
created and
evaluated by
personnel

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

xii.

e.

personnel
screening)

and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

program that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with the
company’s
personnel.

screening and
consulting firms.

PR.IP-12: A
vulnerability
management
plan is
developed and
implemented

A cybersecurity
vulnerability risk
assessment,
testing, and
management
program for
information and
technology
assets has been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
system and
application
vulnerability
management
program that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with system
and application
vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability
management
programs can be
created and
evaluated by
vulnerability
management
software firms
as well as by
external
consulting firms
that specialize in
data
management.

A maintenance
and management
program for
technology
assets has been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
device
maintenance
program that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with device
maintenance
and repair.

Device
maintenance and
repair programs
can be created
and evaluated by
equipment
management
companies that
maintain and
repair equipment
for other firms.

User and service
remote access to
technology
assets have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
device
maintenance
program, to
include remote
access to those
devices where
applicable, that
is consistent
with the

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with remote
device
maintenance
and repair.

Device
maintenance and
repair programs
can be created
and evaluated by
equipment
management
companies that
maintain and
repair equipment
for other firms.

Maintenance (PR.MA):
Maintenance and repairs
of industrial control and
information system
components are
performed consistent with
policies and procedures.
i. PR.MA-1:
Maintenance
and repair of
organizational
assets are
performed and
logged, with
approved and
controlled tools

ii. PR.MA-2:
Remote
maintenance of
organizational
assets is
approved,
logged, and
performed in a
manner that
prevents
unauthorized
access
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organization’s
risk posture.
f.

Protective Technology
(PR.PT): Technical
security solutions are
managed to ensure the
security and resilience of
systems and assets,
consistent with related
policies, procedures, and
agreements.
i. PR.PT-1:
Audit/log
records are
determined,
documented,
implemented,
and reviewed in
accordance
with policy

Audit logs and
records related
to access and
management of
information and
technology
assets have been
documented,
implemented,
and reviewed on
a regular basis to
help detect and
prevent
cybersecurity
events.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

ii. PR.PT-2:
Removable
media is
protected and
its use restricted
according to
policy

A data leakage
assessment and
protection
management
program has
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

iii. PR.PT-3: The
principle of
least
functionality is
incorporated by
configuring
systems to
provide only
essential
capabilities

Technology
asset roles and
service
requirements
that ensure that
the only
minimum
necessary
configuration of
technology
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The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for reviewing
audit logs
related to
activities of
CoT members.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

Technology
management is
required to
create and
implement a
data leakage
and loss
prevention
program, to
include control
over removable
media, where
applicable, that
is consistent
with the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with data
leakage and
loss prevention.

Data leakage
and loss
prevention
programs can be
created and
evaluated by
data leakage
software
companies as
well as by
external
consulting firms.

Base
configuration of
Reprivata CoT
solution are
included in the
software
documentation
prepared for the
UL certification
process.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Definition of
user roles and
responsibilities
and the
application of
the concept of
least privilege
for system
credentials can
be created and

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

iv.

v.

3.

PR.PT-4:
Communication
s and control
networks are
protected

PR.PT-5:
Mechanisms
(e.g., failsafe,
load balancing,
hot swap) are
implemented to
achieve
resilience
requirements in
normal and
adverse
situations

Detect – Develop and implement
appropriate activities to identify
the occurrence of a cybersecurity
event. The Detect Function
enables timely discovery of
cybersecurity events. (18 key
controls)
a. Anomalies and Events
(DE.AE): Anomalous
activity is detected and
the potential impact of
events is understood.
i. DE.AE-1: A
baseline of
network
operations and
expected data
flows for users
and systems is
established and
managed

assets is in place
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
Network
architecture
requirements to
implement
secure network
design and
connectivity
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
Network
architecture
requirements to
implement
secure network
design and
connectivity
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Network data
flows and
communication
paths have been
mapped for
critical business
functions.
Data flows are
included in all
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evaluated by
external
consulting firms.

Reprivata CoT
can integrate
active network
threat
monitoring,
identification,
and mitigation
both inside and
outside the CoT
through its
Global Threat
Intelligence
capabilities.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Technology
management is
required to
create and
implement
network
resiliency
program that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with network
resiliency.

Network
resiliency
programs can be
created and
evaluated by
network
equipment as
well as by
external
consulting firms.

Reprivata CoT
can integrate
active network
threat
monitoring,
identification,
and mitigation
both inside and
outside the CoT
through its

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Network data
flow and
operations
reviews can be
performed and
evaluated by
network
management
software
companies as

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Security reviews
of network
communication
and control
networks for can
be performed
and evaluated by
external
consulting firms.

business process
documentation.

ii. DE.AE-2:
Detected events
are analyzed to
understand
attack targets
and methods

Data flows are
included in all
business
continuity plans.
A threat
intelligence
assessment and
review process is
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders

well as by
external
consulting firms.

Global Threat
Intelligence
capabilities.

Reprivata CoT
can integrate
active network
threat
monitoring,
identification,
and mitigation
both inside and
outside the CoT
through its
Global Threat
Intelligence
capabilities.
Reprivata CoT
can integrate
active network
threat
monitoring,
identification,
and mitigation
both inside and
outside the CoT
through its
Global Threat
Intelligence
capabilities.

Compliant with
NIST CSF
Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

iii. DE.AE-3:
Event data are
collected and
correlated from
multiple
sources and
sensors

A threat
intelligence
assessment and
review process is
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

iv.

DE.AE-4:
Impact of
events is
determined

A threat
intelligence
assessment and
review process is
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Reprivata CoT
can integrate
active network
threat
monitoring,
identification,
and mitigation
both inside and
outside the CoT
through its
Global Threat
Intelligence
capabilities.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

DE.AE-5:
Incident alert
thresholds are
established

A threat
intelligence
assessment and
review process is
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Reprivata CoT
can integrate
active network
threat
monitoring,
identification,
and mitigation
both inside and
outside the CoT
through its
Global Threat

Compliant with
NIST CSF

v.
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Compliant with
NIST CSF
Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Network data
flow and event
information
reviews can be
performed and
evaluated by
network threat
management
software
companies as
well as by
external
consulting firms.
Network data
flow and event
information
reviews can be
performed and
evaluated by
network threat
and incident
management
software
companies as
well as by
external
consulting firms.
Network data
flow and event
information
impact
assessments can
be performed
and evaluated by
network threat
and incident
management
software
companies as
well as by
external
consulting firms.
Network data
flow and event
information
alerts and
assessments can
be performed
and evaluated by
network threat
and incident
management
software
companies as

b.

Cybersecurity
event response
and recovery
programs for
information and
technology
assets have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Intelligence
capabilities.

A network
monitoring
program for
technology
assets has been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Reprivata CoT
can integrate
active network
threat
monitoring,
identification,
and mitigation
both inside and
outside the CoT
through its
Global Threat
Intelligence
capabilities.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

ii. DE.CM-2: The
physical
environment is
monitored to
detect potential
cybersecurity
events

A physical
security
monitoring
program has
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
physical security
monitoring
program that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with physical
security
monitoring.

iii. DE.CM-3:
Personnel
activity is
monitored to
detect potential
cybersecurity
events

A personnel
monitoring
program for the
use of
information and
technology
assets has been
documented,
implemented,
and

Reprivata CoT
can integrate
active network
threat
monitoring,
identification,
and mitigation
both inside and
outside the CoT
through its

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Security Continuous
Monitoring (DE.CM):
The information system
and assets are monitored
to identify cybersecurity
events and verify the
effectiveness of
protective measures.
i. DE.CM-1: The
network is
monitored to
detect potential
cybersecurity
events
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well as by
external
consulting firms.

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Network data
flow and event
monitoring
reviews can be
performed and
evaluated by
network threat
and incident
management
software
companies as
well as by
external
consulting firms.
Physical security
monitoring
programs can be
created and
evaluated by
external
consulting firms
that specialize in
physical
security.

Personnel
activity and
security
monitoring
programs can be
created and
evaluated by
external
consulting firms.

iv.

v.

vi.

DE.CM-4:
Malicious code
is detected

DE.CM-5:
Unauthorized
mobile code is
detected

DE.CM-6:
External service
provider
activity is
monitored to

communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
A secure coding
and testing
program for
systems
development has
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
An anti-virus
and malware
protection
program has
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
A secure coding
and testing
program for
systems
development has
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
An anti-virus
and malware
protection
program has
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
An external
support and
service provider
monitoring
program for the
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Global Threat
Intelligence
capabilities.
Technology
management is
required to
create and
implement a
malicious code
detection and
prevention
program, to
include secure
coding training,
where
applicable, that
is consistent
with the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks malicious
code detection
and prevention.

Malicious code
detection and
prevention and
secure coding
training
programs can be
created and
evaluated by
security
application
testing software
companies, as
well as by
external
consulting firms.

Technology
management is
required to
create and
implement a
malicious code
detection and
prevention
program, to
include secure
coding training,
where
applicable, that
is consistent
with the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks malicious
code detection
and prevention.

Malicious code
detection and
prevention and
secure coding
training
programs can be
created and
evaluated by
security
application
testing software
companies, as
well as by
external
consulting firms.

Reprivata CoT
can integrate
active network
threat
monitoring,

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Network data
flow and event
monitoring alerts
and assessments
can be

Control
implemented in

detect potential
cybersecurity
events

vii.

DE.CM-7:
Monitoring for
unauthorized
personnel,
connections,
devices, and
software is
performed

use of
information and
technology
assets has been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
A personnel
monitoring
program for the
use of
information and
technology
assets has been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
An external
support and
service provider
monitoring
program for the
use of
information and
technology
assets has been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders

viii.

c.

DE.CM-8:
Vulnerability
scans are
performed

A vulnerability
management,
assessment, and
remediation
process is
documented,
implemented,
and
implemented.

Detection Processes
(DE.DP): Detection
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identification,
and mitigation
both inside and
outside the CoT
through its
Global Threat
Intelligence
capabilities.

the Reprivata
solution

performed and
evaluated by
network threat
and incident
management
software
companies as
well as by
external
consulting firms.

Reprivata CoT
can integrate
active network
threat
monitoring,
identification,
and mitigation
both inside and
outside the CoT
through its
Global Threat
Intelligence
capabilities.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Network data
flow and event
monitoring alerts
and assessments
can be
performed and
evaluated by
network threat
and incident
management
software
companies as
well as by
external
consulting firms

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Reprivata CoT
enables access
control
permissions for
end users and
attached devices
through the use
of certificates.
Reprivata CoT
requires end
users and
attached devices
to connect
through the use
of encrypted
virtual private
network tunnels.
Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement a
system and
application
vulnerability
management
program that is
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with system
and application
vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability
management
programs can be
created and
evaluated by
vulnerability
management
software firms
as well as by
external
consulting firms
that specialize in
data
management.

processes and procedures
are maintained and tested
to ensure awareness of
anomalous events.
i. DE.DP-1: Roles
and
responsibilities
for detection
are well defined
to ensure
accountability

User identities,
roles,
permissions, and
access
requirements for
personnel
monitoring
access and
security events
related to
technology
assets have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

ii. DE.DP-2:
Detection
activities
comply with all
applicable
requirements

A threat
intelligence
assessment and
review process is
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

iii. DE.DP-3:
Detection
processes are
tested

The threat
intelligence
assessment and
review process is
tested regularly
and the results of
such tests are
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

iv.

DE.DP-4:
Event detection

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for reviewing
audit logs
related to
activities of
CoT members.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

Reprivata CoT
technology
designed and
implemented to
comply with
NIST CSF.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Reprivata CoT
can integrate
active network
threat
monitoring,
identification,
and mitigation
both inside and
outside the CoT
through its
Global Threat
Intelligence
capabilities.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Network data
flow and event
information
reviews can be
performed and
evaluated by
network threat
management
software
companies as
well as by
external
consulting firms.
Network data
flow and event
information
reviews can be
performed and
evaluated by
network threat
management
software
companies as
well as by
external
consulting firms.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.
When included
in the Reprivata

A threat
intelligence
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Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

The Reprivata
solution enables

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

The Master
Agreements are

information is
communicated

v.

4.

DE.DP-5:
Detection
processes are
continuously
improved

assessment and
review process is
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

Cybersecurity
event detection
policies and
procedures for
monitoring
Information and
technology
assets are
regularly
reviewed to
determine what
enhancements
are required to
meet
cybersecurity
risk management
requirements and
any
enhancements
are documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

Respond – Develop and
implement appropriate activities
to take action regarding a
detected cybersecurity incident.
The Respond Function supports
the ability to contain the impact
of a potential cybersecurity
incident. (19 key controls)
a. Communications
(RS.CO): Response
activities are coordinated
with internal and external
stakeholders (e.g. external
support from law
enforcement agencies).
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secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for improving
security event
detection
processes
related to
activities of
CoT members.

designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for improving
security event
detection
processes
related to
activities of
CoT members.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

i.

RS.CO-1:
Personnel know
their roles and
order of
operations
when a
response is
needed

ii. RS.CO-2:
Incidents are
reported
consistent with
established
criteria

iii. RS.CO-3:
Information is
shared
consistent with
response plans

iv.

RS.CO-4:
Coordination
with

Tactical and
strategic
responsibilities
for responding to
cybersecurity
incidents have
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated
that information
to the
appropriate
stakeholders.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement an
incident
response plan
that outlines the
personnel roles
and
responsibilities
and is consistent
with the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with security
incidents and
events.

Incident
response
programs can be
created and
evaluated by
external
consulting firms
that specialize in
incident
response.

Incident
reporting
procedures and
personnel
assignments
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated
that information
to the
appropriate
stakeholders.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for security
event detection
and reporting
related to
activities of
CoT members.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

Incident
reporting
procedures and
personnel
assignments
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated
that information
to both internal
and external
stakeholders.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for security
event detection
and information
sharing related
to activities of
CoT members.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

Incident
reporting
procedures and

When included
in the Reprivata
Master

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
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All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

stakeholders
occurs
consistent with
response plans

v.

b.

RS.CO-5:
Voluntary
information
sharing occurs
with external
stakeholders to
achieve broader
cybersecurity
situational
awareness

Analysis (RS.AN):
Analysis is conducted to
ensure effective response
and support recovery
activities.
i. RS.AN-1:
Notifications
from detection
systems are
investigated

personnel
assignments
have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated
that information
to both internal
and external
stakeholders.

Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

Incident
reporting
procedures with
suppliers and
other third
parties have
been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated
that information
to both internal
and external
stakeholders.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

Cybersecurity
event detection
and investigation
policies and
procedures for
monitoring
Information and
technology
assets are
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated
that information
to both internal
and external
stakeholders.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.
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collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for improving
security event
detection
processes
related to
activities of
CoT members.

easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for security
event detection
and information
sharing related
to activities of
CoT members.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for notifying
relevant parties
about security
event detection
related to
activities of
CoT members.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and

collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.
ii. RS.AN-2: The
impact of the
incident is
understood

Cybersecurity
event evaluation
policies and
procedures for
monitoring
Information and
technology
assets are
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated
that information
to both internal
and external
stakeholders.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement
incident
response impact
analyses that
determine how
incidents affect
the organization
and are
consistent with
the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with the
impacts of
security
incidents and
events.

Incident
response impact
analyses can be
performed and
evaluated by
external
consulting firms
that specialize in
incident
response
metrics.

iii. RS.AN-3:
Forensics are
performed

Cybersecurity
event
investigation
policies and
procedures for
monitoring
Information and
technology
assets are
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated
that information
to both internal
and external
stakeholders.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for analyzing
the numbers,
types, impacts,
and response
results of
security events
related to
activities of
CoT members.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

Cybersecurity
event evaluation
policies and
procedures for
monitoring
Information and
technology
assets are
consistent with
technology and
operational risk
management
requirement and
are documented,
implemented,
and
communicated
that information
to both internal

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for analyzing
the numbers,
types, impacts,
and response
results of
security events
related to
activities of
CoT members.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

iv.

RS.AN-4:
Incidents are
categorized
consistent with
response plans
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All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration

and external
stakeholders.
v.

c.

RS.AN-5:
Processes are
established to
receive, analyze
and respond to
vulnerabilities
disclosed to the
organization
from internal
and external
sources (e.g.
internal testing,
security
bulletins, or
security
researchers)

Mitigation (RS.MI):
Activities are performed
to prevent expansion of
an event, mitigate its
effects, and resolve the
incident.
i. RS.MI-1:
Incidents are
contained

ii. RS.MI-2:
Incidents are
mitigated

iii. RS.MI-3:
Newly
identified

capabilities of
the CoT.

Processes for
utilizing
externallysourced
vulnerability
information to
improve the
vulnerability
management
program are
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated
that information
to both internal
and external
stakeholders.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

Cybersecurity
event response
and recovery
programs for
information and
technology
assets have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
Cybersecurity
event response
and recovery
programs for
information and
technology
assets have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
Cybersecurity
event response
and recovery
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The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for analyzing
the numbers,
types, impacts,
and response
results of
security
vulnerabilities
related to
activities of
CoT members.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

Reprivata CoT
can integrate
active network
threat
monitoring,
identification,
and mitigation
both inside and
outside the CoT
through its
Global Threat
Intelligence
capabilities.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Incident
response
containment and
mitigation
reviews can be
performed and
evaluated by
external
consulting firms
that specialize in
incident
response
management.

Reprivata CoT
can integrate
active network
threat
monitoring,
identification,
and mitigation
both inside and
outside the CoT
through its
Global Threat
Intelligence
capabilities.

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Reprivata CoT
can integrate
active network

Compliant with
NIST CSF

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

Incident
response
containment and
mitigation
reviews can be
performed and
evaluated by
external
consulting firms
that specialize in
incident
response
management.
Vulnerability
containment and
mitigation

vulnerabilities
are mitigated or
documented as
accepted risks

programs for
information and
technology
assets have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

threat
monitoring,
identification,
and mitigation
both inside and
outside the CoT
through its
Global Threat
Intelligence
capabilities.

Control
implemented in
the Reprivata
solution

reviews can be
performed and
evaluated by
external
consulting firms
that specialize in
vulnerability
management.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for analyzing
the numbers,
types, impacts,
and response
results of
security
incidents
related to
activities of
CoT members.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

Cybersecurity
event evaluation
policies and
procedures for
monitoring
Information and
technology
assets are
consistent with
technology and
operational risk
management
requirement and
are documented,
implemented,
and
communicated
that information
to both internal
and external
stakeholders.
d.

Improvements (RS.IM):
Organizational response
activities are improved by
incorporating lessons
learned from current and
previous
detection/response
activities.
i. RS.IM-1:
Response plans
incorporate
lessons learned

Outcomes from
cybersecurity
event response
and recovery
exercises and
incidents for
information and
technology
assets have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
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All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

ii. RS.IM-2:
Response
strategies are
updated

5.

Recover – Develop and
implement appropriate activities
to maintain plans for resilience
and to restore any capabilities or
services that were impaired due
to a cybersecurity incident. The
Recover Function supports timely
recovery to normal operations to
reduce the impact from a
cybersecurity incident. (6 key
controls)
a. Recovery Planning
(RC.RP): Recovery
processes and procedures
are executed and
maintained to ensure
restoration of systems or
assets affected by
cybersecurity incidents.
i. RC.RP-1:
Recovery plan
is executed
during or after a
cybersecurity
incident

Cybersecurity
event detection
policies and
procedures for
monitoring
Information and
technology
assets are
regularly
reviewed to
determine what
enhancements
are required to
meet
cybersecurity
risk management
requirements and
any
enhancements
are documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

Cybersecurity
event response
and recovery
programs for
information and
technology
assets have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.
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The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for updating
incident
response plans
related to
activities of
CoT members.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for updating
incident
recovery plans
related to

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can

b.

Improvements (RC.IM):
Recovery planning and
processes are improved
by incorporating lessons
learned into future
activities.
i. RC.IM-1:
Recovery plans
incorporate
lessons learned

ii. RC.IM-2:
Recovery
strategies are
updated

Cybersecurity
event detection
policies and
procedures for
monitoring
Information and
technology
assets are
regularly
reviewed to
determine what
enhancements
are required to
meet
cybersecurity
risk management
requirements and
any
enhancements
are documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
Cybersecurity
event detection
policies and
procedures for
monitoring
Information and
technology
assets are
regularly
reviewed to
determine what
enhancements
are required to
meet
cybersecurity
risk management
requirements and
any
enhancements
are documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to

132

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

activities of
CoT members.

utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for updating
incident
recovery plans
related to
activities of
CoT members.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for updating
incident
recovery
strategies
related to
activities of
CoT members.

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master
Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

both internal and
external
stakeholders.
c.

Communications
(RC.CO): Restoration
activities are coordinated
with internal and external
parties (e.g. coordinating
centers, Internet Service
Providers, owners of
attacking systems,
victims, other CSIRTs,
and vendors).
i. RC.CO-1:
Public relations
are managed

ii. RC.CO-2:
Reputation is
repaired after
an incident

iii. RC.CO-3:
Recovery
activities are
communicated
to internal and
external
stakeholders as
well as
executive and
management
teams

Responsibilities
for managing
messaging and
other
communications
during a
cybersecurity
event to ensure
all appropriate
parties are
updated on a
timely basis are
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders.
Procedures for
managing
reputational risks
related to
cybersecurity
events for
information and
technology
assets have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
external
stakeholders
Cybersecurity
event response
and recovery
programs for
information and
technology
assets have been
documented,
implemented,
and
communicated to
both internal and
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Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement
public relations
and reputation
management
programs that
are consistent
with the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
public relations.

Public relation
communication
and impact
analyses can be
performed and
evaluated by
external
consulting firms
that specialize in
corporate public
relations
management.

Senior
management is
required to
create and
implement
public relations
and reputation
management
programs that
are consistent
with the
organization’s
risk posture.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and data
sharing by key
management
stakeholders
when
discussing the
risks associated
with managing
the corporate
reputation.

Reputational
impact reviews
can be
performed and
evaluated by
external
consulting firms
that specialize in
corporate
reputation
management.

When included
in the Reprivata
Master
Agreement, this
enables
compliance with
NIST CSF.

The Reprivata
solution enables
secure
collaboration
and
communication
of internal and
external parties
and their
responsibilities
for discussing
recovery
activities

The Master
Agreements are
designed to be
easily updated
by internal
and/or external
legal counsel as
required by the
CoT owner.
All CoT users
are required to
sign the Master

external
stakeholders.

related to
activities of
CoT members.

Agreement
before they can
utilize the data
sharing and
collaboration
capabilities of
the CoT.

Artifact 3 – Recommendations for Enhancement of Reprivata Master Agreements for
Implementing Community of Trust (CoT) Risk Management Solution
The Reprivata Master Agreements were created to provide a Community of Trust (CoT) owner with the
ability to create business rules of engagement to govern the relationships and collaboration with those
internal and external stakeholders that are part of the CoT network solution.
While the current Master agreements provide a good starting point for setting up these business rules and
relationships, the researcher evaluated specific key controls in the National Institue of Standards and
Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) version 1.1. After reviewing the key controls in the
five Functional security areas covered by the NIST CSF, the following controls were identified as
potential enhancements to the Master Agreements that would help enable cybersecurity maturity and
improvement programs for all the CoT participants.
1. NIST CSF Functional Area – Identify (ID) Controls Language to Include:
NIST CSF Key Controls

Rationale for inclusion in Master Agreements


ID.AM-6: Cybersecurity roles and
responsibilities for the entire workforce and thirdparty stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers,
partners) are established.


Documenting the cybersecurity roles
and responsibilities of internal stakeholders and
third parties, such as suppliers and business
partners, enables the CoT owner establish
access control, incident response reporting, user
collaboration, and data sharing processes to
meet the needs of the CoT as a whole.

The cybersecurity roles for event
identification for the organization and its third
parties like suppliers and partners that are CoT
users should be legally defined in writing to
make sure all obligations are understood.

Compliance to cybersecurity policies by
stakeholders should be specific and with
assessment and reporting requirements for all
CoT users.

Documentation of cybersecurity roles
for all internal and external stakeholders should
be documented and mutual collaboration and
data sharing responsibilities outlined in writing
for all CoT users.

Legal and regulatory compliance
cybersecurity requirements should be clearly
documented for all CoT users.


ID.BE-1: The organization’s role in the
supply chain is identified and communicated


ID.GV-1: Organizational cybersecurity
policy is established and communicated

ID.GV-2: Cybersecurity roles and
responsibilities are coordinated and aligned with
internal roles and external partners

ID.GV-3: Legal and regulatory
requirements regarding cybersecurity, including
privacy and civil liberties obligations, are
understood and managed
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ID.RA-6: Risk responses are identified and
prioritized.

ID.SC-2: Suppliers and third party partners
of information systems, components, and services
are identified, prioritized, and assessed using a
cyber supply chain risk assessment process

ID.SC-3: Contracts with suppliers and thirdparty partners are used to implement appropriate
measures designed to meet the objectives of an
organization’s cybersecurity program and Cyber
Supply Chain Risk Management Plan.

ID.SC-4: Suppliers and third-party partners
are routinely assessed using audits, test results, or
other forms of evaluations to confirm they are
meeting their contractual obligations.

ID.SC-5: Response and recovery planning
and testing are conducted with suppliers and thirdparty providers


Risk management collaboration
requirements for all CoT users should be clearly
defined and stakeholder obligations for risk
review are documented.

Risk management and review
obligations for third parties should be legally
binding when collaborating in the CoT.

Third party contracts should include
provisions for measuring and managing
cybersecurity risks and implementing
cybersecurity controls for controlling related
risks.

Cybersecurity audit and assessment
provisions should be clearly documented and
assessment reporting requirements specified.

Cybersecurity recovery and response
plans should be required of all CoT users.

2. NIST CSF Functional Area – Protect (PR) Controls Language to Include:
NIST CSF Key Controls

Rationale for Inclusion in Master Agreements


PR.AT-3: Third-party stakeholders (e.g.,
suppliers, customers, partners) understand their
roles and responsibilities

PR.IP-7: Protection processes are improved


See ID.AM-6 and ID.GV-2, which
outline the rationale for inclusion in Master
Agreements.

Cybersecurity protection management
process improvement and maturity requirements
are documented for all CoT users.

Collaboration requirements for assisting
CoT users to enhance their cybersecurity
protection technologies and processes are
documented.

Requirements for CoT users to
implement cybersecurity response plans are
documented.


PR.IP-8: Effectiveness of protection
technologies is shared

PR.IP-9: Response plans (Incident
Response and Business Continuity) and recovery
plans (Incident Recovery and Disaster Recovery)
are in place and managed

PR.IP-10: Response and recovery plans are
tested

PR.PT-1: Audit/log records are determined,
documented, implemented, and reviewed in
accordance with policy
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Requirements for CoT users to share the
results of cybersecurity response plan tests are
documented.

Requirements for CoT users to
implement technology logs on all networks,
servers, and other devices and that the logs are
handled and reviewed as part of a log
management process are documented.

3. NIST CSF Functional Area – Detect (DE) Controls Language to Include:
NIST CSF Key Controls

Rationale for Inclusion in Master Agreements


DE.DP-1: Roles and responsibilities for
detection are well defined to ensure accountability



DE.DP-3: Detection processes are tested


DE.DP-4: Event detection information is
communicated


DE.DP-5: Detection processes are
continuously improved


The cybersecurity roles for event
detection for the organization and its third
parties like suppliers and partners that are CoT
users should be legally defined in writing to
make sure all obligations are understood.

Requirements for CoT users to share the
results of detection process and procedure tests
are documented.

Documenting the cybersecurity event
detection responsibilities of internal
stakeholders and third parties, such as suppliers
and business partners, enables the CoT owner to
establish access control, incident response
reporting, user collaboration, and data sharing
processes to meet the needs of the CoT as a
whole.

Cybersecurity detection process
improvement and maturity requirements are
documented for all CoT users.

4. NIST CSF Functional Area – Respond (RS) Controls Language to Include:
NIST CSF Key Controls

Rationale for Inclusion in Master Agreements


RS.CO-2: Incidents are reported consistent
with established criteria

RS.CO-3: Information is shared consistent
with response plans

RS.CO-4: Coordination with stakeholders
occurs consistent with response plans

RS.CO-5: Voluntary information sharing
occurs with external stakeholders to achieve broader
cybersecurity situational awareness

RS.AN-1: Notifications from detection
systems are investigated


RS.AN-3: Forensics are performed
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Requirements for CoT users to share the
results of cybersecurity incidents and under
what situations are documented.

Collabotation requirements between
CoT users on cybersecurity incidents are
documented.

How and when CoT users are required
to work together on cybersecurity incidents are
documented.

How the CoT will be used by users to
share critial response and remediation data
related to cybersecurity events is documented.

Responsibilities for CoT users to
investigate and report cybersecurity events are
documented.

Requirements for CoT users to utilize
forensic tools and share the results of those
investigations are documented.


RS.AN-4: Incidents are categorized
consistent with response plans

RS.AN-5: Processes are established to
receive, analyze and respond to vulnerabilities
disclosed to the organization from internal and
external sources (e.g. internal testing, security
bulletins, or security researchers)

RS.IM-1: Response plans incorporate
lessons learned


RS.IM-2: Response strategies are updated


How cybersecurity events are classified
and what responses are required by specific
event classes are documented.

Requirements for CoT users to utilize
cybersecurity threat and vulnerability resources,
such as research organizations or vendors, as
part of their vulnerability management
programs are documented.

Requirements to CoT users to share
post mortem analyses of the results from
cybersecurity response exercises or tests are
documented.

Requirements for CoT users to keep
their cybersecurity response plans up-to-date are
documented.

5. NIST CSF Functional Area – Recover (RC) Controls Language to Include:
NIST CSF Key Controls

Rationale for Inclusion in Master Agreements


RC.RP-1: Recovery plan is executed during
or after a cybersecurity incident


The requirements for CoT users to
utilize cybersecurity incident response plans
when events are detected are documented.

See RS.IM-1, which outlines the
rationale for inclusion in Master Agreements.

See RS.IM-2, which outlines the
rationale for inclusion in Master Agreements.

Documenting the cybersecurity event
response responsibilities and activities of
internal stakeholders and third parties, such as
suppliers and business partners, enables the CoT
owner to establish access control, incident
response reporting, user collaboration, and data
sharing processes to meet the needs of the CoT
as a whole.


RC.IM-1: Recovery plans incorporate
lessons learned

RC.IM-2: Recovery strategies are updated

RC.CO-3: Recovery activities are
communicated to internal and external stakeholders
as well as executive and management teams
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Artifact 4 – Definitions, Acronyms, and Abbreviations [from Reprivata Community of Trust
documentation and NIST Glossary of Information Security Terms, 2018]
Access Control – The process of permitting or restricting access to applications at a granular level, such
as per-user, per-group, and per-resources.
CA – A certificate authority (CA) is a trusted entity that issues electronic documents that verify a digital
entity's identity on the Internet. The electronic documents, which are called digital certificates, are an
essential part of secure communication and play an important part in the Public Key Infrastructure.
CoT – A Community of Trust (CoT) is a group of like-minded users and service providers that have
created a private network using a combination of IPSec, TLS, and multiple encryption algorithms to
protect the members of the Community of Trust. This can be accomplished by legally bounding a private
network’s owner and members with a cyber demarcation point for end users, employees, and all
interconnected third parties.
Collective Defense – A security arrangement in which each entity in the system accepts that the security
of one is the concern of all, and therefore commits to a collective response to threats and breaches of the
system.
Community Owner – Within a Community of Trust, the Community Owner is the entity that initiates the
CoT with other third parties through the use of standardized service agreements and encrypted
communications technologies that allows the members of the CoT to collaborate securely.
Community Services -- Community Owner provides a suite of services to the End User. This allows an
End User to establish a User Profile consisting of the End User’s PII and/or Non-PII, which is
warehoused in the Central database for each Community. The End User determines what PII and/or NonPII it is willing to share (if any) with other Members, providers, third parties, or selected third parties
when using IPES. In some instances, an End User may be able to receive payment for sharing PII and/or
Non-PII with certain third parties or receive subsidies for third-party provided IPES.
Defense in Depth – The coordinated use of multiple security controls and countermeasures to protect
the integrity of a company’s information assets.
ECDH – Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman is an anonymous key agreement protocol that allows two
parties, each having an elliptic curve public–private key pair, to establish a shared secret over an
insecure channel. This shared secret may be directly used as a key, or to derive another key which can
then be used to encrypt subsequent communications using a symmetric key cipher.
FIPS 140-2 – The Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140-2, (FIPS PUB 140-2),
is a U.S. government computer security standard used to approve cryptographic modules. The title is
Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.
End User – An individual that uses “Community provided IPES Services” delivered via a Community
Owner.
Interconnection Security Agreement – A document that regulates security-relevant aspects of an
intended connection between an agency and an external system. It regulates the security interface between
any two systems operating under two different distinct authorities. It includes a variety of descriptive,
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technical, procedural, and planning information. It is usually preceded by a formal MOA/MOU that
defines high-level roles and responsibilities in management of a cross-domain connection.
IPES – Internet Protocol Enabled Services (IPES) means any services provided to the End User through a
Community Inter-connected Network or the Internet. Examples include web browsing, online gaming,
online educational games or instruction, Voice over Internet Protocol services, e-mail, texting or
messaging, and any other service delivered through a web browser, mobile app or through the use of a
personal computer, laptop, or a mobile device and the Internet.
IPSec – Internet Protocol Security is a protocol suite for securing IP communications by
authenticating and encrypting each IP packet of a communication session. IPSec includes protocols for
establishing mutual authentication between agents at the beginning of the session and negotiation of
cryptographic keys to be used during the session. IPSec can be used in protecting data flows between a
pair of hosts (host-to-host), between a pair of security gateways (network-to-network), or between a
security gateway and a host (network-to-host). IPSec uses cryptographic security services to protect
communications over IP networks. IPSec supports network-level peer authentication, data origin
authentication, data integrity, data confidentiality (encryption), and replay protection. IPSec is an endto-end security scheme operating in the Internet Layer of the Internet Protocol Suite, while some other
Internet security systems in widespread use, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Shell
(SSH), operate in the upper layers at Application layer. Hence, only IPSec protects any application
traffic over an IP network. Applications can be automatically secured by IPSec at the IP layer.
Master Agreement – These agreements require members of a Community of Trust (CoT) to organize
and deploy their independent Communities of Trust using a process that will facilitate the reliable
implementation of security policy and technical interoperability between independent Communities of
Trusts and interconnected entities.
Non-PII – Non-personally identifiable information (non-PII) is data associated with an End User that is
not specific enough to identify an End User individually. Examples include: fist name, zip code, or
birthday.
NSA Suite B – A set of cryptographic algorithms promulgated by the National Security Agency as
part of its Cryptographic Modernization Program. It is to serve as an interoperable cryptographic base
for both unclassified information and most classified information. Suite B was announced on 16
February 2005. Suite B can be used to protect foreign releasable information, US Only information,
and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).
PII – Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is defined as any information about an End User
maintained by an agency, including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an End
User’s identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or
biometric records; and (2) any other information that is linked or linkable to an End User, such as
medical, educational, financial, and employment information. Examples include, but are not limited to
full name, mother’s maiden name, government issued identification numbers like social security number,
passport number, driver’s license number or financial account or credit card numbers, or biometric data
like fingerprint, handwriting, etc.
PKI – A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a set of hardware, software, people, policies, and
procedures needed to create, manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital certificates. In
cryptography, a PKI is an arrangement that binds public keys with respective user identities by means
of a certificate authority (CA).
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Private Communications CoT (PC CoT) Software CA – The Certificate Authority inside the
IPSEC tunnel. This is to authenticate the keys used to initiate the IPSEC tunnel. TLS has another key
and it uses the same Private Communications CoT (PC CoT) software CA inside the IPSEC tunnel.
To encrypt packets, a ZRTP application layer for TwoFish encryption algorithm is implemented.
RFC 1918 – The document that helped create the standards by which networking equipment assigns IP
addresses in a private network. A private network can use a single public IP address. The RFC reserves
the following ranges of IP addresses that cannot be routed on the Internet: 10.0.0.0 - 10.255.255.255 (10/8
prefix).
Risk – A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and
typically a function of: (1) the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and
(2) the likelihood of occurrence.
Risk Adaptive Access Control – Access privileges are granted based on the combination of a user’s
identity, mission need, and the level of security risk that exists between the system being accessed and a
user. Risk Adaptive Access Control will use security metrics, such as the strength of the authentication
method, the level of assurance of the session connection between the system and a user, and the physical
location of a user, to make its risk determination.
Risk Analysis – The process of identifying the risks to system security and determining the likelihood of
occurrence, the resulting impact, and the additional safeguards that mitigate this impact. Part of risk
management is synonymous with risk assessment.
Risk Assessment – The process of identifying the risks to system security and determining the likelihood
of occurrence, the resulting impact, and the additional safeguards that mitigate this impact. Part of risk
management is synonymous with risk assessment.
SIP – The Session Initiation Protocol is a communications protocol for signaling and controlling
multimedia communication sessions. The most common applications of SIP are in Internet telephony for
voice and video calls, as well as instant messaging all over IP networks.
SRTP – A Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) profile intended to provide encryption, message
authentication and integrity, and replay attack protection to the RTP data in audio-visual applications.
Threat – Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations
(including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, or individuals through an
information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information,
and/or denial of service. Also, the potential for a threat-source to successfully exploit a particular
information system vulnerability.
Threat Analysis – The examination of threat sources against system vulnerabilities to determine the
threats for a particular system in a particular operational environment.
Threat Assessment – The process of formally evaluating the degree of threat to an information
system or enterprise and describing the nature of the threat.
Third Party Testing – Independent testing by an organization that was not involved in the design and
implementation of the object being tested (e.g., a system or device) and is not intended as the eventual
user of that object.
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TLS – Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), are
cryptographic protocols designed to provide communications security over a computer network.
Tunnel Mode – One of two modes of transport supported by IPSec. This mode encrypts the entire
packet including the header, it then provides the packet with a new header.
TwoFish – A symmetric key block cipher with a block size of 128 bits and key sizes up to 256 bits.
User Profile – Means the End User’s PII that the End User populates in the Central Privacy Authority
provided by a Community Owner database and the rules defining when certain subsets of PII may be
disclosed to third party IPES providers, i.e., any IPES that is not a Community Owner.
Vulnerability – A weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls,
or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source.
Vulnerability Analysis – The systematic examination of an information system or product to
determine the adequacy of security measures, identify security deficiencies, provide data from which
to predict the effectiveness of proposed security measures, and confirm the adequacy of such measures
after implementation.
Vulnerability Assessment – The formal description and evaluation of the vulnerabilities in an
information system.
ZRTP – A cryptographic key-agreement protocol to negotiate the keys for encryption between two end
points in a Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone telephony call based on the Real-time Transport
Protocol. It uses Diffie–Hellman key exchange and the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) for
encryption.
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APPENDIX B:

Muma College of Business ● Doctor of Business Administration Program, BSN 3403
4202 East Fowler Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33620 ●813-974-6755

27 November 2018
To whom it may concern:
In my capacity as Editor-in-Chief of the Muma Business Review and Muma Case Review, I am writing this
letter to confirm that both journals allow the authors to retain the copyright under a Creative Commons
BY-NC license. As a result, authors can reprint their work wherever it is desired provided they
acknowledge the source.
In the case of Ed Fulford, he has two Muma Case review articles that have been accepted for
publication, proofed and formatted accordingly. He can therefore include them as part of his
dissertation.
If you have further questions, feel free to contact me by email or at my home (813-994-4511).

Yours Sincerely,

T. Gradon Gill, Professor and Academic Director
Doctor of Business Administration program
grandon@usf.edu
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ED FULFORD

IMPLEMENTING A CYBERSECURITY COMMUNITY OF
TRUST: REPRIVATA SEEKS AN “EARLY ADOPTER”1
Reprivata developed a cybersecurity solution which could fundamentally change how companies
create private, trust-based interconnections with their third-party business partners. Now, how
do they attract the right “early adopter” to implement it?
John “Tripp” Hardy, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Reprivata, sat in the San Francisco airport
waiting for his flight to Washington, DC. Tripp, an investment banker by training, had been approached
by one of Reprivata’s founders, Scott Yeager, to join the young company and help it to productize its
cybersecurity solution.
Tripp and Scott had known each other since 2014. Scott was a visionary in the networking field who had
helped start Metropolitan Area Exchange - East (MAE-East), one of the first commercial and largest of
the Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). By 2013, Scott, along with his partner David Cox (an expert in both
networking and application development), had turned their talents to developing a cybersecurity solution
to allow companies to build a Community of Trust (CoT). This CoT would enable the members to
communicate and collaborate securely amongst themselves on business and cybersecurity issues. While
addressing this problem, Scott and David had come to three conclusions. First, a technology was needed
that would allow the businesses to securely communicate and collaborate over the Internet. Second, a
generally-accepted cybersecurity standard was required to provide a methodology for businesses to
mature their cybersecurity programs. Third, the business network connections between companies needed
to be governed by legal language, similar to the Master Service Agreements that had been written in the
1990s for IXPs and ISPs to link their networks. With those three design elements in his mind, Scott and
David had set to work.
After years in development, Scott had shown Tripp the initial solution. Excited about its potential and the
opportunity to work with Scott to build Reprivata, Tripp decided it was the right time to join the company
and help it take the CoT solution to market. As Tripp first began to present the Reprivata CoT solution to
his Financial Services contacts, there was a significant amount of interest in the CoT concept. However,
none of the organizations were willing to implement Reprivata’s solution and show its worth. As Tripp

1
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reviewed his upcoming schedule of meetings in Washington, DC, he thought, “How do we overcome just
one organization’s reluctance when they clearly see the value of our solution?”

The Cybersecurity Problem Spaces
Cybersecurity professionals had been diligently working to better understand the natures and impacts of
the cyber risks. However, the funding and staffing of these efforts needed to change. The adoption of
more pre-emptive and responsive global, national, and business cyber risk management behaviors lagged
the number of cyber risks being identified by cyber risk managers--and being exploited by bad actors.
Additionally, the number of effective cybersecurity solutions that could fix more than very specific
technical vulnerabilities had not increased to a point that interrelated problem spaces could be addressed.
The more aggressive implementation of effective risk measurement and mitigation programs, based on
cybersecurity standards and methodologies, seemed likely to improve the management and assessment of
cybersecurity problem and solution spaces. At this time, however, cybersecurity programs had not
matured at a pace that could keep up with the numbers and varieties of cyber risks (Fulford, 2017).
The problem spaces that cybersecurity practitioners had been required to address were very similar,
regardless of the industry or location they worked in. These problem spaces included:
•
•
•
•

The Global Cybersecurity Problem Space
The Government Cybersecurity Problem Space
The Business Cybersecurity Problem Space
The Cybersecurity Standard Problem Space

More details on the current and emerging issues related to these cybersecurity problem spaces can be
found in “A Note on the Cybersecurity Problem Space in 2018”.

The Drive Toward Broader Cybersecurity Collaboration and Maturity
Cybersecurity practitioners had not been alone in working through the difficulties of achieving and
protecting information sharing between diverse groups. A similar lack of communication had long
plagued law enforcement.

Building Communities of Trust Initiative
As a means of addressing this, in 2010, the United States Department of Justice (U.S. Justice) launched
The Building Communities of Trust (BCOT) Initiative, which focused on developing trust between law
enforcement, fusion centers, and the communities they served, particularly immigrant and minority
communities, so that crime and terrorism could be addressed. This initiative had been administered
primarily by the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (abbreviated as NSI). The
NSI program provided law enforcement with a capacity for gathering, documenting, processing,
analyzing, and sharing suspicious activity reports about behaviors that had a potential nexus to terrorism.
The NSI recognized that each community’s collaboration to gather and share this type of information was
critically important in the prevention of crime and terrorism, since law enforcement agencies were
dependent on community members to report suspicious activity information to state, local, tribal, and
territorial (SLTT) law enforcement officers. To help ensure that this reporting was taking place, it was
essential that law enforcement and community members had strong, trusting relationships. As these
relationships were developed and maintained, members of the community would be more likely to report
crime and suspicious activities, which was the reason the NSI had worked with partners at the federal,
state, and local levels--including United States Attorney’s Offices, public and privacy advocacy groups,
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religious and faith leaders, and a diverse group of local community members--to implement the Building
Communities of Trust initiative (Wasserman, 2010).

Executive Order 13636: Improving National Cybersecurity Maturity
On February of 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order (EO) 13636: Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity, which was aimed at strengthening the cybersecurity of the critical national
infrastructure. Later in 2013, Edward Snowden, a National Security Agency (NSA) contractor with high
level security clearance, copied and leaked classified information from the NSA without authorization.
Snowden’s disclosures revealed numerous global surveillance programs, many run by the NSA and other
intelligence agencies with the cooperation of telecommunication companies and European governments.
Soon after that event, there was significant pressure from the White House to create a cybersecurity
framework to meet the directives in the Executive Order. This led to NIST and industry participants,
beginning work on what was known as the Cybersecurity Framework (CSF).
While the EO did not mandate the use of any particular cybersecurity standard, it did set in motion the
joint government and industry collaboration that led to the development of the initial version of the CSF,
which was released in 2014. As stated in the EO (House, 2013):
It is the policy of the United States to enhance the security and resilience of the Nation's critical
infrastructure and to maintain a cyber environment that encourages efficiency, innovation, and
economic prosperity while promoting safety, security, business confidentiality, privacy, and civil
liberties. We can achieve these goals through a partnership with the owners and operators of
critical infrastructure to improve cybersecurity information sharing and collaboratively develop
and implement risk‐based standards.

Selected Cybersecurity Management Standards
While Reprivata was researching the various cybersecurity standards to determine which one to base their
solution on, two serious issues were noted: first, there were many cybersecurity standards already
published and second, no two industries agreed on which of the standards took precedence. Seeing the
White House’s directions on improving cybersecurity maturity as an opportunity, Scott and David had set
out in search of that overarching cybersecurity standard that would embrace the concepts of collaboration
and cyber maturity as guiding principles. Some of their findings were instrumental in leading them to a
most interesting conclusion (see Exhibit 1).

Industry-Specific Standards
There were also a number of industry-specific standards such as the Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard (PCI DSS) for companies that process, transmit, and store credit card data, the North American
Energy Reliability Corporation Critical Information Protection (NERC CIP) guidelines for the bulk power
energy companies in North America, and the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) Security Rule, which established national security standards to protect individuals’ electronic
personal health information that was created, received, used, or maintained by a covered Healthcare
entity. Adopting one of the more general industry-specific security frameworks above could be
complementary to other similar methodologies. However, many companies were required to be compliant
with several of these standards and to submit themselves to regular compliance assessments, so it became
increasingly difficult for them to be fully compliant with all of the specific standards or regulations at any
one time. Also, none of these regulations or standards required companies to measure the maturity of
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their cybersecurity program, nor did they require companies to collaborate on solving mutually-held
security issues.

International Standards Organization 27000 Standards
As perhaps the most widely known family of information security standards, the International Standards
Organization (ISO) 27000 framework was a very mature one that focused on creating and enhancing an
organization’s Information Security Management System (ISMS). The framework also provided
requirements under which an ISMS could be audited and certified by an ISO registrar. At the time of this
case study, the ISO 27000 series of standards included 45 individual guidelines across the functional areas
that made up a company’s security program. As a very comprehensive set of standards, the ISO 27000
guidelines could be used across a wide range of industries and types of business environments. ISO 27000
was the security equivalent of the ISO 9000 quality management standards used by manufacturers to
demonstrate operational excellence. Because ISO 27000 was very established with cybersecurity
practitioners compared to other standards, countries had used it as a basis to create regulatory compliance
requirements and related guidance about security as well as directions to organizations on how extend the
use of the ISO standards in their enterprise risk management practices and programs. Because of the
expanding scope of the ISO 27000 series of guidelines, an ISMS could be difficult to measure and
challenging to get certified. As such, many smaller companies were reluctant to expend the necessary
resources required to achieve accreditation, so there was a widely-held perception that ISO 27000 could
be difficult to deploy and maintain. As with industry-specific standards, ISO 27000 did not require
companies to measure the maturity of their cybersecurity programs, nor did it dictate that companies
collaborated to work on the security challenges they faced.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework
The National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF) had much in
common with the NIST 800 series information security guidelines, which were created about 20 years ago
and had evolved over that time. The original NIST 800 series of guidelines provided a starting point for
other information security guidelines and methodologies. The CSF, as an extension of the original NIST
800 series, leveraged a wide range of information security standards and leading practices. While the
NIST CSF was created recently relative to other information security standards, it was designed to be
very comprehensive and was targeted for use by large enterprises, as well as those companies with
business connections in the United States. It was found to be easily aligned to the ISO standards, such as
ISO 27000 and ISO 9000. It was the only information security framework that defined specific
measurements whereby companies could demonstrate their cybersecurity maturity. It also required
companies to collaborate with their third-party business partners in cybersecurity issues that affected their
business relationships. Because the NIST CSF contained a lot of very practical guidance, it could be
adapted to smaller and non-US organizations without a great deal of effort and expense.

General Data Protection Regulation
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was adopted in 2016 as a personal data protection and
privacy regulation in European Union (EU) law. GDPR was created as a new set of data security and
management guidelines and was designed to give EU citizens more control over their personal data and to
hold businesses that manage and process this personal data accountable for implementing and
strengthening the security and privacy controls over this data. GDPR was aimed at simplifying the
regulatory environment for businesses, so both citizens and businesses in the EU could benefit from the
products and services offered by the growth of the digital economy. GDPR also addressed the movement,
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export, and exfiltration of personally identifiable data outside of the EU and the European Economic Area
(EEA). The EEA covered the EU countries of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and
Sweden. The EEA also included Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, which allowed these countries to be
part of the EU’s single market for trade and economic development. While Switzerland was neither an
EU nor EEA member, it was part of the single EEA market. The United Kingdom, as part of its plans to
leave the EU in 2019, implemented the Data Protection Act of 2018, which contained equivalent data
security and privacy protection language to GDPR. As of 2019, the United Kingdom would become a
third country for the purposes of the transfer of personal data outside the EU, which could require the EU
to review the United Kingdom’s data protection framework to determine if the data security and privacy
controls were equivalent to those required by GDPR.

Reprivata
David, I was there at MAE-East when we made up the rules for how companies interconnect to
others on the Internet. Why don’t we just make up the rules now around how businesses
collaborate privately and securely to meet our own needs? – Scott Yeager to David Cox (2013)
David Cox was a talented technologist who saw an increasingly serious security problem facing
companies that did business over the Internet: there were few, if any, applications that were flexible and
secure enough to enable interconnected businesses to communicate and collaborate together. In 2012,
David began to build the first version of an encrypted collaboration and communication application.
David’s solution was based on open source software and included the highest level of encryption
available at the time.
The cybersecurity communication and collaboration application that David developed utilized a multilayered encryption software approach. This created a secure encrypted connection while cloaking the
accessibility of the edge devices connected to a defined set of network end points that required the ability
to pass secured traffic through those interconnections. Traffic from all the edge devices inside the secured
connections were policed, and anomalous or suspicious traffic flows were captured and stored in the
Central Privacy Authority Intrusion Database (CPAID), which was a key component of the functionality
of the application.
In 2013, David contacted Scott Yeager, who he had known from Scott’s work on MAE-East. After some
discussion, David and Scott formed Reprivata to productize David’s application. Reprivata’s name was
based on the Latin phrase “Res privata” which means private business. One of Reprivata’s strategic goals
was to “re-privatize” how companies did business over the Internet.
David originally funded the start-up through his company MiMTiD, and Scott provided additional capital
to begin work on creating the Reprivata CoT solution. Once Scott understood that the solution David had
developed allowed a company to build secure private networks using the software, Scott realized that the
problem of enabling secure communication and collaboration between connected business partners could
be solved one private network at a time. He discussed this with David and they decided to create new
rules around how a private network could become cyber secure and have interconnected entities play by
the same set of rules.
One of the ideas for this new cybersecurity solution was to bound the edges of a private network, as built
out of the software, with a new set of interconnection contracts, similar to those used in the early days of
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the internet between IXPs, ISPs, and CDNs. Scott believed that creating these new legal demarcation
points for a private network and bounding those demarcations for the network’s end users, employees and
interconnected third parties would be the most prudent and successful approach.

Reprivata Community of Trust Conceptual Model
The Reprivata Community of Trust (CoT) Conceptual Model (see Exhibit 2) was developed to articulate
the interactions of elements that influence successful cybersecurity CoT implementations using the
Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution. These elements helped determine and, in some cases,
manage the resources within these projects as part of the overarching corporate business strategy which
determined the cyber risk posture, and how that posture could be managed and measured. These were two
distinct groups of elements: one composed of the cybersecurity frameworks and legal documents that
provide structure to the CoT, and one that constituted the Internal and External Stakeholders of the CoT.
The CoT Governance element (see Exhibit 2) was based on the Master Agreements that are executed
between the overall Community of Trust’s Internal Stakeholders and its External Stakeholders. The
Master Agreements provided the legal guidance over its governance functions that the CoT members
would utilize in interactions between themselves and were the basis for the on-going collaboration
activities in the CoT. The IT risk assessment processes were defined, outlining the risk management
requirements for each member, such as purchasing cyber insurance and the how the cybersecurity
program maturity of the members would be evaluated against the CSF security controls framework. The
contractual obligations of each member regarding their IT compliance, and how the technical and
business interconnections were to be managed were also specified by this element. Finally, the risk
metrics were defined, outlining the risk measurements and the frequency of reporting those measurements
were stipulated.
The CoT Risk Management Strategy and the CoT Governance elements of the model augmented each
other as required to implement the selected Cyber Risk Management methodology (see Exhibit 2). The
provisions of CoT Governance empowered the company’s ability to measure risk and show the
company’s overall risk posture was being managed effectively. If risk management requirements were
changed, the company typically would reassess its risk posture and determine how any such changes
would impact its operational stance within the CoT and under the conditions of the Master Agreement. In
this way, the Proposed Conceptual Model would demonstrate that any changes in one or both of these
elements would typically require a business to re-assess its cyber risk posture with respect to the overall
change in its technology footprint it used to support the CoT and its strategic and operational decisions
and initiatives. The effects on the corporation’s internal technology environment were ways that these
elements influenced the direction and scope of the cyber-related management programs. These
influencers provided both an internal and external context on how the CoT Risk Management Strategy
was implemented, how its success would be measured, and how it would be evaluated against CoT
Governance requirements (such as internal or external audits, external risk assessments, or regulatory
reviews). These evaluations would influence the CoT Risk Management Strategy implementation by
providing the legal and cybersecurity orientation for enhancing cyber risk management, as well as the key
performance metrics and reporting required by management.

Defining the CoT Rules of Engagement
During his days in networking, Scott had worked on these types of legal and regulatory issues with Andy
Lipman, a partner at the law firm of Morgan Lewis and one of the leading attorneys in the area of
Telecommunications law. Earlier in his career, Andy had heavily influenced the interconnection language
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that was incorporated in the Telecommunication Act of 1996. Scott and David went to Andy and
discussed their proposed business model with him. Scott had been part of developing some of the original
commercial rules of the Internet connectivity with Rick Adams, the founder of UUNET, and several other
Internet pioneers. Scott thought that Reprivata could make up new rules for a private network and these
new rules could be enforced by the owner of the private network without asking permission of any
jurisdictional entity.
Andy found Scott’s approach to be unique and forward-thinking, and strongly encouraged David and
Scott to continue maturing their solution. In addition, Andy confirmed to Scott and David that they could
make up new rules for a private network and those rules could also be used to enforce cybersecurity
maturity requirements via Master Agreements, using the notion of a demarcation point in the Master
Agreement to create and enforce those rules across all interconnected users, employees and third parties.
Andy then reviewed Reprivata’s concepts and software design and was impressed by the ways the
company was solving for some of the more impactful security issues facing interconnected companies
doing business over the Internet. On his recommendation, Reprivata filed for two patents. The first one
was for an Encrypted Community of Trust (CoT) using the Central Privacy Authority to warehouse data
owned by End Users and to facilitate management of encryption keys controlled by the CoT owner. The
second patent was for an Advertising Compliance Authority (ACA), based on functionality created
through the use of Reprivata’s software.

Reprivata’s Cybersecurity Community of Trust
As Reprivata performed its early research into the key functionality required by its cyber risk
management solution, Scott and David found that the Community of Trust (CoT) model, similar to one
implemented by the U.S. Justice’s BCOT initiative (even though they had no knowledge of the U.S.
Justice’s efforts at the time Reprivata was developing its strategy), was key to the broad-based adoption
and success of the solution with clients. They then designed Reprivata’s CoT approach around several
core concepts:


The CoT members were required to meet a minimum cybersecurity standard that was uniform,
repeatable, easy-to-understand, and measure.



The CoT was implemented as a private network between its members with demarcation points
documented both technically and legally through Master Agreements (standardized contracts) at
the employee, end-user and independent third party (I3P) levels.



The CoT agreements were required its members to obtain cyber insurance as a form of risk
management and third-party monitoring control.



The CoT agreements were defining the limits on liability for its members in case of a data breach
or other major cybersecurity event.



The CoT agreements were both defining and enabling secure information sharing and
collaboration between the members on cybersecurity issues that impacted the community as a
whole.



The CoT should be able to provide members with the ability to monitor cybersecurity events
related to the members’ business activities across servers, applications, devices, and data flows
from all interconnected third parties. This notion was called a Community of Trust Privacy
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Authority (CoTPA) and was defined and described in all the CoT Master Agreements, so
information could be legally collected and agreed to by all parties in the private network. It
allowed Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and other sensitive business data to be stored by
the CoT owner as the custodian of the data, and also to be held privately in the CoTPA Privacy
Authority and managed on behalf of all the members of the CoT in a secure and legal manner.


The CoTPA also helped the CoT owner to collect data about the activities of members inside the
private CoT and use it as needed to protect the overall cybersecurity posture and maturity of the
CoT in a manner that protected all parties. This enabled the CoT owner to share data between
themselves and the interconnected third parties, so that they could collaborate about cyber
maturity matters across the demarcation set out in the Master Agreement.

Selecting the Right Cybersecurity Standard
With these guiding principles established and the initial technology platform designed, the Reprivata team
began to review the different cybersecurity standards and frameworks that were used in various
industries. One of the first things they learned was that there were actually many cybersecurity
methodologies to choose from. After reviewing a number of the most widely used ones, the team realized
that none of the standards met their needs. There seemed to be no good way to proceed at this point. The
other standards, though comprehensive, did not facilitate collaboration between companies to solve
mutually-held cybersecurity issues--a key part of the Reprivata’s technology and process-oriented
solution. Then, Scott and David evaluated the NIST CSF and they recognized that they had found the
right cybersecurity standard for their needs.
This decision was also influenced by David’s personal experiences. After returning from a trip abroad as
part of a cybersecurity project team he initiated, David told Scott they should use the NIST CSF. The
NIST CSF was a comprehensive set of cybersecurity requirements based on 23 control categories across 5
cybersecurity functional areas (see Exhibit 3). As such, the cybersecurity requirements offered a
comprehensive framework on which companies could construct their cybersecurity programs. Also, the
NIST CSF included a cybersecurity program maturity model that gave companies several ways to
determine how they were performing as they implemented the framework’s security controls (see Exhibit
4).
To David’s way of thinking, a standard with cybersecurity and risk management control guidelines
developed by industry, NIST, and other government agencies charged with protecting the U.S. critical
national infrastructure was a match to Reprivata’s guiding principles. When Scott heard David’s
reasoning, he agreed that the NIST CFF was the standard to use in the Master Agreements to help ensure
consistent cybersecurity maturity across the clients’ private networks. Now, with the NIST CSF providing
direction on how to implement and mature a cybersecurity program, the team incorporated these security
controls and maturity requirements into the Master Agreements.

Illustrating the Reprivata CoT Solution Space
A shared framework such as the NIST CSF focused on the rapid identification and remediation of security
control gaps relative to a generally accepted cybersecurity standard, as opposed to having to regularly recertify their cybersecurity posture to multiple information infrastructure protection guidelines or, at worst,
against ad hoc security requirements. Reprivata realized that this approach to closing security control
weaknesses required not only collaboration between the members of a CoT, but a very robust
cybersecurity program as well.
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Of particular interest for Reprivata and its CoT solution was NIST CSF Tier 3 (see Exhibit 4). NIST CSF
Tier 3 required the organizations that adopted the framework as part of building a trusted commercial
relationship with their interconnected business partners to implement cyber risk initiatives as part of an
on-going cybersecurity process improvement program. Each organization in the CoT was required to
incorporate cyber risk into its enterprise risk management policies and program. This enterprise approach
to cyber risk meant that an organization-wide approach to managing cybersecurity risk could be adopted
and applied to both internal and external stakeholders. By including stakeholders in the cybersecurity
program, the company then began to recognize and document the interdependencies on third parties and
the increased need for collaboration between all key stakeholders.
Another benefit of NIST CSF Tier 3 to the organization was that it could be readily mapped to
government, international, and industry-specific standards, such as the ISO 27000 security requirements
and others that are applicable to Financial Services, Healthcare, and other industries that needed to
evaluate the cyber risks in their business and technology strategies.
In practice, NIST CSF Tier 3 could be implemented as a private network with demarcation points defined
both technically and legally through the adoption of standardized Master Agreements or similar contracts
at the employee, end-user and information and infrastructure protection levels. Such contracts defined
limits of liability for all parties, in accordance to their technology footprint, interconnections, and
identified risks. Another advantage of the standardized contracts was that risk mitigation measures such
as cyber insurance were more easily integrated into the business partners’ overall cybersecurity posture as
a form of mutually-approved risk management and third-party monitoring. By having such defined risk
mechanisms, secure information sharing and broader collaboration between the partners was facilitated.
There were other advantages for the company that was the leader or “owner” of the CoT. The
organization's cyber risk management practices had to be formally approved and expressed as policy, with
appropriate NIST CSF key performance indicators included in enterprise risk management reporting.
Under the framework, organizational cybersecurity practices were required to be regularly updated, based
on the application of risk treatments. These treatments were defined in response to changes in internal and
external strategic and tactical requirements as well as the changing threat and technology landscapes the
business faced.
The proposed cyber risk evaluation solution artifacts were designed to be easily integrated into a
company’s enterprise risk management program. The artifacts allowed the rapid application of tools and
techniques such as gap analyses, compliance testing, threat surveillance, and incident response
postmortems that were critical to the success of understanding cyber risks as they were discovered and
assessed. These methods were consistent to the NIST CSF framework and could be shared with business
partners to support their cybersecurity postures as well as to enable more thorough government and
industry compliance reviews of security controls, which increased collaboration and cooperation between
the partners.
In 2015, Scott had briefed the United States Department of the Treasury (U.S. Treasury) about the
business interconnection issue. At the same time, he had started educating the American Bankers
Association (ABA) about the NISF CSF and cyber insurance approach to enterprise risk management and
cybersecurity maturity which were incorporated in the Master Agreements. Scott also contacted the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) as an organization as well as each state
insurance commissioner and met with them about the Reprivata CoT Master Agreements and related
Reprivata’s decision to seek Underwriter’s Laboratory’s new cybersecurity certification on the Reprivata
software suite. This was a major effort and took until the end of 2016.
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The First Independently Certified Cybersecurity Software
In 2016, Reprivata decided to take a bold step. It approached the UL to certify the CoT solution under
UL’s recently created Cybersecurity Assurance Program (UL CAP). Scott and David met members of the
UL CAP program at a trade show and, after that meeting, Scott decided to engage UL CAP to perform a
certification assessment on the Reprivata software. If the assessment was successful, Reprivata’s solution
would be the first cybersecurity software to be certified under the UL CAP program. Reprivata knew that
the UL certification could be a marketing advantage for them with potential clients, especially as a new
company. Also, because UL certifications were well-respected in the insurance industry, a UL
endorsement like this potentially helped clients get cyber insurance to cover losses from cyberattacks and
to assist with getting the appropriate levels of coverage required to remediate from these events. Pursuing
the UL CAP certification was truly an opportunity for Reprivata to distinguish itself as a leader in the
development of robust cybersecurity solutions.
UL CAP assessors applied the UL 2900 series of cybersecurity standards to the certification process. To
ensure David met the demanding certification requirements, Scott reached out to Nathan Gregory, who
Scott had known from the MAE-East days of the 1990s. Initially, Nathan worked on documenting the
software according to the UL CAP guidelines. As the certification process went on, Nathan also assisted
David and the UL security testers to make sure that all issues found by the cybersecurity testing and
evaluations were cleared. Nathan provided the UL testers with guidance on the software’s architecture
functionality as they assessed the solution’s potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses in order to verify
that its internal security capabilities and controls were implemented as designed.
Over several months, UL’s security assessment team tested the CoT solution and tried to break its
cryptographic security, but was not able to do so. The application testing protocol was extensive, covering
such areas as malformed input testing, software composition and runtime analysis, malware analysis, and
penetration testing.
Finally, in July of 2016, the UL certification was awarded. Now, Reprivata had an innovative
cybersecurity product that was the very first to be UL certified. Scott and David continued to look for an
early adopter, but no company would commit to implement the product yet.
More details on the Reprivata software and CoT solution are included in the Technical Note
accompanying this case study.

A Unique Opportunity to Test the Solution
Then, Reprivata got its first big break. David's work on the early versions of the Reprivata software for
the intelligence community made him more well-known in the cybersecurity field. As a result, David was
approached by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to implement some technology and policy approaches in the
Kingdom’s cybersecurity operations center. As David started his work, it became clear implementing a
CoT based on Reprivata’s software suite would be extremely useful to the program he was leading. While
this was a chance to implement the Reprivata software in a cyber environment where it would be severely
tested because of the number of attacks it would likely face, the agreement with the Saudi government
also required David to be onsite in Saudi Arabia to manage the system. After much debate, Scott and
David agreed that this was a situation they could not pass up. However, it also meant that finding a client
in the United States would take more time in light of David’s move to Saudi Arabia to run the project.
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Searching for an Early Adopter
In 2017, Scott and David discussed Reprivata’s future. They decided that it was time to find a hands-on
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who had deep connections with corporate executives and industry leaders
and could help the company begin a more extensive marketing campaign to formally launch the CoT
solution in the United States. Tripp Hardy was recruited to fill this role and the search for an “early
adopter” in the United States accelerated.
Tripp's first major act as CEO was to work with Scott and David on a white paper that addressed a U.S.
Treasury request for comments on the cybersecurity issues related to business interconnections. This
paper was the first time that Reprivata had presented anything in the public domain regarding the idea of a
CoT with Master Agreements being a solution for companies that wanted to set boundaries on the risks
inherent with third party business interconnections to their corporate networks. The paper, in addition to
the awarding of the UL certification of their software, was a catalyst for Reprivata being asked to
participate in meetings with several government agencies and also attracted the interest of companies in
industries like Banking and Insurance. The pursuit of an early adopter was on in earnest.
In March of 2018, Tripp, Scott, and other members of the Reprivata senior management team had been
engaged by potential clients at several high profile Federal and state government agencies in an attempt to
sign up the first adopter of their cybersecurity solution. As a result of these meetings, the company had
been asked to come to Washington, DC to perform a technical demonstration of a client-provided use
case. Part of this demonstration included the integration of Microsoft Office into the solution to facilitate
workgroup collaboration. Of particular interest to this agency was the concept of a “micro CoT”,
essentially a small (10 to 100 user) private collaboration group that helped their internal departments
change security and risk management behaviors immediately. This CoT implementation strategy also had
the ability to make those groups compliant with NIST CSF Tier 3 requirements, taking small careful steps
to raise the cyber maturity of the entire agency. However, this demonstration was not without potential
obstacles and risks.

Challenges
There was growing acknowledgement within the company that additional development would be required
before a client would agree to implement their solution. After they reviewed the company’s finances,
Tripp and Scott met with the other members of the Reprivata management team to discuss next steps.
Reprivata was a self-funded company; Scott and David had originally funded the startup and Tripp had
become an investor when he joined the company. When he joined Reprivata as Chief Technology Officer,
Nathan Gregory had also self-funded his considerable participation in Reprivata, especially his earlier
efforts in documenting the Reprivata software suite as part of the requirements to obtain the UL
certification for the solution and assisting the UL security testers during the software’s certification
assessment.
Now, the company was at a crossroads and looking at potential funding options because of the number of
organizations that had started taking interest in Reprivata and its solution. While all the management team
had agreed that remaining self-funded was the direction they wanted to go, they also understood that they
did not have sufficient funds to maintain the current capital burn rate. The management team had
unanimously decided that the integration project for the upcoming product demonstration was critical to
the future of the company, even though it would require them to spend most of the available cash.
Without a real client yet, could Reprivata remain self-funded, complete the software integration,
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successfully demonstrate the solution with a client use case, and close the deal--or would it need to pursue
other funding options to execute its plans?
The Reprivata CoT solution had been built using open source software, tools, and applications for voice,
video, file transfer, and text communications. Initially, no development efforts had been focused on
integrating collaborative and office support tools like Microsoft Office and SharePoint into the solution.
All the clients the Reprivata team had spoken with had either asked about or required this type of
integration to enhance the solution’s native collaborative capabilities. While the Reprivata team believed
that this integration would be feasible, they had become more certain that this functionality was a
requirement for the solution’s broader acceptance in the market. Would a client want to risk implementing
the Reprivata CoT solution without these capabilities?
Reprivata had not been able to pay sales people to reach out to potential clients. Scott, from his prior
entrepreneurial experience, had a list of sales and marketing contacts that, after hearing about the
Reprivata CoT solution, were eager to help set up meetings with potential clients. At this time, after 3
years with no real successes in finding an early adopter for the solution, the number of people who were
either still interested in or willing to help Reprivata gain entrée into the right cybersecurity executives and
influencers in companies had shrunk. Without sales people who considered taking a risk and continued to
assist Reprivata without a near-term opportunity for compensation, could Reprivata find the next adopter
of its solution--and the one after that--if they successfully closed the deal with their current client after the
upcoming demonstration?
David Cox had been overseas for over a year. At a very critical time for Reprivata, with a software
integration project and system demonstration in the offing for its first real U.S. client, David was
supporting the cybersecurity operations center for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia was a major target for cyberattacks and other security events. David was tapped for this project
because of the development of a security and threat intelligence system that was part of the Reprivata
CoT solution. With the technical abilities to help complete the integration project on time, David’s
assistance ensured the client demonstration would be successful. Unfortunately, the client demonstration
would soon be held in Washington, DC. Would David be able to participate in the preparation of the
client demonstration and then be able to attend the formal presentation with the client in Washington,
DC?

Decisions
All of the members of the Reprivata management team had spent a great deal of time, effort, and money
to meet with potential clients in order to get an early adopter in the United States. Now, Scott and Nathan
had both spent a significant amount of their own personal funds and could not easily raise additional
money. David was not wealthy and did not have a great deal of available cash to help prop up the
company’s finances in the short term. Tripp, being an investment banker working in the Silicon Valley
area, had funded some of the companies’ activities since he joined the company, but he was a widowed
father with 5 children to care for and could not contribute much more money at this time. That left the
management team with several alternatives to consider.
Scott had always stated that his vision had already been to concentrate on the Master Agreements and let
the clients define their own uses of a collaboration solution, even though they might not be the one
Reprivata offered. Was the approach of allowing clients to determine how and if they wanted to
implement a collaboration technology without using the Reprivata solution a prudent one?
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There was quite a bit of discussion on how to fix the short-term money issues. Was it a good idea to go all
in right now and spend most, if not all, of the remaining capital on the upcoming product demonstration,
betting heavily on its success to secure the “early adopter” client the firm had been seeking?
With his investment banking background, Tripp had a number of high-level contacts with some of the
leading venture capital firms and individual investors in Silicon Valley and New York that might be
interested in investing in Reprivata. With a large client win potentially in the offing now, was it prudent to
make an attempt to raise funds now? Also, if the Reprivata management team did that, what would they
have to give, either in participation in the company or in ownership of its proprietary technology, to make
such a deal?
Tripp and Scott had been attending security trade shows and conferences and had spoken with several
cybersecurity vendors about the Reprivata solution. A number of the companies they met, including a few
of the very large cybersecurity vendors, were interested in forming partnerships to bring a more
comprehensive cybersecurity solution to market by integrating Reprivata’s technology. If they made such
an arrangement, would Reprivata ultimately lose its identity and, more importantly, the potential for
future earnings from its unique and innovative technology?
Tripp, Scott, and David had a number of conversations about the best way to productize the Reprivata
solution. One way they discussed was to spin off the proprietary technology solution suite to form a
software company. In fact, the technology was perhaps the most valuable asset the company held.
However, Scott was adamant that Reprivata would not become a software development firm, which
would require the hiring of programming, support, and sales people. Tripp made the argument that
spinning the technology off into a separate company could give Reprivata a great opportunity to further
mature the product and could provide more opportunities to integrate the software with other
cybersecurity technologies and make the proprietary technology even more valuable. Did Reprivata really
need such a development capability?
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Exhibit 1: Comparison of Selected Cybersecurity Management Standards
Comparison
Criteria

Industry-Specific
Cybersecurity
Standards

ISO 27000
Standards

NIST
Cybersecurity
Framework

General Data
Protection
Regulation

Includes
Comprehensive
Security Guidance
and Leading
Practices

Differs between
standards

Yes

Yes

Yes

Aligns with other
Information Security
and Business
Standards

Alignment is
relatively easy,
but takes time to
do

Yes

Yes

Yes

Facilitates
Compliance with
other Information
Security Standards

No, but there are
some frameworks
that use other
standards as
models for
technical controls

Yes

Yes

Yes, but
requires
compliance
assessment to
determine

Is Specific to a Single
Country or Region

Yes, in most cases

No

Yes, but useful
for foreign
companies
doing business
in the United
States

Yes

Includes
Cybersecurity
Maturity Model

No

No

Yes

No

Requires
Collaboration
between Business
Partners

No

No

Yes

No

Source: Developed by case writer
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Exhibit 2: Reprivata Community of Trust Conceptual Model

Source: Developed by case writer
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Exhibit 3: NIST CSF Functions & Control Categories for Assessment
Functions

Identify (ID)

Protect (PR)

Detect (DT)

Respond (RS)

Recover (RC)

Categories
Asset Management (AM)
Business Environment (BE)
Governance (GV)
Risk Assessment (RA)
Risk Management Strategy (RM)
Supply Chain Risk Management (SC)
Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control (AC)
Awareness and Training (AT)
Data Security (DS)
Information Protection Processes and Procedures (IP)
Maintenance (MA)
Protection Technologies (PT)
Anomalies and Events (AE)
Security Continuous Monitoring (CM)
Detection Processes
Response Planning (RP)
Communications (CO)
Analysis (AN)
Mitigation (MI)
Improvements (IM)
Recovery Planning (RP)
Improvements (IM)
Communications (CO)

Source: Developed by case writer
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Exhibit 4: NIST CSF Implementation Tiers
Maturity Tier
1. Partial

Definition and Characteristics
Risk Management Process – Organizational cybersecurity risk management
practices are not formalized, and risk is managed in an ad hoc and sometimes
reactive manner. Prioritization of cybersecurity activities may not be directly
informed by organizational risk objectives, the threat environment, or
business/mission requirements.
Integrated Risk Management Program – There is limited awareness of
cybersecurity risk at the organizational level. The organization implements
cybersecurity risk management on an irregular, case-by-case basis due to
varied experience or information gained from outside sources. The
organization may not have processes that enable cybersecurity information to
be shared within the organization.
External Participation – The organization does not understand its role in the
larger ecosystem with respect to either its dependencies or dependents. The
organization does not collaborate with or receive information (e.g., threat
intelligence, best practices, technologies) from other entities (e.g., buyers,
suppliers, dependencies, dependents, ISAOs, researchers, governments), nor
does it share information. The organization is generally unaware of the cyber
supply chain risks of the products and services it provides and that it uses.

2. Risk
Informed

Risk Management Process – Risk management practices are approved by
management but may not be established as organizational-wide policy.
Prioritization of cybersecurity activities and protection needs is directly
informed by organizational risk objectives, the threat environment, or
business/mission requirements.
Integrated Risk Management Program – There is an awareness of
cybersecurity risk at the organizational level, but an organization-wide
approach to managing cybersecurity risk has not been established.
Cybersecurity information is shared within the organization on an informal
basis. Consideration of cybersecurity in organizational objectives and programs
may occur at some but not all levels of the organization. Cyber risk assessment
of organizational and external assets occurs, but is not typically repeatable or
reoccurring.

3. Repeatable

External Participation – Generally, the organization understands its role in the
larger ecosystem with respect to either its own dependencies or dependents, but
not both. The organization collaborates with and receives some information
from other entities and generates some of its own information, but may not
share information with others. Additionally, the organization is aware of the
cyber supply chain risks associated with the products and services it provides
and uses, but does not act consistently or formally upon those risks.
Risk Management Process – The organization’s risk management practices are
formally approved and expressed as policy. Organizational cybersecurity
practices are regularly updated based on the application of risk management
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processes to changes in business/mission requirements and a changing threat
and technology landscape.
Integrated Risk Management Program – There is an organization-wide
approach to manage cybersecurity risk. Risk-informed policies, processes, and
procedures are defined, implemented as intended, and reviewed. Consistent
methods are in place to respond effectively to changes in risk. Personnel
possess the knowledge and skills to perform their appointed roles and
responsibilities. The organization consistently and accurately monitors
cybersecurity risk of organizational assets. Senior cybersecurity and noncybersecurity executives communicate regularly regarding cybersecurity risk.
Senior executives ensure consideration of cybersecurity through all lines of
operation in the organization.
External Participation – The organization understands its role, dependencies,
and dependents in the larger ecosystem and may contribute to the community’s
broader understanding of risks. It collaborates with and receives information
from other entities regularly that complements internally generated
information, and shares information with other entities. The organization is
aware of the cyber supply chain risks associated with the products and services
it provides and that it uses. Additionally, it usually acts formally upon those
risks, including mechanisms such as written agreements to communicate
baseline requirements, governance structures (e.g., risk councils), and policy
implementation and monitoring.
4. Adaptive

Risk Management Process – The organization adapts its cybersecurity
practices based on previous and current cybersecurity activities, including
lessons learned and predictive indicators. Through a process of continuous
improvement incorporating advanced cybersecurity technologies and practices,
the organization actively adapts to a changing threat and technology landscape
and responds in a timely and effective manner to evolving, sophisticated
threats.
Integrated Risk Management Program – There is an organization-wide
approach to managing cybersecurity risk that uses risk-informed policies,
processes, and procedures to address potential cybersecurity events. The
relationship between cybersecurity risk and organizational objectives is clearly
understood and considered when making decisions. Senior executives monitor
cybersecurity risk in the same context as financial risk and other organizational
risks. The organizational budget is based on an understanding of the current
and predicted risk environment and risk tolerance. Business units implement
executive vision and analyze system-level risks in the context of the
organizational risk tolerances. Cybersecurity risk management is part of the
organizational culture and evolves from an awareness of previous activities and
continuous awareness of activities on their systems and networks. The
organization can quickly and efficiently account for changes to
business/mission objectives in how risk is approached and communicated.
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External Participation - The organization understands its role, dependencies,
and dependents in the larger ecosystem and contributes to the community’s
broader understanding of risks. It receives, generates, and reviews prioritized
information that informs continuous analysis of its risks as the threat and
technology landscapes evolve. The organization shares that information
internally and externally with other collaborators. The organization uses realtime or near real-time information to understand and consistently act upon
cyber supply chain risks associated with the products and services it provides
and that it uses. Additionally, it communicates proactively, using formal (e.g.,
agreements) and informal mechanisms to develop and maintain strong supply
chain relationships.
Source: Developed by case writer based on CSF version 1.1, 2018
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ED FULFORD

A NOTE ON THE CYBERSECURITY PROBLEM SPACE IN
20182
The Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) used for Internet communications was
designed so that traffic from one device connected to the Internet was visible to all other connected
devices. This one attribute made it possible for bad actors and hackers to attack any company, country, or
person from anywhere on earth across the Internet. For the first time in recorded history, a disgruntled
individual, terrorist group, or rogue country wreaked havoc on other people, companies, countries, and-of even greater concern--the global economy. All that was required was a computer, an Internet
connection, and one or more vulnerable endpoints attached to critical applications or networks also linked
to the Internet.
The cybersecurity industry had long acknowledged that the Internet was not originally designed for
electronic business. Also, it was never intended for the transmission of critical information, nor for the
support of mission critical networks and infrastructure. As quoted from a 2002 research report produced
by the CERT Coordination Center in connection with the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at
Carnegie Mellon University (CMU): “The Internet was not designed to resist highly untrustworthy users”
(Lipson, 2002).
Recognizing this problem, the cybersecurity industry’s mindset was focused on defending against
untrustworthy users. After all, this approach worked in the physical world. If one knew the weapon that
an attacker was using and the direction from which the attack was coming, an effective defense could
often be planned and implemented. However, this had not been the case when defending against
cyberattacks on the Internet. There usually were many ways to stage an attack without being detected. In
addition, the technologies that were used for masking such attacks had become more sophisticated, as
2
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demonstrated by attackers’ abilities to anonymize themselves and their attack vectors, which made it
much more difficult to isolate the sources of attacks. Also, remember that many of the recent
cybersecurity solutions defended against an attack that had already occurred and offered no assurance that
they could defend against the next attack.
Cybersecurity and risk management professionals had been working diligently to improve information
security and risk management practices in order to reduce overall cybersecurity risks. While these efforts
had managed to improve information security practices, they had done so without showing any significant
or maintainable reductions in the numbers and types of cybersecurity risks. This situation had identified a
variety of challenges that cybersecurity experts needed to address in a number of key problem areas.

The Cybersecurity Problem Space
Ely Kahn from Sqrrl, one of responders to the 2017 Passcode (The Christian Science Monitor's section on
security and privacy) poll of cybersecurity practitioners, stated (Sorcher, 2017):
I think the most urgent cybersecurity challenge is the need for all organizations to fully
understand the cyber risks they face, how those risks affect their mission, and what are the most
cost-effective ways to mitigate those risks.
The cybersecurity practitioners’ struggles to stem the tide of cyber risks came at the increasing expense of
the resources--tools, personnel, and support--needed to change the nature of global, national, and business
behaviors that helped create this situation in the first place. The focus on creating cybersecurity solutions
to fix more than point problems had not gained significant mindshare with cybersecurity practitioners, so
they tried to transform current information security and risk management approaches to address broader
and increasing more interrelated problem spaces. As a method of dealing with cybersecurity risks,
information security might ultimately have had an indirect impact on the successful implementation of
effective cybersecurity control programs over time. However, the management and assessment practices
related to information security problem and solution spaces were not encompassing enough and were too
inwardly focused to enable wide-reaching strategic and tactical enhancements to take place. As such,
cybersecurity programs were not maturing quickly enough to deal with these risks. One significant reason
for this situation was the lack of collaboration between companies that did business together. In many
cases, these business partners did not discuss their common cybersecurity issues because of the lack of
defined rules of engagement and secure communication capabilities.
For the purpose of this article, the following cybersecurity problem areas will be discussed:





Global Cybersecurity Problems
Government Cybersecurity Problems
Business Cybersecurity Problems
Cybersecurity Standards Problems

Global Cybersecurity Problems
Europol, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, recently assessed the global
impact of cybersecurity events like the ransomware epidemic. In their study, they found that their efforts
had some successes in disrupting criminal groups that primarily operated online. However, they also
determined that the economic impact was far reaching with cross-border implications as multinational
banks and international corporations were attacked. Commenting on this situation in an October 2017
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interview published on HelpNetSecurity.com, Europol’s Executive Director Rob Wainwright stated (“The
Global Impact,” 2017):
The global impact of huge cyber security events such as the WannaCry ransomware epidemic (a
cryptoworm attack in 2017 which targeted computers running the Microsoft Windows operating
system by encrypting data and then demanding the owners to make payments in the Bitcoin
cryptocurrency to release the computer has taken the threat from cybercrime to another level.
Summing up the efforts of Europol and its law enforcement partners at the conclusion of the interview,
Wainwright said that, even with the progress that had been made, “The collective response is still not
good enough” (“The Global Impact,” 2017).
Over time, cybersecurity threats and attacks like the WannaCry incidents had become ever-present news
items. As terrorist groups and rogue governments sought new ways to economically damage or strike fear
in their enemies, the number and sophistication of cybersecurity incidents grew. The 2017 Internet
Organized Crime Threat Assessment cited several examples of cyber events with a global reach that
included:


Ransomware eclipsed most other cyber-threats with global campaigns indiscriminately affecting
victims across multiple industries in both the public and private sectors. Some attacks targeted
and affected critical national infrastructures at levels that could have endangered lives. These
attacks highlighted how network interconnectivity, poor digital hygiene standards and insufficient
security practices allowed such threats to quickly spread and expand the attack vectors.



The first serious attacks by botnets using infected insecure Internet of Things (IoT) devices
occurred.



Data breaches continued to result in the disclosure of vast amounts of data, with over 2 billion
records related to European Union citizens reportedly being leaked over a 12-month period, often
exacerbated by poor digital hygiene and security practices.



The Darknet remained a key cross-cutting enabler for a variety of crime areas. It provided access
to among other things:
o

The supply of drugs such as Fentanyl and new psychoactive substances which directly
led to many fatalities internationally

o

The supply of firearms that were used in terrorist acts

o

Compromised payment data which enabled bad actors to commit various types of
payment fraud

o

Fraudulent documents which facilitated various types of fraud, trafficking in human
beings, and illegal immigration activities



Offenders continued to abuse the Darknet and other online platforms, sharing and distributing
child sexual abuse material, and engaging with potential victims, often coercing or sexually
extorting vulnerable minors.



Payment fraud affected almost all industries, having the greatest impact on the Retail, Airline and
Accommodation sectors. Several sectors had been targeted by these fraudsters as the services they
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provided could be used for the facilitation of other crimes, including trafficking in human beings
or drugs, and illegal immigration.


Direct attacks on bank networks manipulated card balances, took control of ATMs or directly
transferred funds, known as payment process compromise, represented one of the serious
emerging threats in this area. (“The Global Impact,” 2017).

While governments began to allocate more money and personnel to defend their countries, many
companies were not financially able to defend themselves, and affected individuals were even less able to
do so. Even with the regulatory and industry requirements placed on them, neither companies nor
individuals could adequately defend themselves from cyber-attacks and were not likely to have the
training, competence, or capability to do so. The best that could be expected was that companies would
continue to strive to maintain a heightened degree of operational resilience, business continuity, and
disaster recovery in their strategic and tactical plans.
As outlined in the cybersecurity industry report mentioned above, international and business boundaries
had been all but eliminated by electronic commerce, which put more pressure on governments and
companies to be more vigilant in their own cybersecurity controls to prevent or limit the impacts from
cyber incidents. Practitioners in the cybersecurity field actively discussed if it was more prudent to
implement, maintain, and monitor the effectiveness of security controls around their supply chains or their
networks. Ultimately, however, these cybersecurity professionals determined that more work was
required. In many cases, the international supply chains were intertwined with transnational computer
networks, which made the deployment and monitoring of these security control mechanisms and systems
much more difficult. As discussed previously, the lack of cybersecurity program maturity in governments
and international companies, in addition to the absence of consistent collaboration between these groups
based on prescribed rules for doing so, limited their abilities to coordinate actions to deal with
cybersecurity issues that arose on a seemingly daily basis.
The consequences from the set of circumstances outlined above were far-reaching. For example, the
rising hostility of threat actors was often misunderstood and not foreseen before attacks took place, which
lessened the time and ability for governments or companies to respond, thus costing them financially and
operationally as well as negatively impacting their reputations. The other effects from such events
included critical systems and services not being available or functioning as designed during emergencies
and the civil conflicts that resulted from prolonged service outages.

Government Cybersecurity Problems
Government agencies had helped safeguard very sensitive information on their country’s citizens as well
as data about their actions and programs that affected the public welfare. This had made them particularly
attractive targets for cyberattacks. Unfortunately, governments had often lagged behind businesses in the
implementation of cybersecurity controls and protection systems. This became a serious concern as the
cyberattacks and the terrorists who launched them became more sophisticated. The Heritage Foundation,
in its January, 2018 report on Federal cyber breaches, found that there were over 30,000 cybersecurity
incidents that affected the United States government in 2016, with 16 rising to the level of a being a major
incident (Walters, 2018). Both the Obama and Trump Administrations issued Executive Orders
mandating the United States government to implement modern, focused, responsive, and proactive
cybersecurity programs that had the ability to adapt to the threat environment and to provide better
measurements of the cyber risks faced. At this point, it was not readily apparent that the government had
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begun to dedicate the appropriate resources to do this and to meet these cyber challenges in an aggressive
way.
Cybersecurity practitioners both inside and outside the government questioned what intelligence and law
enforcement agencies had done to deploy effective cyber defense technologies. Of particular concern
were the abilities of agencies charged with cybersecurity monitoring as well as identifying and
remediating security breaches. For example, when Wikileaks released what it believed to be a list of CIA
hacking tools in March, 2017, these abilities were seriously questioned. This incident exposed a list of
cybersecurity hacking applications known as “Year Zero” or “Vault 7,” which were reportedly acquired
by Wikileaks while the information passed between government employees and contractors in an
“unauthorized manner.” A month later in April, 2017, a group known as the Shadow Brokers continued
releasing what it claimed were NSA hacking tools. One of the tools included in this release, known as
EternalBlue, was associated with a number of cyberattacks, including those involving WannaCry
ransomware, which occurred throughout the summer of 2016 and into 2017. The Shadow Brokers
claimed to have stolen these tools from a team, known as the “Equation Group,” which was reportedly
associated with the NSA (Walters, 2018).
Also, state and local governments had been even more at risk from such cyberattacks. Few had the money
to invest in the technologies and the appropriately trained personnel to provide needed services in
network security, threat intelligence, risk-based analytics, and data encryption. The ransomware attack
that crippled the government support systems of the City of Atlanta, Georgia for over a week in March,
2018 was further indication that local governments had been woefully underprepared from a technical
capability perspective and a personnel standpoint to deal with these types of cyberattacks when they
occurred (Hutcherson, 2018).
Government agencies at all levels had not been able to effectively create cyber defense capabilities in
their organizations, primarily due to the fact that their cybersecurity strategies had often been “siloed” in
one functional area. As such, these agencies had not concentrated on bringing their entire organization up
to a baseline level of compliance to cybersecurity standards such as those created by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST). By assessing their current cybersecurity strategies and
competencies against these standards, agencies determined what gaps existed in their processes and
practices as well as in their technical capabilities. This began to help them determine how exposed their
information assets were and the best ways to resolve those security control issues.
From a functional standpoint, government agencies needed to build more robust security-focused cultures
that monitor, measure, and manage cybersecurity behaviors. Once this had been initiated, agencies then
concentrated on pushing out cyber risk management activities to the rest of their organizations. Providing
the right visibility to, and understanding of, cyber risks to the broader organization was found to be
critical to success in mitigating them quickly and minimizing their impacts.
Collaboration and communication of potential and real cybersecurity events and attack scenarios showed
that such activities facilitated agencies working better together. This information sharing assisted agencies
in better understanding cyber incidents that had the potential to affect agencies and other public
organizations. By identifying critical points of failures, decision criteria, and barriers to progress,
government agencies had developed better cyber defense strategies that speeded remediation from
breaches and prevented similar events from occurring in the future. In the Heritage Foundation’s report,
one of the key takeaways was that the United States government should continue to focus on securing its
own networks while collaborating with the private sector and international communities on better
understanding cyber risks. (Walters, 2018).
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In order to change the behaviors in government agencies, the numbers and types of cybersecurity threats
and vulnerabilities had been evaluated in more detail, including the activities of foreign and domestic
cyber threat actors and their attendant risks. This had shown the potential to speed up the implementation
of cyber risk management technologies to defend against these actors. This had also assisted with better
aligning cybersecurity strategies with those of the agencies’ operational missions. Government agencies
had not consistently created and tested cyber defense readiness plans. When done proactively, these
programs had success in ensuring that incident response and escalation procedures were widely
communicated and tested for their effectiveness. Additionally, this facilitated collaboration between
agencies to show how they jointly managed cyber incidents. In the law enforcement arena, programs like
the Department of Justice’s Building Communities of Trust initiative improved how federal and local law
enforcement groups worked together. (Wasserman, 2010).
Finally, government agencies had not had the appropriate levels of internal expertise required to make
better cybersecurity investment and program management decisions. Agencies needed to examine their
cybersecurity investments against leading practices and benchmarks, but this had not been done
consistently. In order to ensure agencies allocated their resources with a risk-based approach, they had
utilized mission objectives, benchmarks, and cybersecurity directions as guides. Government agencies
had approached their cybersecurity postures as an evolving landscape of increasing potential threats--one
that had required the ability to adapt to those risks. Proactive and mature cybersecurity programs had
needed the commitment from leaders to be able to invest wisely, create a culture of cyber innovation, and
maintain relevant and continuous training and awareness programs.

Business Cybersecurity Problems
Cybersecurity had become one of the most important issues facing businesses today. According to the
World Economic Forum’s 2018 Global Risks Report, both large-scale cyberattacks and major data
breaches or fraud were ranked among the top five most likely risks in the next decade (“The Global Risks
Report,” 2018). At the time of the case, companies had been required to deal with cybersecurity problems
head on because those issues have had significant impacts on the overall business operations as well as
the Information Technology (IT) infrastructure. This had become even more critical for those businesses
that were interconnected with third parties such as partners and suppliers. These interconnections exposed
all the business partners to cyber threats that had become more severe and frequent. As the numbers of
security risks had risen, businesses learned, to their dismay, that they faced more threats and more attacks
than ever before, many of which required more and faster cyber response and remediation capabilities
than were already in place.
As businesses expanded their interconnections and shared more information, the number of networks and
devices that required more comprehensive security controls increased as well. In recent years, 63 percent
of breaches were traced to third-party vendors, according to the Soha System’s 2016 survey on third-party
risk management (“Soha Systems' Survey,” 2016). The security of mobile telephones, tablet computers,
and other networkable devices had lagged in the implementation of cybersecurity controls too.
Additionally, new technology advances such as artificial intelligence and machine learning enabled threat
actors to create more malicious and sophisticated tools to use in their attacks.
If the statistics from recent global security breaches had been accurate indicators, the impacts of these
incidents clearly affected businesses and their partners as a group as well as individually. In a November,
2017 article on ComputerWeekly.com, incidents affecting infrastructure hosted by a third party cost small
businesses £106K on average, while large enterprises lost nearly £1.5M as a result of breaches affecting
suppliers they shared data with, and saw another £1.2M in expenditures because of insufficient levels of
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protection from providers of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) (Ashford, 2017). The threat environments
had changed, with hacking software and hackers themselves becoming much more advanced in both
capability and reach. Cyber terrorists had progressed in more economically-focused directions including
industrial espionage, corporate disinformation, market and financial manipulation, and disruption of
critical public and private infrastructures. They had done so without slowing their previous activities such
as data exfiltration, system ransom and extortion, and digital vandalism. Mitigating these threats had
required businesses to re-think the cybersecurity and business risk postures. In many cases, organizations
developed a more inclusive approach to enterprise risk management. Current thinking in business
strategies had required companies to reconsider how cyber risks affected the company as a whole,
including stakeholders like customers, partners, suppliers, industry groups, and regulators. The
ComputerWeekly.com article quoted Alessio Aceti, head of the enterprise business division at Kaspersky
Lab, a multinational Internet security and anti-virus provider, who stated (Ashford, 2017):
While cyber security incidents involving third parties prove to be harmful to businesses of all
sizes, their financial impact on a company had the potential to result in twice as much damage.
Because cybersecurity had been considered a business risk as well as a technology risk, integrating
monitoring for both of these risks into the company’s cybersecurity risk management program had
become essential. Cyber risks had impacted entire businesses operationally and financially, and seriously
damaged their reputations in the process. In such situations, businesses needed to continue evaluating,
updating, and communicating their cybersecurity policies, practices, business rules, training programs,
and other procedures to cause the requisite cultural changes required for better cybersecurity hygiene.
When done in a holistic way, cyber risk management had become a strategic weapon for better protecting
the company’s environment while maturing its cybersecurity capabilities at the same time. Companies
had approached this challenge by creating better new rules of engagement with their interconnected
business partners, such as contractual agreements in which both the company and its partners were
required to improve their cybersecurity programs and provide ways to demonstrate the maturity of the
programs. However, this change had not been adopted widely, and many businesses had not started to
collaborate with their partners in this area. A key reason was that businesses had not had technologies that
enabled them to communicate securely with their internal and external stakeholders to deal with mutual
cybersecurity risks.
In its 2016 Global 1000 survey, CGI, a leading independent information technology and business process
services firm, found that organizations that viewed security not only as a mandatory part of operations,
but also as an enabler to growth and change, maximized the benefits of digital transformation efforts. At
the same time, only 14% of clients who responded to the Global 1000 survey stated that they were at a
level of maturity where cybersecurity was a key part of their value propositions (CGI, 2016). In order to
move forward, companies had begun to take input from regulatory, industry, consumer, and other
stakeholder groups in order to mature their cybersecurity strategies and risk management systems. By
approaching cybersecurity as a business problem first, companies had been better able to create more
resilient operational frameworks that would improve their abilities to identify, respond to, and remediate
cyberattacks and mitigate any business interruptions more quickly and cost effectively.

Cybersecurity Standards Problems
Cybersecurity practitioners had reviewed security and control-related guidelines and standards to
determine which ones of the various government, industry, and independently developed guidelines
would be the best ones for them to utilize as they continued development on their cybersecurity programs.
Companies had been increasingly challenged by regulators, industry groups, and business partners to
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become savvier in the areas of maturing their cybersecurity programs and understanding their cyber risks.
However, as determined by a review of the academic literature (Fulford, 2017), there were a significant
number of cybersecurity and risk management frameworks used by cybersecurity practitioners that ranged
from rudimentary ones based on manual questionnaires using qualitative techniques to those that were
very complex utilizing strong quantitative and statistical measures. In January, 2018 the IT Governance
web site published a review of the most frequently adopted cybersecurity frameworks (Watson, 2018):





Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) – 47%
International Standards Organization (ISO) 27001/27002 – 35%
Center for Internet Security (CIS) Critical Security Controls – 32%
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Framework for Improving Critical
Infrastructure Security – 29%

While all of these frameworks had large numbers of adopters, the newer NIST Cybersecurity Framework
(NIST CSF) successfully combined qualitative and quantitative methods in an easy-to-use and
understandable format. This methodology, which was created in part from the older NIST 800 series
security and risk management approach, was found to map directly to most of the control requirements
and most of the other security frameworks, which would make it relatively easy to implement for many
companies and government agencies. To many companies, the ability to measure and understand cyber
risks on several levels internally and externally had become daunting challenges to companies’ enterprise
risk management programs. A framework, like the NIST CSF, that enabled companies to assess each
other’s cyber maturity and define collaboration in disseminating ways to better deal with risks across their
business ecosystem, regardless of industries involved or the technologies they used to interconnect and
exchange products, services, and--most importantly--information.
Current directions in cyber risk evaluation had been seeking a way for companies to “get credit” for the
work they were doing to mature their cybersecurity programs while simultaneously identifying cyber
risks and related security control gaps. This type of approach had helped senior executives rationalize
their investments in their technology footprints and attendant cybersecurity governance and management
practices. An overarching cybersecurity implementation and risk management methodology which
enabled companies in different industries and business practices to have common vocabulary and
taxonomy for discussing and understanding their cyber risks would be extremely beneficial to a variety of
industry and government organizations.
Such a methodology had assisted companies in standardizing and streamlining the implementation of
cyber risk management controls that were required by the establishment and operation of new business
technology interconnections. This had helped businesses to eliminate redundancies in security controls
and to increase the understanding of how effectiveness of those controls was measured. Companies had a
duty to be more cyber mature, including improving understanding the cyber risks related to their internal
and external technology interconnections, as well as their indirect interconnections (such as the
interconnections of their business partners’ partners).
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